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Summary 
 
The subjective perception and experience of characters in media such as novels, 
films, and virtual reality-based games and environments has long engaged interest 
(Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974; Lombard and Ditton, 1997; Maccoby and Wilson, 
1957; Horton and Wohl, 1956; Balázs, 1938). Especially in visually-based media, 
advances in sophisticated technology and computer animation, the desire to meet the 
challenge of high realism (MacGillivray, 2007; Maddock et al., 2005), and efforts to 
improve the usability of virtual reality (Geven et al., 2006; Power et al., 2002) have 
shifted attention to the affect on subjective experience of high realism in the 
anthropomorphic design of humanlike characters. This attention has been heightened 
by the general concern that greater realism does not necessarily predict a better 
reception of the character by the observer (Geller, 2008). One particular expression 
of this concern is summarized in the so-called Uncanny Valley Hypothesis (UVH) 
(Mori, 1970). The UVH suggests that particular degrees of anthropomorphic realism 
in the design of characters and objects (e.g., robots, prosthetic hand) elicit negative 
affective experience akin to various forms of avoidant behaviour, failing therefore to 
engage the user in the way that the character’s or object’s design intended. Though 
Mori did not subject his hypothesis to empirical examination, the UVH has influenced 
animators, video game designers, and roboticists in the design of anthropomorphic 
characters and robots and lead to a relatively new field of research.  
 
This new field is still in a formative stage in which many potential aspects of the 
impact on subjective experience of anthropomorphic characters and objects have yet 
to be investigated. The present thesis focuses on developing a better understanding 
of the dimension of human likeness (DHL) of the UVH. This focus was motivated by 
the fact that the UVH seeks to understand positively and negatively valenced 
affective experience as a function of human likeness along the DHL. While the 
examination of affective experience has received much attention, the way in which 
human likeness along the DHL is actually perceived has received no attention. Given 
the absence of any research on the DHL, the general inconsistencies in uncanny-
related findings to date, and the likelihood that the UVH’ conceptualization of human 
likeness does not reflect the way in which human likeness is perceived and 
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represented cognitively, three studies comprising in total seven experiments were 
conducted to develop more insight into the UVH. These studies used morph continua 
based on human and highly realistic computer-generated (avatar) faces to represent 
the DHL. 
 
Study A entitled “The human likeness dimension of the "uncanny valley hypothesis": 
behavioural and functional MRI findings” had two aims. The first aim was to 
determine whether the DHL could be defined in terms of effects of categorical 
perception (CP). In contrast to the UVH’ definition of the DHL as a linear perceptual 
dimension, the two behavioural experiments show that perceptual discrimination (PD) 
performance between faces along the DHL is enhanced in that region of the DHL at 
which the UVH anticipates that it should be attenuated. This is critical for the UVH 
because it assumes that attenuated PD (i.e., increased perceptual discrimination 
difficulty) evokes negative affective experience. These findings suggest that this 
prediction might be wrong (see Study C). The second aim was to examine the impact 
of processing category change along the DHL. The expectation was that 
categorization experience with novel nonhuman but highly humanlike faces would 
evoke a different pattern of neural activity than that evoked by human faces (for 
which there is everyday perceptual and categorization expertise). The event-related 
functional MRI study (the third experiment) confirmed this, showing that a change in 
category between (otherwise highly similar) sequentially presented faces evoked 
modulations of neural activity in brain regions associated with category learning and 
category uncertainty. Importantly, the pattern of regions was entirely different 
depending on whether the target of processing was an avatar or human face. This 
finding is important for the UVH and the DHL because it suggests that extremely 
similar nonhuman and human category faces represent different categorization 
problems that require dissimilar processes or strategies to resolve them. 
 
Study B “Category processing and the human likeness dimension of the uncanny 
valley hypothesis: eye-tracking data” followed up on this suggestion. It examined 
whether there is a difference in eye sampling behaviour when extracting perceptual 
information from faces of the DHL to determine the human versus nonhuman 
category membership of the faces. Differences were compared between categorically 
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unambiguous human and nonhuman faces and categorically ambiguous faces using 
the dependent measures total number of fixations and dwell time of fixations to facial 
features. Both the data for fixation number and dwell time confirmed the relative 
importance of the face feature hierarchy (eyes, nose, and mouth) across the DHL, 
but there were no further findings for fixation number. Categorization ambiguity did 
influence the relative amount of dwell time spent extracting visual information from 
the eye, nose, and mouth before making a category decision, but this effect applied 
only for unambiguous nonhuman compared with ambiguous faces. The behavioural 
data showed that category assignment of nonhuman faces is much faster than that of 
human faces, meaning that there is a categorization advantage for nonhuman faces. 
Considered together, the data show that categorically unambiguous nonhuman faces 
are processed differently than ambiguous or human faces. This difference is 
consistent with the idea that category decision making is generally influenced by a 
cognitive strategy that involves preferential detection of nonhuman-specifying rather 
than human-specifying perceptual information along the HDL. What this information 
might be was investigated in the final experiment of Study C.  
 
Study C entitled “Perceptual discrimination difficulty and familiarity in the Uncanny 
Valley” was based on consideration of the findings and conclusions of the 
experiments in Studies A and B. The critical feature of the UVH is the prediction that 
perceptual discrimination difficulty will evoke negatively valenced (i.e., uncanny) 
experience at that point along the DHL at which categorization is most ambiguous. In 
the first experiment of Study C, a perceptual discrimination task was used to 
delineate the profile of PD difficulty along the DHL. The findings clearly reject the 
implicit assumption underlying the UVH' prediction, showing that PD difficulty is in 
fact attenuated for categorically ambiguous faces and greatest for unambiguous 
human faces. In addition, and after controlling for physical differences, the data show 
a clear asymmetry in PD difficulty such that nonhuman faces (and ambiguous faces) 
are easier to discriminate than human faces. The second experiment replicated the 
findings of the first. Importantly, the second experiment tested the UVH’ predicted 
direction of the relationship between PD difficulty and affective experience (in the 
sense of the UVH' familiarity dimension). In contrast to the UVH, greater PD difficulty 
was associated with more positively rather than negatively valenced affective 
experience. Notably, this effect was actually strongest for those faces along the DHL 
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that were categorically most ambiguous. A third experiment examined a possible 
explanation for the asymmetry in PD difficulty along the DHL. This experiment found 
no evidence to suggest that the asymmetry in PD along the DHL is attributable to a 
differential processing strategy (i.e., processing avatars at a category and human 
faces at an individual level). But the data indicated that PD along the DHL generally 
relies on the coding of human likeness-specifying information relating to facial 
features such as the eyes, nose, and mouth and other features such as skin tone. In 
conclusion, the data strongly challenge the UVH by showing that the UVH' assumed 
distribution of PD difficulty along the DHL and the predicted relationship between this 
and feelings of familiarity is incorrect. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die subjektive Wahrnehmung und das Erleben von fiktiven Charakteren in 
verschiedenen Medien wie Romane, Filme, Videogames und Virtual Reality 
Environments erweckt seit langem intensives Interesse (Tellegen und Atkinson, 
1974; Lombard and Ditton, 1997; Maccoby und Wilson, 1957; Horton und Wohl 1956, 
Balázs, 1938). Vor allem im Bereich der visuell-basierten Medien haben Fortschritte 
in der ausgefeilten Technik und Computeranimation, kombiniert mit dem Ziel noch 
höheren Realismus zu erreichen (MacGillivray, 2007; Maddock et al, 2005) und die 
Benutzerfreundlichkeit der virtuellen Realität zu verbessern (Geven et al, 2006; 
Power et al, 2002), die Aufmerksamkeit von Forschern und Designers auf die Frage 
nach der Auswirkung sehr realistischer menschenähnlicher Charakteren auf 
subjektive Wahrnehmung und Erleben gelenkt.  
 
Dieses Interesse hat v.a. mit der Annahme zu tun, dass erhöhter Realismus im 
anthropomorphischen Design nicht unbedingt zu einer besseren Akzeptanz des 
Charakters führt (Geller, 2008). Diese Annahme wird wohl am besten in der 
sogenannten Uncanny Valley Hypothese (UVH) (Mori, 1970) zum Ausdruck 
gebracht. Die UVH legt nahe, dass insbesondere anthropomorphisch sehr 
realistische Charaktere und Objekte (zB. Roboter, Hand-Prothese)  einen negativen 
Affekt auslösen können. Obwohl Mori seine Hypothese nicht empirisch geprüft hat, 
ist der Einfluss der UVH auf Animatoren, Videospiel-Designer und Roboteringenieure 
dennoch groß (zB. Minato et al., 2006). Dieser Einfluss hat auch zu einem relativ 
neuen Bereich der Forschung geführt. 
 
Dieser Forschungsbereich befindet sich in einer frühen Phase, in der noch viele 
Aspekte der Auswirkung von anthropomorphen Charakteren und Objekten auf das 
subjektive Erleben unbekannt sind. Die Studien in dieser Abhandlung fokussieren auf 
die Entwicklung eines besseren Verständnisses der Dimension der 
Menschenähnlichkeit (DM) der UVH, d.h. wie Stimuli entlang der DM wahrgenommen 
werden, und wie diese Wahrnehmung im Zusammenhang zu erlebtem Affekt steht. 
Die UHV versteht das Auftreten von negativem und positivem Affekt in Abhängigkeit 
des Ausmasses an Menschenähnlichkeit entlang der DM. Bisherige Uncanny Studien 
haben sich auf die Affektdimension der UVH fokussiert, aber nichts ist darüber 
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bekannt, wie Menschenähnlichkeit entlang der DM wahrgenommen wird. Angesichts 
der inkonsistenten Befunde der bisherigen Uncanny Studien über den Uncanny-
Effekt, der fehlenden Kenntnisse über die DM, und der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die 
UVH-Konzeption der DM, wie Menschenähnlichkeit wahrgenommen und kognitiv 
repräsentiert wird, falsch ist, wurden drei Studien (bestehend aus insgesamt sieben 
Experimenten) durchgeführt. Jede Studie nutzt Morphkontinuen, um die DM zu 
repräsentieren. Die Kontinuen wurden auf Basis von Menschenbildern und höchst 
realistischen computergenerierten (Avatar) Bildern entwickelt.  
 
Studie A (Titel: "The human likeness dimension of the "uncanny valley hypothesis": 
behavioural and functional MRI findings") hatte zwei Ziele. Das erste Ziel war es, 
festzustellen, ob Effekte der kategorialen Wahrnehmung einen Einfluss auf die 
kognitive Repräsentation von Stimuli entlang der DM haben. Im Gegensatz zu der 
Definition der DM in der UVH, die die DM als eine lineare physikalische Dimension 
versteht, zeigten die beiden Verhaltensexperimente der Studie A, dass die  
perzeptuelle Diskriminierungsleistung entlang der DM sehr unterschiedlich (d.h. nicht 
linear) ist. Vor allem in dem Bereich der DM, in dem die UVH  annimmt, dass die 
perzeptuelle Diskriminierung schwieriger sein soll, war diese Leistung deutlich 
besser. Dieser Befund ist entscheidend für die UVH, weil sie vorhersagt, dass gerade 
die erhöhte Schwierigkeit der perzeptuellen Diskriminierung negativen Affekt auslöst. 
Diese Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass diese Vorhersage der UVH falsch sein könnte. 
Das zweite Ziel war es, die Auswirkungen der kategorialen Verarbeitung entlang der 
DM auf neuronale Prozesse zu untersuchen. Die ereignis-korrelierte funktionelle 
MRI-Untersuchung bestätigt, dass die kategoriale Verarbeitung von Avatar und 
Menschengesichtern zur Modulation neuronaler Aktivität in Hirnregionen führt, die mit 
kategorialem Lernen und kategorialer Ambiguität assoziiert sind. Dabei zeigte sich, 
dass das Muster an Hirnregionen unterschiedlich war, je nachdem, ob der Zeilreiz bei 
der kategorialen Verarbeitung ein Avatar oder ein Mensch war. Das unterschiedliche 
Muster ist assoziiert mit unterschiedlicher Kategorisierungserfahrung (d.h. für neue 
höchstrealistische Avatars im Vergleich mit typischen Menchengesichtern). Diese 
Feststellung ist wichtig für den UHV, weil sie schlussfolgern lässt, dass die 
Verarbeitung von sehr realistischen Avatars und Menschen unterschiedliche 
Kategorisierungprobleme darstellen, die durch unterschiedliche Prozesse oder 
kognitive Strategien gelöst werden.  
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Studie B  ("Category processing and the human likeness dimension of the uncanny 
valley hypothesis: eye-tracking data") ging auf diese Schlussfolgerung ein und prüfte, 
ob es einen Unterschied bei kategorialen Wahrnehmungsentscheidungen in den 
Blickbewegungen gibt. Dabei dienen die Blickbewegungen dem Extrahieren von 
perzeptuellen Informationen zur Entscheidungsfindung. Dazu wurden die Variablen  
Fixationsdauer und Fixationshäufigkeit von bestimmten Gesichtsmerkmalen bis zum 
Zeitpunkt der Wahrnehmungsentscheidung erfasst und analysiert. Die Daten 
bestätigten die relative Bedeutung der Hierarchie der Gesichtsmerkmale (d.h. Augen, 
Nase, Mund in dieser Reihenfolge) entlang der gesamten DM. Die Daten zeigten 
aber auch, dass sich kategoriale Ambiguität auf die Fixationsdauer auf diese 
Gesichtsmerkmale auswirkte, aber nur im Vergleich zwischen eindeutigen Avatars 
und uneindeutigen Gesichtern. Die Verhaltensdaten zeigten einen 
Kategorisierungsvorteil für die nicht-menschlichen Gesichter, in dem die 
Kategorisierung von Avatars deutlich schneller war als die von Menschengesichtern. 
Zusammen berücksichtigt, sprechen die Befunde dafür, dass kategoriale 
Wahrnehmungsentscheidungen entlang der DM durch eine Klassifizierungsstrategie 
beeinflusst wird, in der perzeptuelle Information, die diagnostisch ist, für die 
Nichtmenschenkategorie präferentiell kodiert wird.  
 
 
Studie C ("Perceptual discrimination difficulty and familiarity in the Uncanny Valley") 
basierte auf die Erkenntnisse und Schlussfolgerungen aus den Experimenten in 
Studien A und B. Die UVH macht die Vorhersage, dass Schwierigkeit bei der 
perzeptuellen Diskriminierung zwischen Stimuli der DM mit negativen Affekt (d.h. den 
Uncanny Effekt) einhergeht. Dabei soll der Uncanny Effekt an dem Punkt entlang der 
DHL auftreten, an dem die kategoriale Ambiguität zwischen Exemplare der 
Menschen- und der Nichtmenschenkategorie am grössten ist. Im ersten Experiment 
wurde das Profil der Schwierigkeit der perzeptuellen Diskriminierung (PD) entlang 
der DM erfasst. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass die implizite Annahme der 
UVH, dass PD Schwierigkeit an diesem Punkt am grössten ist, widerlegt werden 
kann. Im Gegensatz dazu, zeigten die Daten verbesserte PD für die kategorial 
uneindeutigen Gesichtern und grösste PD Schwierigkeit für die Menschenkategorie. 
Die Daten zeigen auch eine klare Asymmetrie in PD entlang der DM, in dem 
zwischen nicht-menschlichen Gesichtern generell leichter zu diskriminieren ist als 
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zwischen  Menschengesichtern. Das zweite Experiment repliziert die Ergebnisse des 
ersten. Das zweite Experiment prüfte auch die in der UVH vorhergesagte Richtung 
der Beziehung zwischen PD Schwierigkeiten und erlebten Affekt (d.h. im Sinne der 
Familiaritätsdimension der UVH). Im Gegensatz zur Vorhersage der UVH ging 
zunehmende PD Schwierigkeit mit zunehmend positivem statt negativem Affekt 
einher. Dabei war dieser Effekt tatsächlich am stärksten für die kategorial 
uneindeutigen Gesichter der DM. Ein drittes Experiment untersuchte eine mögliche 
Erklärung für die Asymmetrie der PD Schwierigkeiten entlang der DHL. Dieses 
Experiment fand aber keinerlei Hinweise darauf, dass diese Asymmetrie auf eine 
Differentielle Verarbeitungsstrategie zurückzuführen ist (d.h., die Verarbeitung von 
Avatars auf der Kategorienebene und die menschlichen Gesichter auf der 
individuellen Ebene). Die Daten des dritten Experiments sprechen aber dafür, dass 
die perzeptuelle Diskriminierungsleistung entlang der DM generell auf die Kodierung 
von perzeptuellen Merkmalen (wie Augen, Nase und Mund) und andere Merkmale 
wie die Hauttextur (Farbe, Schattierung) beruht. Schlussfolgernd sagen die Daten 
aus, dass die in der UHV angenommene Verteilung der PD Schwierigkeiten entlang 
der DHL wie auch die vorhergesagte Richtung der Beziehung zwischen PD  
Schwierigkeiten und Affekt (d.h. Familiarität) sehr wahrscheinlich falsch ist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Inspired by informal observation of the emotionally aversive responses of individuals 
to their encounter with human-like robots, Mori (1970) put forward the Uncanny 
Valley Hypothesis (UVH). Though vague in its formulation, the UVH proposes a 
nonlinear relationship between an entity's degree of physical human likeness, defined 
along the UVH’s dimension of human likeness (DHL) and the subjective experience 
of positively or negatively valenced feelings and cognitive evaluations in response to 
that entity. This experience is defined along the UVH’s affective dimension of 
familiarity (see Figure 1). The key feature of this relationship is the prediction that 
individuals will experience a state of personal discomfort due to difficulty 
distinguishing a realistic humanlike entity (e.g., industrial robot, lifelike prosthetic 
hand, human corpse, mannequin) from its natural human equivalent. This state is 
described as including feelings of strangeness and the uncanny. This uncanny effect 
is reflected in a sharp negative peak or valley (thus dubbed the uncanny valley) in the 
slope of Mori's depiction of the relationship between human likeness and subjective 
experience.  
 
The longstanding UVH has only recently evoked research interest (e.g., Hanson, 
2005). The aim of this thesis is to develop further insight into the underlying notions 
of the UVH. It does so by introducing to uncanny-related research a focus on the 
DHL. The reason for this focus is that the UVH and research guided by it aims to 
understand affective experience of as a function of human likeness. In defining 
affective experience this way, a better understanding of the subjective perception of 
human likeness along the DHL is critical, especially in view of the general 
inconsistencies in findings to date in uncanny-related research and the UVH’ 
conceptualisation of human likeness along the DHL. Given the absence of any 
research on the DHL, Chapter 2 of this thesis brings together the essential elements 
of uncanny-related research that form the theoretical background for the studies of 
this thesis and the issues in uncanny research that these studies seek to address. 
These studies are presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis 
with a summary of the results of these studies and a general discussion. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the non-linear relationship between positively and negatively 
valenced subjective experience (i.e., the UVH’ dimension of familiarity) and perceived human 
likeness (i.e., along the UVH’ dimension of human likeness). The otherwise positive 
relationship shows a sharp negative peak (i.e., uncanny valley) at the level of realism at 
which fine-grained differences in appearance and behaviour between a highly realistic 
nonhuman entity and the human equivalent is suggested to elicit a sense of strangeness and 
personal discomfort, that is, an uncanny feeling (illustration from MacDorman, 2006). 
2. Theoretical background 
 
The progress of recent years in robotics and computer graphics in the realistic 
simulation of human appearance and behaviour in conjunction with ongoing 
uncertainty as to the real influence of enhanced anthropomorphism on subjective has 
spurred interest in the UVH in relation to the design of anthropomorphic robots and 
computer-generated characters experience (e.g., Ho & MacDorman, 2010; Minato et 
al., 2004; Woods et al., 2004; Walters et al., 2008; Fabri et al., 2004; Tinwell and 
Grimshaw 2009). This uncertainty has been fuelled in part by the intuitive appeal of 
the UVH and by anecdotal “evidence” indicating that high realism in computer 
animations of various feature films and featurettes (Ho and MacDorman 2010; 
MacDorman et al., 2009; Tinwell and Grimshaw 2009) and modern robots, for 
example, the Geminoid HI-1 and Repliee Q2 robots (Saygin et al., 2011; Becker-
15 
 
Asano, 2010) can evoke a sense of disquiet. From this, a new domain of research 
has evolved that is very much in its formative stage.  
 
This stage is characterised by a process toward understanding and specifying more 
clearly the general research problem stated in the UVH and the approach to its 
investigation. This process is apparent in the initial exploratory studies of the uncanny 
problem presented in the UVH (Hanson, 2005; MacDorman, 2006), subsequent 
doubt and criticism (Hanson, 2006), search for new supporting data (Seyama and 
Nagayama, 2007), formation of new ideas and opinions, such as the  mismatch 
hypothesis (e.g., Ho et al., 2008; MacDorman et al., 2009), early suggestions and 
debate about possible underlying mechanisms of the uncanny effect (e.g., reviewed 
in MacDorman et al., 2009), compilation of available data and ideas (Pollick, 2009), 
introduction of empirically well-founded psychological methods and concepts to 
investigate the UVH (e.g., Cheetham et al, 2011; Saygin et al, 2011; Looser and 
Wheatley, 2011), and first signs of converging lines of thought and subsequent 
empirical and theoretical enquiry (e.g. Cheetham et al, 2013; Saygin et al, 2013; 
Looser and Wheatley, 2011, Yamada et al, 2012; Rhodes, 2012). Reflecting the early 
stages of enquiry and uncertainty as to concepts and measurement, this processes 
has include empirical studies favouring and studies failing to substantiate the notion 
of the uncanny effect (e.g., Green et al., 2008; MacDorman, 2005; MacDorman et al., 
2009; Tinwell & Grimshaw, 2009; Hanson, 2006; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006; 
Brenton et al., 2005, Bartneck et al., 2007). 
 
There are a number of reasons for this inconsistency in findings to date. These 
largely stem from one common problem: Mori did not embed his insightful ideas in 
any kind of scientific empirical framework within which to specify his terminology and 
to operationally define his conjectures for empirical testing. The UVH provides only a 
vague though illustrative description of a number of loosely related behaviours, 
feelings and affective evaluations. Mori refers to these collectively as shinwakan. This 
is an ambiguous Japanese neologism, the actual meaning of which is not clear. 
There have therefore been various renderings of it in translation, with shinwakan 
being investigated in terms of affective dimensions such as likability, pleasantness, 
and familiarity (i.e., familiar vs. strange) (e.g. Green et al., 2008; Seyama & 
Nagayama, 2009, 2007; Dill et al., 2012; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006; Tinwell & 
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Grimshaw 2009; Bartneck et al., 2007; Tinwell et al., 2011). Reflecting this construct 
problem, Mori (2012) recently and vaguely re-defined shinwakan as affinity. 
Nevertheless, the UVH speculates that shinwakan has a negative (i.e., the uncanny 
effect, or bikumi as Mori calls it) or positive character as a function of physical 
humanlike realism in appearance and motion. This speculation does convey a sense 
of the general problem that Mori envisaged. But its formulation in pre-scientific 
(everyday) and ambiguous terms that lack clear construct and operational definitions 
of shinwakan and bikumi as well as the lack of a clear specification of the relationship 
between these and humanlike realism renders the UVH unamenable to empirical 
testing without augmenting the UVH with further assumptions, or auxiliary 
hypotheses (Poundstone, 1988).  
 
These auxiliary assumptions are needed in order to deal with a second likely reason 
for inconsistencies in findings to date. The appeal of the UVH is that it describes the 
notion of positive and negative subjective responses to humanlike objects in a simple 
and straightforward way. But the description does not reflect the likely complexity of 
the phenomenon the UVH seeks to characterize (Hodgins et al., 2010; Tinwell et al., 
2009). From the perspective of psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the positively 
or negatively valenced response to and experience of humanlike entities (e.g., 
empathic feelings, emotional engagement, approach and avoidance behaviors, 
experience of eeriness, uncanny feelings) will be the result of a complex interplay of 
perceptual, cognitive and affective mechanisms and underlying neural processes 
(see e.g., Cheetham et al., 2009). This complexity is hinted at in initial neuroimaging 
studies of the relationship between perceived human likeness and neural processing 
in various cognitive domains and in the experimental paradigms used in these 
studies to disentangle and isolate components of the perception and experience of 
humanlike entities (Looser et al., 2012; Cheetham et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2010; Chaminade et al. 2010; Krach et al., 2008; Hegel et al., 2008; 
Gazzola et al., 2007; Chaminade et al., 2007; Tai et al., 2004). 
 
While multiple psychological mechanisms will underpin this experience and require, 
therefore, the application of various methodological strategies and paradigms to 
assess this experience, uncanny–related research has almost exclusively relied on 
the use of ad hoc developed self-rating scales to assess subjective experience (e.g., 
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Tinwell et al., 2010; MacDorman et al., 2009a, 2009b; Seyama and Nagayama, 
2009; Green et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2008; MacDorman, 2006; Hanson, 2006; see also 
Looser and Wheately, 2011). The methodological reliance on self-rating scales has 
been favoured because these are inexpensive and easy to administer (see e.g., Ho 
et al., 2007). But the lack of construct specification in the UVH has left researchers 
faced with the general complexity of affective experience itself and its measurement 
(Nielsen and Kaszniak, 2007). A first real step toward alternative assessment 
strategies has been undertaken by Ho and MacDorman (2010), who constructed a 
multi-axes set of indices to capture subjective perception of humanness and 
experience of the uncanny effect, though the process of psychometric validation does 
not appear to be concluded (cf. Lienert and Raatz, 1994). Critically, the heavy 
reliance on self-rating scales for evaluation of subjective state is that the cognitive-
evaluation process needed to for this is likely to interrupt the very pre-reflective 
experience of the humanlike entity that is of interest to the designer (Fahrenberg et 
al., 2007; Hegel et al., 2009; Eyssel et al., 2010).  
 
The reliance on one method neglects the potential advantage of using convergent 
(and non-convergent) findings that might result from the use of other methods as a 
means to informing the iterative process needed to refine and specify the UVH' 
conceptualisation and measurement.  Given that the UVH is not an empirically 
testable statement of a problem (cf. Hempel 1945) and perhaps better described as a 
non-scientific statement, pseudo-hypothesis or as conjecture (Popper, 2004), this 
iterative process would feed the development of scientific theory. The purpose of 
scientific theory would be to furnish the UVH with a coherent framework in which 
observed or experienced phenomena are clearly described on the basis of empirical 
evidence (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). This might extend beyond any evidence that 
substantiate the occurrence of uncanny feelings as a function of anthropomorphic 
realism (i.e., the uncanny effect) toward the generation of a well-developed uncanny 
valley theory that would incorporate predictive and explanatory knowledge as to 
when and why these feelings occur (e.g., Van de Ven, 1989; Gioia and Pitre 1990; 
Lynham, 2000, 2002). At present, the development of scientific theory in relation to 
the UVH has focussed on proposing theoretical accounts of the uncanny effect.   
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These explanatory accounts (reviewed in MacDorman et al., 2009) might be 
understood as implying that the uncanny effect is empirically well established (as a 
pre-condition for their explanation). This is in fact presumed in uncanny-related 
research suggesting how the designer should proceed to ensure that the humanlike 
character does not “fall” into the uncanny valley (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009a, 
2009b; Walters et al., 2008: for tool development to aid such design decision making, 
see Ho & MacDorman, 2010). Similarly, the uncanny effect has been used in 
empirical studies to explain the presence of unexpected findings and of participants’ 
negative responses to the appearance and behaviour of avatars or robots (e.g., 
Yamamoto et al., 2009; Aylett, 2004; Wages et al., 2004).  
 
But these explanatory accounts might also be viewed as exploratory attempts to 
explicate the meaning of the ambiguous UVH. Threat avoidance is one such account 
that is already hinted at in the UVH. One variant of this account that largely bypasses 
without reference to it the wealth of psychologcial literature on threat avoidance (e.g. 
Gray, 1982) is the avoidance of pathogens. This suggests that cues that may be 
interpreted as indicative of disease are thought to elicit feelings of unease. The 
exploratory nature of such accounts can be seen in subsequent empirical studies. 
For example, Hodgins et al. (2010) and Tinwell et al. (2011) adopted and examined 
this particular account by altering in their studies the animation of avatar’s facial 
features to generate the impression of muscular disease. Similarly, the mortality 
salience account (MacDorman, 2005), based on terror management theory, 
hypothesizes that feelings of unease are associated with the confrontation with death 
and with the awareness of our own mortality. This has account has been used for 
example in a study in which videos of horror game characters (e.g., vampires) were 
compare against photo-realistic and cartoon avatars (Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009).  
 
A further approach to the examination of the proposed uncanny effect that has 
received little attention is based on cognitive evaluations and attribution of mind, 
especially, concerning the perception of robots expressing a capacity for affective 
experience. This work revolves around the social cognitive Theory of Mind approach 
to ‘understanding others’. This entails the adoption by the observer of the other and 
explicit inference or evaluation of the mental state and feelings of the other (e.g. Fan 
et al. 2011). The initial findings of this approach indicate that robots are evaluated in 
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terms of the dimensions of agency and experience (Gray et al., 2007). Following this, 
Gray and Wegner (2012) lend support to the general notion of the UVH by showing 
that feelings of unease are induced when a machine is perceived to have the 
capacity to experience (i.e., to feel and to sense) but not agency (for the impact of 
inferential processing on experience of nonhuman entities, see also e.g., Waytz and 
Norton, 2014; Epley et al., 2008). Theory of Mind related processes have been 
investigated in connection with the UVH in neuroimaging research that reveal the 
recruitment of brain areas that subserve these evaluative mechanisms (e.g., 
Chaminade et al., 2007; Saygin et al., 2011). Processes of empathy that entail 
automatically sharing and implicitly generating a representation of the other entity’s 
affective state (e.g., Decety and Jackson, 2004) have as yet received almost no 
attention, possibly with the exception of (MacDorman et al., 2013). Motivated by 
Mori’s (2012) re-definition of shinwakan as empathy and affinity, MacDorman and 
colleagues’ undertook to examine the UVH in terms of empathy-related processing. 
They were unable to substantiate this new perspective. 
 
Uncanny-related research has largely focussed on the affective experience of 
humanlike entities (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2013;  Green et al., 2008; Seyama & 
Nagayama, 2009, 2007; Dill et al., 2012; MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006; Tinwell & 
Grimshaw 2009; Bartneck et al., 2007; Tinwell et al., 2011;  Minato et al., 2006; Fabri 
et al., 2004; Walters et al., 2008; MacDorman et al., 2009a; Ho and MacDorman, 
2010; Hanson, 2006; MacDorman, 2006; Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009). But the way 
in which human likeness along the DHL is subjectively perceived and cognitively 
represented has reviewed no attention. This question is critical for UVH because the 
UVH and uncanny-related researchers seeks to understand and to define subjective 
experience (i.e., shinwakan) as a function of perceived human likeness. The 
conceptual and experimental representation of the DHL is therefore of particular 
importance (Cheetham and Jancke, 2013).  
 
Consideration of the UVH’ conceptualisation of the DHL raises a number of issues. 
One way of understand the UVH and the illustrated curve is to view the shape of the 
curve and the objects depicted along it as a visual hyperbole (Roberts and Kreuz, 
1994). The purpose of the exaggerated valley in the shape of the curve and the 
objects named or depicted along it is to render meaning to the basic ideas presented 
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in the UVH. Arguably, the illustration is not intended to invite literal interpretation. But 
the influence of the UVH’ conceptualisation of the DHL is such that some studies 
have been guided by the illustrative depiction of the UVH (e.g., Tinwell and 
Grimshaw, 2009). These have used wide a range of stimuli that can be defined as 
varying along a perceptual dimension like human likeness. But there has been no 
control for visual cues of other perceptual dimensions that could confound with the 
processes under investigation, such as judgments of human likeness, perceptual 
discrimination performance, mind attributions, category judgements, or familiarity 
judgements along the DHL. For example, cues that relate to ethnicity, gender, facial 
distinctiveness, familiarity and identity, and facial expression confound with human 
likeness (Ho et al, 2008; Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; Hanson, 2006; MacDorman 
and Ishiguro, 2006). 
 
Another issue is that the UVH conceptualizes the DHL as a linear dimension of 
physical similarity space, the human end of which is represented by a single human 
category exemplar. Clearly, Mori focuses on the wide variation of potential physical 
forms of nonhuman objects. But the idea that the human image might be treated as a 
general point of reference, as adopted in investigations and theoretical consideration 
of the UVH (e.g., Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009; Ramey, 2005; Walters et al., 2008; 
Minato et al., 2006), implicitly assumes that variation in human likeness cannot be 
plotted along the DHL, that is, that human likeness does not vary within the human 
category. For this reason, the second positive peak in the hypothesis’ original 
familiarity-human likeness relationship is located at the human end of the DHL (see 
Fig.1). The emphasis on the nonhuman aspect of the DHL has been influential in 
studies guided by the hypothesis (e.g. Tinwell et al., 2011; Tinwell, 2009; Schneider 
et al, 2007). But this assumption is incorrect (e.g., Cheetham et al., 2011; Looser and 
Wheatley, 2011; Yamada et al., 2012).  
 
The preceding issue highlights one drawback of UVH–related research based on 
robots. The robot-based approach effectively places the focus of investigation of 
uncanny experience and subjective evaluations on entities that are clearly 
nonhuman. This in part because the researchers are specifically interested in the 
application of robots in different real-world contexts that are by design stylizations of 
the human ‘model’ (e.g., Walters et al., 2008; Minato et al 2008; Ho et al., 2008; 
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Green et al., 2008; Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Hegel et al., 2010). While some current 
robots do have features that permit a diversity of possible modulations in 
appearance, social expressiveness and biomimetic movement (e.g., Hegel et al., 
2010; Hegel et al., 2006;  RoboThespian, https://www.engineeredarts.co.uk), 
technological constraints on robotic design limit their use as a means to investigating 
the UVH. One essential reason for this is the point that the UVH is concerned – in its 
vague formulation - with the degree of nonhuman and human object similarity along 
the DHL at which difficulty making the distinction between nonhuman and human is 
most likely to evoke personal uncertainty and discomfort (i.e. at the point along the 
DHL characterised by the valley, see Fig 1). Empirical examination of the UVH 
requires therefore use of technology that allows experimentally controlled fine-
grained manipulation of humanlike appearance and behaviour (Cheetham and 
Jancke, 2013). The fine-grained approach is important because the UVH does not 
predict the actual degree of perceived human-like appearance or behaviour at which 
the transition between positively and negatively valenced emotions and cognitions 
should occur.  
 
One way to represent human likeness along the DHL is to generate morph continua 
(e.g., MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Hanson et al., 2005; Ho et al, 2008; Seyama  
and Nagayama, 2007; Hanson, 2006). The specific advantage of computer-graphics 
technology is that it permits experimentally controlled fine-grained manipulation of 
humanlike appearance and behaviour to be brought into relationship with behavioural 
measures of subjective perception and experience. While static and dynamic stimuli 
would aid investigation of the contribution of invariant (e.g., facial texture, facial 
configuration) and variant (e.g., emotional expression) information to perceptual, 
affective and cognitive processing of human like entries, as reflected in various 
studies of affect and facial and whole body processing (e.g., Karnadewi and Lipp, 
2011; Cloutier et al., 2008; Schindler et al., 2008),  uncanny-research using 
computer-graphics has focussed on the use of static stimuli. This reflects the interest 
in Mori’s suggestion that dynamic and non-dynamic stimuli or stimulus features 
modulate subjective experience differently and therefore the current focus on non-
dynamic perceptual features.  
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The use of morph continua to represent the DHL has been subject to confounding 
factors that have limited the internal validity of studies aiming to test the UVH.  These 
confounds include the use of two or even three different juxtaposed continua to 
represent the DHL (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Hanson, 2006). Though 
conducted to explore the uncanny effect described in the UVH, these juxtaposed 
continua effectively alter the UVH concept of human likeness and the ability to 
actually test the UVH by introducing perceptual discontinuities to the DHL (cf., 
Pastore, 1987). This means for example that equivalent increments of physical 
change along the DHL are not ensured. A central feature of the UVH is that 
perceptual difficulty discriminating between highly realistic humanlike entities and 
their human equivalent will evoke an unpleasant affective state. Controlling for 
physical differences between these entities along continua is therefore important for 
testing the UVH. A lack of experimental control is otherwise apparent in morphing 
artefacts resulting from the morphing of facial information like upper facial features 
and hair profile (Ho et al., 2008), using dissimilar continua parent images in which 
non-facial information such as head attire and facial jewellery are only present in one 
stimulus (Seyama and Nagayama, 2007), in the simultaneous presentation of human 
and nonhuman perceptual information in the same stimuli intended to represent the 
human end of the DHL (Hanson et al., 2005), and in morphing noise (i.e., disparities 
in the alignment of facial features between successive morphs of a continuum) in 
recent research (Yamada et al., 2012). 
 
Mori did not pursue his general notion of the uncanny effect any further or subject his 
hypothesis to empirical examination. The UVH and the problem that it poses can be 
understood in its pre-scientific formulation as representing the initial stage of scientific 
enquiry (Northrop, 1966). At this stage, it can be assumed that Mori had not 
developed the scientific hypotheses needed to examine the problem that he 
conceived of.  Exploratory thought is thus needed to specify more clearly the details 
and scope conditions (Cohen, 1989) of the UVH in such a way that the problem or 
aspects of it may be developed as testable hypotheses (Hempel, 1945). To this end, 
Mori’s visual hyperbole might be better conceived of as a useful heuristic device 
rather than the object of research itself. As such, this device renders the ideas in the 
UVH accessible to exploratory thought. This thought requires the use of background 
knowledge from psychology and other domains of science in order to introduce to the 
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UVH established terminology, concepts, and methods as a basis for hypothesis 
testing and for interpretation of findings (Fleck, 1979; Hempel, 1945; Northrop, 1966; 
Poundstone, 1988). For example, the well-established concepts and knowledge on 
perceptual and category processing, perceptual decision making and category 
perception (CP) (e.g., Harnad, 1987) can be used to develop and specify testable 
ideas. The aim of the three studies described in the following sections (and the total 
of 7 experiments therein) was to introduce such concepts and knowledge to the 
investigation primarily of the DHL.  
 
3. Study A. The human likeness dimension of the "uncanny valley 
hypothesis": behavioural and functional MRI findings 
 
3.1. Abstract 
 
The uncanny valley hypothesis (Mori, 1970) predicts differential experience of 
negative and positive affect as a function of human likeness. Affective experience of 
humanlike robots and computer-generated characters (avatars) dominates “uncanny” 
research, but findings are inconsistent. Importantly, it is unknown how objects are 
actually perceived along the hypothesis’ dimension of human likeness (DOH), 
defined in terms of human physical similarity. To examine whether the DOH can also 
be defined in terms of effects of categorical perception (CP), stimuli from morph 
continua with controlled differences in physical human likeness between avatar and 
human faces as endpoints were presented. Two behavioural studies found a sharp 
category boundary along the DOH and enhanced visual discrimination (i.e., CP) of 
fine-grained differences between pairs of faces at the category boundary. 
Discrimination was better for face pairs presenting category change in the human-to-
avatar than avatar-to-human direction along the DOH. To investigate brain 
representation of physical change and category change along the DOH, an event-
related fMRI study used the same stimuli in a pair repetition-priming paradigm. 
Bilateral mid-fusiform areas and a different right mid-fusiform area were sensitive to 
physical change within the human and avatar categories, respectively, whereas 
entirely different regions were sensitive to the human-to-avatar (caudate head, 
putamen, thalamus, red nucleus) and avatar-to-human (hippocampus, amygdala, 
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mid-insula) direction of category change. These findings show that Mori's DOH 
definition does not reflect subjective perception of human likeness and suggest that 
future “uncanny” studies consider CP and the DOH’s category structure in guiding 
experience of nonhuman objects. 
 
3.2. Introduction 
 
The uncanny valley hypothesis (Mori, 1970) proposes that observation of a 
humanlike object (e.g., industrial robot, lifelike prosthetic hand, human corpse, doll, 
mannequin) can evoke positive or negative feelings and cognitions (referred to here 
as valence) depending on the object’s degree of physical similarity to human 
appearance (for recent overviews, see e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009; Pollick, 2006). 
Importantly, the relationship between valence and human likeness is suggested to be 
non-linear. As illustrated in Fig. 1, valence increases positively with greater human 
likeness up to a level of relatively high realism at the first peak of the curve along the 
dimension of human likeness (DOH). Positive valence reflects the experience of 
emotional engagement with and feelings of empathy for the humanlike object. At 
greater degrees of realism, the observer encounters difficulty in distinguishing an 
object from its natural human counterpart and experiences personal discomfort. Mori 
characterises this discomfort as an uncanny feeling marked by a sense of 
strangeness, eeriness and disquiet that can extend to feelings of disgust and 
revulsion. This uncanny feeling is reflected in a sharp negative peak or valley (i.e., 
uncanny valley) in the slope of the depicted valence-human likeness relationship. 
When an object’s appearance is so realistic that it is perceived to be human the 
valence of associated affect and cognition is thought to reach a second positive 
peak.  
 
The hypothesis’ central prediction that individuals can feel less emotionally engaged 
or even distracted by relatively realistic humanlike objects has been very influential in 
guiding animators, video game designers, and roboticists in the design of virtual 
characters (e.g., Fabri et al., 2004) and robots (e.g., Minato et al., 2006). This has 
lead to research into how characters should be designed to avoid “falling” into the 
uncanny valley (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009a, 2009b; Walters et al., 2008) and into 
tool development to aid such design decision making (Ho & MacDorman, 2010). The 
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idea of the uncanny valley has also been used in empirical studies to account for 
unexpected findings and negative responses of participants to the appearance and 
behaviour of avatars or robots (e.g., Yamamoto et al., 2009; Aylett, 2004; Wages et 
al., 2004). In view of this interest, it is noteworthy that Mori did not subject his working 
hypothesis to empirical examination. In fact, research of the valence-human likeness 
relationship is in its infancy, largely focussing on the valence of subjective feelings 
and evaluations in response to variously realistic nonhuman characters. But findings 
have been inconsistent (e.g., Tinwell et al., 2010; Tinwell & Grimshaw, 2009; 
MacDorman, 2006; Hanson, 2006), this being in part attributable to the uncertainty 
surrounding Mori's vague definition of the valence dimension (e.g., MacDorman et 
al., 2009a; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007). In contrast, the way in which human 
likeness along the DOH is actually perceived has not been scrutinised.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the non-linear relationship between the experience of negative and 
positive affect (valence) and perceived human likeness. The otherwise positive relationship 
shows a sharp negative peak (i.e., uncanny valley) at the level of realism at which subtle 
differences in the appearance and behavior of a highly realistic yet discernibly unnatural 
humanlike object is suggested to elicit a sense of strangeness and personal discomfort (i.e., 
an uncanny feeling). Illustration adapted from MacDorman (2005b). 
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The hypothesis’ central prediction that individuals can feel less emotionally engaged 
or even distracted by relatively realistic humanlike objects has been very influential in 
guiding animators, video game designers, and roboticists in the design of virtual 
characters (e.g., Fabri et al., 2004) and robots (e.g., Minato et al., 2006). This has 
lead to research into how characters should be designed to avoid “falling” into the 
uncanny valley (e.g., MacDorman et al., 2009a, 2009b; Walters et al., 2008) and into 
tool development to aid such design decision making (Ho & MacDorman, 2010). The 
idea of the uncanny valley has also been used in empirical studies to account for 
unexpected findings and negative responses of participants to the appearance and 
behaviour of avatars or robots (e.g., Yamamoto et al., 2009; Aylett, 2004; Wages et 
al., 2004). In view of this interest, it is noteworthy that Mori did not subject his working 
hypothesis to empirical examination. In fact, research of the valence-human likeness 
relationship is in its infancy, largely focussing on the valence of subjective feelings 
and evaluations in response to variously realistic nonhuman characters. But findings 
have been inconsistent (e.g., Tinwell et al., 2010; Tinwell & Grimshaw, 2009; 
MacDorman, 2006; Hanson, 2006), this being in part attributable to the uncertainty 
surrounding Mori's vague definition of the valence dimension (e.g., MacDorman et 
al., 2009a; Seyama & Nagayama, 2007). In contrast, the way in which human 
likeness along the DOH is actually perceived has not been scrutinised.  
 
While Mori defined the DOH in terms of a linear change in the degree of physical 
humanlike similarity, we proposed that the subjective perception of objects along the 
DOH might be described differently, namely, in terms of the effects of categorical 
perception (for CP see, e.g., Harnad, 1987). Applied to the DOH, CP means that 
irrespective of physical differences in humanlike appearance objects along the DOH 
are treated as conceptually equivalent members of either the category 'nonhuman' or 
the category 'human', except at those levels of physical realism at the boundary 
between these two categories. At this category boundary, the available sensory 
evidence does not allow rapid and effortless discrimination of an object in terms of 
the observer’s category representations of nonhuman and human. Consistent with 
this, ambiguity in discriminating a humanlike object from its natural human 
counterpart lies at the heart of Mori's hypothesis, and, when no such ambiguity is 
experienced, Mori implicitly assumes that the observer assigns his or her sensory 
impressions of an object to the nonhuman or the human category. The defining 
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feature of CP is considered to be enhanced discrimination of pairs of different stimuli 
that are perceptually adjacent (along a dimension such as the DOH) but straddle 
opposite sides of the category boundary (such as between the categories human and 
nonhuman) and poorer discrimination of pairs of different stimuli from within a given 
category (Pastore, 1987). In other words, the ability to discriminate between 
physically different stimuli might not be the same at all points along the DOH, with 
enhanced sensitivity for objects closest to the category boundary (for CP criteria, see 
e.g., Studdert-Kennedy et al., 1970).  
 
It is important to note that CP does not occur along any human likeness dimension. 
Campbell et al. (1987) found CP for faces of humans and cows but not for humans 
and monkeys. CP and indeed processing of the human category along Mori’s DOH 
has not been investigated. In fact, a prominent feature of Mori’s hypothesis is that it 
does not consider the possibility that objects assigned to the human category might 
also differ in the degree of humanlike similarity along the DOH. Our interest in 
understanding the categorical structure of the DOH is based on the assumption that 
negatively valenced or uncanny experience is likely to occur in association with 
categorisation ambiguity for stimuli at or closest to either side of the nonhuman-
human boundary. For this, the human category and the potential impact of CP on 
processing objects along the full length of the DOH need to be considered. The 
present investigation focused therefore on the subjective perception of human 
likeness rather than on valence in order to provide a clear theoretical-psychological 
framework for further studies of uncanny experience. 
 
Two behavioural and one neuroimaging study was conducted. The behavioural 
studies aimed to demonstrate that subjectively assigned human faces do vary in 
humanlike appearance within the human category along the DOH and to test the 
proposal that subjective perception of human likeness along the DOH shows effects 
of CP. To represent the DOH, linear continua of morphed faces were generated 
using avatar and human faces as endpoints to create a controlled transition of 
physical similarity between them. Using stimuli drawn from these continua, the first 
study entailed a forced-choice classification task to determine the presence and 
location of the avatar-human category boundary, and the second used a perceptual 
discrimination task to determine the presence and location of the discrimination 
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boundary (i.e. the point of enhanced perceptual discrimination) and thus to verify CP. 
The subsequent neuroimaging study used functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to investigate nonhuman-human category processing in the brain. The first 
aim of this was to show that distinctly different brain regions are responsive to 
processing the physical similarity of faces along the DOH and to processing the 
DOH’s discrete human and nonhuman categories. For this, we used a pair-repetition 
priming paradigm (for reviews see, Henson, 2003; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001). 
This paradigm entailed the presentation of stimulus trials, each comprising a pair of 
faces (i.e. prime and target) displayed in quick succession, and the measurement of 
the physiological BOLD response to the primed targets as an indicator of neural 
activity. Repetition in the target of information presented in the prime has been shown 
to induce neural adaptation (i.e. attenuation of neural activity) in brain areas 
selectively responsive to processing the repeated information (e.g., Grill-Spector et 
al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2006). This neural adaptation effect and its regional 
localisation have been successfully used to disentangle regions responsive to 
physical and category change (e.g., Jiang et al., 2007; Rotshtein et al., 2005).  
 
We focussed in the fMRI study on category change, hypothesising that implicit 
processing of the discrete change in category between our prime and target stimuli 
would modulate neural activity in regions associated with category learning and 
categorisation uncertainty, that is, basal ganglia, medial temporal lobe, thalamus, 
medial frontal gyrus, and the anterior insula (e.g., Fleming et al., 2010; Seger & 
Miller, 2010; Li et al., 2009; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Grinband et al., 2006). Mori 
focussed in his informal description of the hypothesis on the situation in which a 
nonhuman object is initially mistaken for human. The second aim of this fMRI study 
was to explore the possibility that the anticipated effects of category change in these 
brain regions might be different depending on the actual direction of category change 
between the stimuli used as prime and target, that is, in the human-to-avatar direction 
along the DOH (i.e., human as prime and avatar as target) or the avatar-to-human 
direction (i.e. avatar as prime and human as target). The basis for this idea was that 
different brain regions (e.g. in the basal ganglia and medial temporal lobe) are known 
to be differentially modulated depending on categorisation experience with a given 
category (e.g., Poldrack et al., 1999). Given the asymmetrical category knowledge of 
our participants with human and novel nonhuman faces, we assumed that this 
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differential effect might similarly apply for category processing along the DOH in 
individuals with little or no experience of our nonhuman stimuli. Category-related 
processing of highly realistic and potentially biologically salient human-like faces 
might also modulate neural responses in further regions specifically associated with 
appraisal of affective valence (e.g., Vuilleumier, 2005) or processing under conditions 
of valence ambiguity (e.g., Herwig et al., 2007). We explored this, anticipating 
involvement of regions commonly associated with affective processing, especially the 
amygdala (e.g., Todorov & Engell, 2008; Herwig et al., 2007).  
3.3. Material and methods 
 
Participants 
Healthy male and female, consistently right-handed (Annett, 1970) adult volunteers 
with no record of neurological or psychiatric illness and no current medication use 
volunteered for one of the three studies. All participants were students of the 
University of Zurich, native speakers of Swiss-German or Standard German, reported 
having no explicit experience with avatars such as those used in video games, virtual 
role playing games, or second life, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Written informed consent was obtained before participation according to the 
guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. Each volunteer received 20 Swiss Francs 
for participation. The study and all procedures and consent forms were approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the University of Zurich. 
 
Stimuli 
Avatar-human morph continua were generated to represent Mori's DOH. The 
selected stimuli for use as endpoints in the morphing procedure were 32 
photographic images of unknown people and 32 facial images of avatars, together 
forming 32 morph continua (see Fig, 2.B). All faces were male, presented with full 
face, frontal view and neutral expression. The avatars were generated with the 
modelling suite Poser 7 (Smith Micro Software, http://www.smithmicro.com), which 
permits considerable texture detail and control over the facial mesh. The facial 
geometry and texture of the avatars were modelled (age and configural cues) to 
closely match the human counterpart to minimise perception of biological motion 
during quick successive presentation of faces (e.g. Schultz & Pilz, 2009). The images 
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were edited in Adobe Photoshop CS3, masking external features with an elliptic form 
and black background (72 dpi and 560 x 650 pixels). Contrast levels, overall 
brightness and skin tone of each pair of colour images of faces used as the 
endpoints of each continuum were adjusted to match before morphing. Morpher 3.3 
(Zealsoft Inc., Eden Prairie, MN) was used to generate the linear morph continua. 
Each continuum comprised 13 different morphed images. These images or morphs 
were labelled M0 (beginning with the avatar endpoint) through to M12 (at the human 
endpoint), each morph representing a difference in physical appearance at 
increments of 8.33%.  
 
All morphs (i.e., M0 to M12) were presented in the forced choice classification task of 
study 1. As described in the following, only those morphs representing increments of 
33.33% in physical difference along each continuum (i.e., M0, M4, M8, M12) were 
used for the subsequent perceptual discrimination task of study 2 and the target-
monitoring task in the (fMRI) study 3. 
3.4. Experiment 1: Forced choice classification 
 
A two-alternative forced-choice classification task was conducted to determine the 
presence of a sigmoid shaped response function along the avatar-human morph 
continua. This response function is considered to indicate a category boundary 
(Harnad, 1987). 
 
Participants  
 
N=25 volunteers (13 female, mean age 21.8 years; range 19 - 28 years) participated.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
All participants were tested individually. Each participant received written instructions 
presented on the screen before commencement of the experiment. A practice pre-
test of 5 trials using stimuli from continua not included in the main test was then 
performed to ensure that the instructions had been understood. It was again ensured 
that participants understood the meaning of the word avatar. All morph stimuli were 
presented individually in random order for a total presentation of 416 trials. Each trial 
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began with the presentation of a fixation point for 500ms (participants were required 
to maintain fixation), followed by a morph image for 750ms. The participant was 
asked to identify the stimulus as either an avatar or human as quickly and precisely 
as possible by pressing one of two response keys. A black screen with fixation point 
remained after morph image presentation until the participant pressed a key, after 
which a blank black screen without fixation cross remained for 1500 ms until the next 
trial began. The task was conducted in a sound attenuated and light-dimmed room, 
and morph stimuli were presented on a LCD monitor (1280 x 1024 resolution, 60 Hz 
refresh rate, at eye-to-monitor viewing distance of 62 cm), using Presentation® 
software (Version 14.1, www.neurobs.com)  
 
Analyses 
 
The classification data were summarised by the shape of the avatar-human 
classification curve as described by the slope of the response function. The slope 
was determined by fitting logistic function models to the response data of each 
participant and continuum, and the parameter estimates were derived. Individual 
continua were analysed across participants to ensure best fit of logistic functions, 
these reflecting a step-like shape in the avatar-human classification curve and thus a 
categorical component (Harnad, 1987). To test for a step-like shape across all 
continua, the derived parameter estimates for the logistic function of each continuum, 
averaged across participants, were tested against zero in a one-sample t-test. This 
and the average boundary value (i.e. the morph position associated with greatest 
decision uncertainty) of the fitted logistic curves are reported. SPSS 16 was used for 
data analysis.  
 
3.5. Experiment 2: Perceptual discrimination 
 
A variant of the same-different discrimination task (e.g., Angeli et al., 2008) was 
performed to determine CP along the morph continua. Participants judged whether 
the presented faces of a face pair were both the same or different in appearance. 
Greater performance accuracy in "different" judgements for face pairs that are 
perceptually adjacent (and therefore physically different along the avatar-human 
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continua) but straddle opposite sides of a category boundary (as determined in the 
preceding task) is taken as evidence of CP (Pastore, 1987).  
 
Participants  
 
N = 20 participants (9 female, mean age 25.1 years; range 18 - 30 years) were 
tested. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
The choice of continua for use in this task was determined on the basis of the results 
(see Results section 3.1.) of the preceding forced choice classification task. Four 
morphs M0 and M4 (categorised as avatars) and M8 and M12 (categorised as 
human) were selected from each of the continua (see Fig. 2B), with M4 and M8 
straddling the category boundary. M0, M4, M8, and M12 represent increments of 
33% along the length of each continuum to ensuring control of physical dissimilarity.  
For the perceptual discrimination task, stimulus trials were presented that each 
comprised a pair of faces (see Fig. 3). The first face of a face pair was either an 
avatar or a human. Trials in which the first face was an avatar are referred to as 
'avatar' trials (see Fig. 3, C) and those in which a human face was presented first are 
referred to as 'human' trials (see Fig. 3, D). In the avatar trials, the first face was 
always the avatar morph M4, and the first face in the human trials was always the 
human morph M8. The choice of the second face of each face pair was determined 
according to three different face pair conditions: 'within' category face pairs (both 
faces drawn from within a category), 'between' category face pairs (first and second 
face morphs lying either side of the category boundary), and the 'same' stimulus face 
pairs (faces of a pair are identical). In the within category condition, the second face 
was morph M0 for avatar trials and M12 for human trials. In the between category 
condition, the second face was morph M8 for avatar trials and M4 for human trials. In 
the 'same' stimulus condition, M4 was used as the first and second face for avatar 
trials and M8 as the first and second face for human trials. Based on these 
conditions, the presentation of face pairs was therefore as follows: Avatar trials 
comprised the face pair morphs M4 - M0 for the within, M4 - M4 for the same, and 
M4 – M8 for the between conditions, and humans trials comprised the face pair 
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morphs M8 – M12 for the within, M8 – M8 for the same, and M8 – M4 for the 
between conditions.  
 
Both faces of each face pair were always drawn from the same continuum in which 
they were originally morphed. The presentation of face pairs was pseudo-randomised 
so that no trials of face pairs from within the same continuum were shown in close 
sequence. The presentation of avatar or human trials from a given continuum was 
determined randomly but counterbalanced across all participants in such a way as to 
ensure that each participant viewed either avatar or human trials from any given 
continuum, and that in total an equal number of avatar or human trials were viewed. 
Each face of a face pair was presented for 500ms with an inter stimulus interval (ISI) 
of either 75ms or 300ms between the faces of a pair. This was to determine whether 
ISI duration would differentially impact judgements (see, e.g., Rotshtein et al., 2005). 
Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was 2,500ms between trials of face pairs. Please 
note that these features of the experimental design of stimulus presentation were 
also carried over to the fMRI investigation of Study 3 (and are therefore not described 
again in the Materials and Procedure section of Study 3). This experimental design 
allowed within category effects for faces from the avatar category and for faces from 
the human category to be examined, and the effects of category change between 
face pairs comprising an avatar and a human face to be examined in both directions 
along the DOH, that is, in the avatar-to-human and human-to-avatar directions.  
 
The task was conducted in a sound attenuated and light-dimmed room, and morph 
stimuli were presented on a LCD monitor (1280 x 1024 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate, 
at eye-to-monitor viewing distance of 62 cm), using Presentation® software (Version 
14.1, www.neurobs.com)  
 
Analyses 
 
To examine discrimination accuracy for face pairs that crossed the category 
boundary compared with face pairs from the same side of the boundary, the 'different' 
responses (indicating the judgement that both faces of a pair were of different 
physical appearance) were computed as proportions of the total number of face trials 
and subjected to 3 x 2 ANOVA, with 3 face-pair conditions (within, between, same) 
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and 2 ISI (short and long). The data for avatar trials and human trials were treated 
separately in analysis. Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to correct the 
degrees of freedom whenever the assumption of sphericity was violated. SPSS 16 
was used for data analysis. 
 
3.6. Experiment 3: Target monitoring and fMRI 
 
Participants  
 
N = 22 volunteers (10 female; mean age, 21.9 years; range, 19-27) participated in 
the fMRI study.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
A pair-repetition paradigm with a target-monitoring task was applied. The stimulus 
conditions (i.e. the morph stimuli for the face pairs in the within, same and between 
conditions in the avatar and human trials, and the presentation times for the stimuli, 
ISI, and SOA) were the same as described in the preceding perceptual discrimination 
task.  
 
The target-monitoring task required participants to press a response button upon 
detection of one of four possible up-turned rare target faces (M0, M4, M8 or M12) 
selected at random from an unused morph continuum. This was to ensure attention 
of the participants to the stimuli of interest. This task requires no explicit judgements 
of human or avatar category or physical similarity of faces, thus eliminating the 
confounding effects on BOLD signal modulation by motor response requirements 
(Henson 2003). Differential attention to prime and target was avoided in that the up-
turned target face was presented as the first or second face of a face pair trial. There 
were 192 trials of face pairs, 15% of this trial number being in addition rare target 
faces and 25% in addition null events with fixation cross but no face stimuli. 
Participants were required to maintain fixation. Each scanning session consisted of 
two experimental runs. The visual stimuli were presented using the "VisuaStim - 
Digital" MRI-compatible head-mounted display (Resonance Technology Inc.), with a 
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visual mono display, resolution of 800 x 600, and 30° field of view. The total scanning 
time was approximately 26 minutes.  
 
fMRI data acquisition  
 
Structural and functional images were acquired using a 3T whole-body MR unit 
(Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) and eight-channel Philips SENSE 
head coil. Structural images of the entire brain were registered using a T1-weighted 
three-dimensional, spoiled gradient echo pulse sequence (180 slices, TR = 20 ms, 
TE = 2.3 ms, flip angle = 20°, FOV = 220 mm × 220 mm x 135 mm, matrix size = 224 
x 187, voxel size = 0.98 mm × 1.18 mm × 0.75 mm, resliced to 0.86 mm x 0.86 mm x 
0.75 mm). Functional images were acquired from 225 whole-head scans per run 
using a Sensitivity Encoded (SENSE) (Pruessmann et al., 1999) single-shot 
echoplanar imaging technique (repetition time, TR = 2.6 s; echo time, TE = 35 ms; 
field of view = 220 mm × 220 mm × 132 mm; flip angle = 78°; matrix size = 80 × 80; 
voxel size = 2.75 mm × 2.75 mm × 4 mm, resliced to 1.72 mm x 1.72 mm x 4 mm). 
Susceptibility artefacts in temporal cortices were reduced by adjusting the slice tilt to 
30° from the transverse plane (Weiskopf et al., 2007). Three dummy scans at the 
beginning of each run were acquired and discarded in order to establish a steady 
state in T1 relaxation for all functional scans. 
 
fMRI data analysis  
 
Preprocessing and MRI data analysis were performed using MATLAB 2006b 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA) and the SPM5 software package 
(http://fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All images were realigned to the first recorded volume, 
normalised into standard stereotactical space (using the EPI-template provided by 
the Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI brain), resliced to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm 
voxel size and smoothed using a 6-mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
Activated voxels were identified by a general linear model (Friston et al., 1995) 
implemented in SPM5. High-pass filtering (cut-off 128 s) was applied to the time 
series. For each subject, the fMRI responses were modelled with a design matrix 
using the onset of the second face of each face-pair in each of the six face pair 
conditions (i.e., within, same and between for avatar and human trials) and the onset 
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of the target events (for target monitoring) as regressors convolved with SPM’s 
standard canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The parameter estimates 
of the HRF for each regressor were calculated for each voxel, and linear contrasts 
were computed for each subject (Friston et al., 1995). These contrasts were entered 
into a second-level model.  All contrast images were first smoothed using a 8 mm 
FWHM Gaussian kernel to allow inter-subject localisation differences to be accounted 
for, with a final estimated overall smoothing of 10 mm FWHM ((6^2+8^2)^(1/2)). One-
sample random effects t-statistics across subjects was performed to allow for 
population inferences.  
 
The pair-repetition paradigm used the same face pairs and face-pair conditions as 
described for the preceding perceptual discrimination task. Briefly, the 'within', 'same' 
and 'between' face pair conditions used the face pair morphs M4 – M0 (i.e., within), 
M4 – M4 (i.e., same), and M4 – M8 (i.e., between) in the avatar trials and M8 – M12 
(i.e., within), M8 – M8 (i.e., same) and M8 – M4 (i.e., between) in the human trials 
(see Fig. 3,B). Contrasts were defined on the basis of these face-pair conditions in 
order to identify brain regions sensitive to physical and category-related change 
between the presented prime and target stimuli. The rationale behind this is that 
(further to the description in the introduction) the neural adaptation effect (Grill-
Spector & Malach, 2001) evokes a smaller BOLD signal in response to the second of 
a pair of identical stimuli than to the second of a pair of dissimilar stimuli. As the 
targets in the same, within and between conditions represent dissimilar points along 
the DOH in terms of physical attributes and/or category, relative differences in signal 
decrease between the face-pair conditions permits localisation of neuron populations 
responsive to change in physical attributes and/or category along the DOH (see e.g., 
Jiang et al., 2009; Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Murray & Wojciulik, 2004). As the prime 
was always M4 in avatar and M8 in human trials, the following contrasts refer to the 
targets of each face pair condition in the avatar (M0, M4, M8) and human trials (M12, 
M8, M4). Sensitivity to physical change was detected using the contrast of conditions 
M0 (i.e., within) plus M8 (i.e., between) > M4 (i.e., same) for avatar trials and M12 
(i.e., within) plus M4 (i.e., between) > M8 (i.e., same) for human trials.  To detect 
brain regions selectively responsive to category change across the boundary in the 
direction avatar to human and human to avatar, the contrasts M8 (i.e., between) > 
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M4 (i.e., same) plus M0 (i.e., within) for avatar trials and M4 (i.e., between) > M8 (i.e., 
same) plus M12 (i.e., within) for human trials were used.  
 
Whole-brain voxel-wise analyses was performed. In examining the sensitivity of brain 
regions to variation in physical attributes, we expected and focussed on activations in 
bilateral regions of the mid-fusiform gyrus (e.g., Xu et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2009), 
but for purposes of comparison with other studies (e.g., Rotshtein et al., 2005) all 
voxels are reported that survived significance thresholding at p < .001, uncorrected 
for multiple comparisons with a spatial extent threshold of k = 5 voxels.). 
 
The hypothesised regions of interest (ROIs) sensitive to category change are 
described in the introduction. The exploration of further regions associated with 
affective processing and affective ambiguity focused on the amygdala. Because of 
this dual approach with predefined ROIs and exploration of additional regions, all 
clusters of voxels (k = 20 voxels) responsive to category change that survived a 
threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected) are reported and discussed. The more lenient 
threshold (but more stringent level of contiguous voxels) reflected the exploratory 
interest in reducing type-2 errors (e.g. Wager et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2008) 
coupled with the view that hemodynamic responses in sub-cortical structures of the 
affect processing network are considered more difficult to detect (e.g. Herwig et al., 
2007; Etkin et al., 2006; Phelps, 2004). But, those voxels surviving significance 
thresholding at p < .001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a spatial extent 
threshold of k = 20 voxels, are also reported in the results section.  
 
3.7. Results 
 
Forced choice classification 
 
The logistic slope value of the fitted regression curve of each individual continuum 
was highly significant at p > 0.001. Given the large number of values for all continua, 
we report the test of this response function across all continua and against zero in a 
one-sample t-test. This showed that the response function has a highly significant 
logistic component (t31= 29.28, P > 0.001) that reflects a sigmoid step-like function 
consistent with the presence of a category boundary (Harnad, 1987). The grand 
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mean (see Fig. 2 A) of the fitted logistic curves (and of the response data) across 
continua shows the sigmoid-shaped curve with lower and upper asymptotes of avatar 
or human categorisation responses (as percentages of “different” responses) nearing 
100% for avatars and 100% for humans, respectively. Across continua, the mean 
category boundary value (M = 6.30, SD = 0.85) corresponds with morph M6 (i.e. the 
midpoint along the morph continua). This value is derived from the fitted logistic curve 
and the ordinate midpoint between the lower and upper asymptotes of the 
categorisation responses, indicating therefore that the maximum uncertainty of 50% 
in categorisation judgements was associated with the morph M6.  
 
Morphs M0, M4, M8 and M12 were selected for presentation in the subsequent two 
studies. The mean percentage of avatar or human identifications across all continua 
(reported here in terms of the response "human" as shown in Fig. 2 A) for the morphs 
M0, M4, M8 and M12 was 2.25 (SD = 2.5), 10.25 (SD = 4.8), 89.27 (SD = 8.4), 98 
(SD = 2.9), respectively (see, Fig. 2 B).  
 
In the interest of gaining an overall picture of categorisation response times (RT) 
along the DOH, an RM-ANOVA with factors continuum (32 continua) X morph 
position (13 levels) and RT as dependent variable was conducted. The analysis 
revealed no effect for continuum, but there was a main effect for morph position, F 
(2.75, 66.01) = 27.04, p < 0.001. Consistent with the preceding result of maximum 
uncertainty in decision responses at morph M6, the mean RT across participants 
indicated longest RTs for M6. To characterise this more clearly, the mean RT values 
at M6 were compared with the mean RT values at all other morph positions. A one-
way RM-ANOVA analysis with morph position (2 levels: M6 versus all other morphs) 
and RT in seconds as dependent variable collapsed across continua showed that RT 
for M6 (M = 1.42, SD = 0.26) differed highly significantly from RT for the other morph 
positions (M = 0.99, SD = 0.46), F(1,24) = 62.04, p < 0.001. 
 
In the interest of gaining an overall picture of categorisation response times (RT) 
along the DOH, an RM-ANOVA with factors continuum (32 continua) X morph 
position (13 levels) and RT as dependent variable was conducted. The analysis 
revealed no effect for continuum, but there was a main effect for morph position, F 
(2.75, 66.01) = 27.04, p < 0.001. Consistent with the preceding result of maximum 
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uncertainty in decision responses at morph M6, the mean RT across participants 
indicated longest RTs for M6. To characterise this more clearly, the mean RT values 
at M6 were compared with the mean RT values at all other morph positions. A one-
way RM-ANOVA analysis with morph position (2 levels: M6 versus all other morphs) 
and RT in seconds as dependent variable collapsed across continua showed that RT 
for M6 (M = 1.42, SD = 0.26) differed highly significantly from RT for the other morph 
positions (M = 0.99, SD = 0.46), F(1,24) = 62.04, p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of the forced choice classification task (A) and example of a morph 
continuum (B). Mean percentage of responses (across 25 participants) in the forced choice 
classification task (A), showing the grand average of the response data (dashed black line), 
the fitted logistic response curve (solid blue line), and the estimated mean category boundary 
value (blue dashed line) over all continua. Results indicate a step-like response function 
consistent with the presence of a category boundary. Example of a morph continuum (B) with 
13 levels from M0 to M12. The relative degree of linear physical transition between the 
avatar (e.g., 100 % A) and human (e.g., 0 % H) endpoints of morphs M0 and M4 (avatar 
category) and M8 and M12 (human category) are shown as percentages. The controlled 
physical dissimilarity of M0, M4, M8, and M12 was 33% along the continuum. These morphs 
were used in the subsequent perceptual discrimination task and fMRI study. 
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As the morphs M0, M4, M8 and M12 were to be used in the subsequent two studies, 
we tested also for differences in RT between these morphs. A one-way RM-ANOVA 
analysis with morph position (4 levels: M0, M4, M8 and M12) and RT as dependent 
variable collapsed across continua was conducted. The analysis revealed an effect 
for morph position, F(1.77, 41.32) = 19.19, p < 0.001. Tests of planned within-subject 
contrasts showed significant differences in RT within each category such that RT for 
M0 (M = 0.67 s, SD = 0.27) was shorter than for M4 (M = 1.05s, SD = 0.71) [F(1.24) 
= 48.2 p < 0.001] and RT for M12 (M = 0.91, SD = 0.56) was shorter than RT for M8 
(M = 1.19s, SD = 0.56) [F(1.24) = 17.2 p < 0.001], indicating quicker responses for 
morphs at either end of the continua than for the morphs M4 and M8 that straddled 
the category boundary. But, there was no significant difference in RT between M4 
and M8.  
 
Perceptual discrimination task 
 
Avatar trials 
For the 'avatar' trials (see Fig. 3, A), the ANOVA analyses showed a significant main 
effect on discrimination accuracy of face pair condition, that is, within, same, and 
between [F(2,38) = 149.74, p <.001] and of ISI [F(1,19) = 10.28, p =.006]. The ISI 
effect appears to reflect a general bias irrespective of face pair condition toward more 
“different” responses in the short ISI condition than in the long ISI condition. Pre-
planned tests of within-subject contrasts revealed that face-pairs that crossed the 
category boundary ('between' trial type) were significantly more often indicated as 
different than were those pairs from within a category (F(1,19) = 142.89 p <.001). 
There was also a significant effect of discrimination accuracy within the avatar 
category because pairs from within a category (i.e. 'within' trial type) were more 
frequently indicated to be different than those pairs of the "same" trial type, F(1,19) = 
6,09, p <.026.  
 
Human trials 
 
Similarly, for the 'human' trials (see Fig. 3, B), the ANOVA analyses showed a 
significant effect on discrimination accuracy of face pair condition [F(2,38) = 876.46, 
p <.001] but no effect of ISI. Pre-planned tests of within-subject contrasts revealed 
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that face-pairs that crossed the category boundary ('between' trial type) were 
significantly more often indicated as different than were those pairs from within a 
category ('within' trial type), F(1,19) = 932.03, p <.001. There was also an effect of 
discrimination accuracy within the human category because pairs from within a 
category were significantly more frequently indicated to be different than those pairs 
of the 'same' trial type, F(1,19) = 478.52, p = 028.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of the perceptual discrimination task (A,C) and example of stimulus 
conditions (B, D). The three different stimulus conditions for pairs of faces presented in the 
perceptual discrimination task and the fMRI study are shown (B, D): the faces of a pair were 
drawn from the within the same category (“within”), were identical (“same”), or showed 
category change by straddling opposite sides of the category boundary (“between”). In the 
perceptual discrimination task, same-different judgments were made according to whether 
faces were the same or different in physical appearance. Morphs M0, M4, and M8 were used 
for analysis of avatar trials (B) and M4, M8, and M12 for human trials (D): the first face in (B) 
is always M4 and in (D) always M8. The upper panels show the proportion of “different” 
responses for avatar (A) and human (C) trials across 20 participants. Controlling for relative 
distance of morphs along the continua, results show better discrimination accuracy for face 
pairs that crossed the category boundary (as determined in the forced choice classification 
task) than for pairs drawn from the same (avatar or human) side of the boundary, thus 
demonstrating categorical perception along our continua of human likeness for avatar and 
human faces. 
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In summary, the results demonstrate that processes of categorical perception are 
very likely to influence processing of objects along the DOH. The effect shown in this 
task was one of better discrimination accuracy for pairs that crossed the category 
boundary than for equidistant pairs drawn from within a category on one or other side 
of the boundary, this effect applying similarly for both avatar and human trials.  
 
Target monitoring task and event-related fMRI 
 
On this basis of the perceptual discrimination task, brain activity was expected to be 
differentially affected by the within and between category conditions. The ISI 
condition (short vs. long) of the perceptual discrimination task was carried over to the 
fMRI study.  
 
Sensitivity to physical change  
 
To detect brain regions sensitive to differences in physical features, face pairs in 
which there was a change in physical features between prime and target were 
compared with those face pairs in which there was no change in physical features 
(see Table 1). 
 
Avatar trials 
 
The contrast  'within plus between versus same' was applied to face pairs in which an 
avatar was the prime, and this revealed right-lateralised increased activations in the 
fusiform gyrus (BA37), superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), and middle frontal gyrus 
(BA6). No differences between short and long ISI were found. 
 
Human trials 
 
Similarly, the contrast 'within plus between versus same' for face pairs in which a 
human was the prime revealed modulation of activation bilaterally in the fusiform 
gyrus (BA37), left precuneus (BA4), right mid-cingulum (BA 32), and left insula 
(BA13). No differences between short and long ISI were found. 
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Figure 4. Effects of physical change on hemodynamic activity during observation of avatar   
(A) and human (B) trials. 
 
Sensitivity to category change  
 
To detect brain regions selectively responsive to category change across the 
boundary in the avatar-to-human and human-to-avatar directions along the 
continuum, face pairs in which there was a change in category between prime and 
target were compared with the conditions in which there was no such change in 
category (see Table 2). 
 
Avatar-to-human direction along DOH 
 
For the avatar-to-human direction, the contrast 'between versus same plus within' 
was applied to face pairs in which an avatar was the prime. This showed (at p < .005) 
a large cluster that included the left hippocampus (BA 28), entorhinal area (BA34), 
perirhinal area (BA35), and amygdala, and a further cluster in the right mid-insula 
(BA13). The activation in the left hippocampus (BA 28) was found also at the higher 
significance threshold of p < .001 (max t value 4.12 (k = 12) at -24, -14, -14). No 
differences between short and long ISI were found. 
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Table 1. Brain areas sensitive to physical change. 
 
 
Human-to-avatar direction along DOH 
 
To establish the pattern of activation associated with brain regions sensitive to 
crossing the category boundary in the direction of human-to-avatar, the same 
contrast ('between versus same plus within') was applied for face pairs in which a 
human was the prime. This showed a different pattern of brain areas sensitive to 
category change (at p < .005), including left and right putamen, left caudate head, 
right lateral posterior nucleus of thalamus, and left red nucleus. Both the right 
thalamus (lateral posterior nucleus) (max t value 3.88 (k = 13) at 14, -22, 12), left 
caudate head (max t value 3.62 (k = 5) at 12, 14, -6) and left putamen (max t value 
3.88 (k = 5) at -20, 6, 14) were found also at the higher significance threshold of p < 
.001. No differences between short and long ISI were found. 
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Figure 5. Effects of category change in the avatar-to-human direction (A) and human-to-
avatar direction (B) along continua of human likeness. 
 
 
   Table 2. Brain areas sensitive to category change. 
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3.8. Discussion 
 
The forced-choice classification task showed that faces drawn from continua 
representing the DOH are subjectively assigned to the discrete avatar and human 
categories. Because morphed faces are computer-generated and modelled, Seyama 
and Nagayama (2010) suggest that they are artificial and might therefore be 
processed differently than are natural human faces. But this view does not apply for 
the outcome of our perceptual category judgements: Morph stimuli regarded as 
artificial in a technical sense can be explicitly judged to be human. Importantly, the 
faces assigned to the human category were drawn from different points along the 
morph continua, thus demonstrating that there is variation in human-like appearance 
within the human category. Mori did not consider this in his hypothesis, focussing 
instead on the wide variation of potential physical forms of nonhuman objects along 
the DOH as often found in uncanny research (e.g. Walters et al., 2008; Minato et al., 
2006). Ramey (2005) reflects that these objects are designed and modelled after the 
human image. The implication of this design and investigative approach to the 
uncanny is that the human image is often treated as a general point of reference 
irrespective of the fact, as shown in the present study, that there are differences in 
human likeness within the human category and its cognitive representation.  
 
Mori´s particular concern was with the threshold of nonhuman and human object 
perception and associated uncertainty and discomfort. Defining the nonhuman-
human category boundary is therefore critical to examining Mori´s hypothesis. The 
classification response function of all our continua showed a sigmoid shape 
consistent with the presence of an avatar-human category boundary (Harnad, 1987). 
The reaction time data indicated significant increases in and a similar degree of 
decision uncertainty for morphs close to each side of the category boundary. One 
could reframe Mori´s hypothesis in terms of category processing and suggest that 
any personal discomfort associated with processing human likeness is most likely to 
occur in response to stimuli at or near the category boundary for which there is 
greatest categorisation ambiguity. It is possible that this prediction applies to stimuli 
either side of the avatar-human category boundary. This awaits investigation.  
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The perceptual discrimination task showed that a pair of faces located either side of 
the avatar-human category boundary is easier to distinguish than a pair of faces (with 
the same degree of physical difference along the DOH) drawn from within a category, 
thus indicating CP for the DOH. In other words, the cognitive representation of the 
category structure of the DOH influences the observer’s sensitivity for perceptual 
information relating to human likeness. Evidently, this sensitivity is greatest at or near 
to the threshold of nonhuman and human object perception at which small changes 
in realism (i.e. concerning human or nonhuman-specifying perceptual features) might 
evoke uncertainty and discomfort. Taken together, these behavioural findings 
demonstrate that the DOH may be defined both in terms of a gradual change in the 
degree of physical human-like similarity, as described by Mori, as well as in terms of 
the effects of CP and the dimension’s underlying category structure, as proposed in 
this investigation. 
 
The stimulus conditions described by Mori (i.e. observing novel nonhuman objects 
subtly different in physical appearance from that of the human counterpart) were 
simulated within the constraints of fMRI methodology. The imaging data confirmed 
that different regions of the brain are responsive to processing change in physical 
human-like similarity and processing change in category along the DOH. We 
consider the findings for physical change first. The right and left mid-fusiform areas 
were sensitive to fine-grained change in physical human likeness for human trials 
and a different right mid-fusiform area was sensitive to physical change for avatar 
trials. This is consistent with reports in other studies of sensitivity in these areas to 
facial physical similarity (Xu et al., 2009), to similarity of facial geometry (Jiang et al., 
2009; Jiang et al., 2006) and to similarity of surface properties of facial texture (e.g. 
Jiang et al., 2006). Our fMRI data give no indication as to the relative importance of 
shape and texture in processing faces along the DOH (for face recognition see, e.g. 
Russell et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2006; O'Toole et al., 1999). But participants 
consistently reported attending to the skin texture of avatars in the forced choice 
classification task. Surface cues are an important diagnostic aid for judging human 
likeness (MacDorman et al., 2009a) and for distinguishing synthetic and natural 
objects and faces (e.g. Biederman and Ju, 1998; Russell and Sinha, 2007), 
especially when the objects are highly similar in structure (Price & Humphreys, 1989). 
The reported attention to skin texture may reflect greater difficulty with or preferential 
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use of specific facial information for forced choice classification of avatars, but this is 
not clear. As performance in visual discriminations of facial surface properties and 
shape does depend on experience (Balas & Nelson, 2010; Vuong et al., 2005), there 
should at least be differences between the processing of perceptual features of 
human and novel avatar faces. An additional analysis comparing the avatar and 
human "within" conditions in our perceptual discrimination task supports this: Fine 
visual discrimination of avatars was less accurate than that of human faces, F(1,19) = 
6,31, p = .02. Whether and how the relative importance of structural and textural 
information changes along the course of the DOH has not been investigated (but see 
MacDorman et al., 2009).  
 
A change in the category of sequentially presented faces (i.e. prime and target of 
paired faces) was found to evoke modulations of neural activity in brain regions 
previously associated with category learning and category uncertainty. The pattern of 
regions was entirely different depending on whether the target was an avatar in the 
human-avatar pairs or human in the avatar-human pairs. This shows that the 
direction of change along the DOH does influence the way in which humanlike faces 
are processed, at least within our paradigm. The dorsal and ventral striatum 
(putamen and head of caudate), thalamus, and red nucleus were responsive to the 
avatar target and the medial temporal lobe (MTL) (hippocampus, entorhinal and 
perirhinal areas), mid-insula and amygdala were responsive to the human target.  
 
The results for the striatum and MTL were the most prominent. These regions are 
thought to have different roles in and an antagonistic relationship during category 
processing and learning (e.g. Seger & Cincotta, 2005; for overview see Poldrack & 
Rodriguez, 2004). For example, relative activity in the MTL memory system subsides 
and that of the striatal memory system increases during categorisation training 
(Poldrack et al., 1999, Poldrack et al., 2001). Alternatively, these and other memory 
systems (e.g. Poldrack & Foerde, 2008) might actually work in concert during 
category processing (Cincotta & Seger, 2007). Irrespective of their possible interplay, 
the differential response of these regions to the direction of category change between 
prime and target (i.e. human-avatar or avatar-human) suggests that the avatar and 
human faces represent different categorisation problems that require, at least in part, 
dissimilar processes or strategies to resolve them. There is some support for this in 
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the behavioural data from the perceptual discrimination task. An additional analysis 
compared the avatar and human "between" conditions and found a significantly 
higher proportion of judgement errors [F(1,19) = 8,69, p < .01] for avatar-human pairs 
than for human-avatar pairs.  
 
In the pair-repetition paradigm, processing of the target stimulus is biased by the 
implicit memory of the preceding prime that represents a different "expected" or 
"predicted" category than is actually shown in the target. The caudate head 
(responsive to avatar targets) is sensitive to prediction error in various tasks (e.g. 
O'Doherty et al., 2003; Bray and O'Doherty, 2007; King-Casas et al., 2005; Jensen et 
al., 2007). Besides contributing to learning stimulus–category associations (Seger 
and Cincotta, 2005, Seger and Cincotta, 2006) and selecting and executing motor 
responses for signalling category membership (Seger et al., 2010, Williams and 
Eskandar, 2006), the putamen (also responsive to avatar targets) is associated with 
processing prediction error (den Ouden et al., 2010). It is possible that these striatal 
regions contribute to processing the deviation of the novel avatar target from the 
human prime and do so on the basis of the prime and well defined category 
representations of human faces. If this is true, one would expect the "between" 
condition of the perceptual discrimination task to be easier for the human-avatar pairs 
than for the avatar-human pairs for which corresponding category representations 
are less well defined. The preceding additional analysis of the "between" condition 
supports this. Predictive processing has been investigated explicitly under conditions 
of decision uncertainty and shown to modulate activity in the ventral striatum (and the 
thalamus and red nucleus as also found in response to our targets of the avatar-
human face pairs) (Volz et al., 2003). Filoteo et al. (2005) suggest that the caudate 
head might be involved in switching between potential category rules used to 
establish category membership, while Grinband et al. (2006) found activations highly 
similar to ours in their study of categorisation ambiguity, and they suggest that the 
ventral striatum signals adjustment of the represented categorical boundary in order 
to minimise errors. 
 
MTL structures (responsive to human targets) are involved in processing novel and 
familiar stimuli, novelty detection, and uncertainty coding (e.g., Rutishauser et al., 
2006; Stark and Squire, 2000; Stern et al., 1996; Vanni-Mercier et al., 2009). MTL is 
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thought to encode and retain individual category instances of novel stimuli (Poldrack 
et al., 1999, Seger and Cincotta, 2005) and to facilitate further category-related 
processing of features by other systems including the basal ganglia (Meeter et al., 
2008). Given our paired presentation of similar human and novel avatar faces, it is 
noteworthy that processes of novelty detection in the hippocampus are considered to 
entail processing of the deviation of actual sensory input from expected input (e.g., 
Kumaran and Maguire, 2006). This would be consistent with the notion that the 
processing of our human targets was strongly guided by representations of the 
preceding input from the avatar primes. The hippocampus is involved in visual 
categorisation and perceptual learning, while impaired processing of faces is found 
only when both hippocampus and perirhinal cortex are damaged (Graham et al., 
2006). The perirhinal cortex played a clear role in response to category change 
between human primes and avatar targets. The perirhinal cortex appears to be 
critical for object memory, contributing to resolving complex visual discriminations 
and those of high ambiguity (Bussey et al., 2003) when both novel and familiar stimuli 
share visual features (Barense et al., 2005).   
 
Consistent with its role in decision-making under conditions of category processing 
and uncertainty (e.g. Fleming et al., 2010; Heekeren et al., 2008; Grinband et al., 
2006; Hsu et al., 2005; Volz et al., 2003), we expected the anterior rather than the 
mid-insular cortex to be responsive to category change. The mid-insular cortex was 
responsive to human targets. The role of this region in the present study and 
generally (Wager and Feldman Barrett, 2004) is not clear. The mid-insular is 
responsive to affective ambiguity, anticipation of emotionally aversive visual stimuli, 
and to physical pain (Simmons et al., 2008), this reflecting the processing of negative 
expectation particularly in the context of pain (e.g. Petrovic et al., 2000). Our 
participants were not exposed to noxious stimulation, but similar neural mechanisms 
are thought to mediate the experience of pain and feelings of personal discomfort 
(Price, 2002). Right mid- (Lutz et al., 2009) and anterior insula activity (Critchley et 
al., 2002) is also associated with measures of arousal (heart rate and galvanic skin 
responses). Given the suggested role of prediction error processing, Paulus and 
Stein’s (2006) proposed anxiety mechanism is interesting. Applied here, the deviation 
between the expected arousal state on the basis of the avatar prime and the actual 
arousal associated with the unexpected human target might be interpreted as 
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signalling the presence of uncertainty, threat or potential threat. Uncanny-related 
arousal and discomfort is suggested to be rooted in mechanisms of threat avoidant 
behaviour (Green et al., 2008; MacDorman, 2005a). Interestingly, Gray and Critchley 
(2007) and Wager et al. (2003) associate mid-insular representations with a threat-
related component and avoidant behaviour. Alternatively, arousal and mid-insula 
responsiveness to category change may be more closely related to the role of the 
right anterior insula during category processing in marshalling attentional resources 
to enhance performance during categorisation under conditions of uncertainty 
(Heekeren et al., 2008).  
 
In exploring additional brain areas otherwise associated with affective processing, the 
amygdala was found to be responsive to category change in avatar-human face 
pairs.  The amygdala is responsive to natural and computer-generated human faces 
(e.g. Todorov and Engell, 2008), human-like but unnatural faces (Rotshtein et al., 
2001) novelty, uncertainty, unclear predictive value, and ambiguous valence (e.g. 
Neta and Whalen, 2010; Herwig et al., 2007; Levy et al., 2010; Phelps and LeDoux, 
2005). Whether and how appraisal of affective valence (and prospective outcomes in 
terms of potential threat or reward) contributes to category processing is not clear, 
though prospective outcomes are thought to interact with and bias processes of 
perceptual categorisation (Heekeren et al., 2008; see also Gupta et al., 2011). In 
view of the different responses of the striatum and MTL in this study, Seger and 
Miller’s (2010) suggestion is interesting. They propose that the amygdala might play 
a role during category processing in altering the balance between the memory 
systems of these two regions depending on the affective meaning of a situation. For 
example, modulation of the amygdala might reflect its involvement in processing of 
novel category information in conjunction with the MTL and enhancement of 
attentional and memory processing of the novel avatar primes (Kleinhans et al., 
2007). Alternatively, the amygdala might have been responsive to the "unexpected" 
category of the targets (i.e. the human faces) (Roesch et al., 2010).  
 
This investigation demonstrates that the definition of the DOH in terms of the degree 
of object similarity to human appearance does not reflect the way in which human 
likeness is subjectively perceived along this dimension. The forced-choice 
categorisation task showed that there is variation in human likeness within the human 
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category, and the perceptual discrimination task confirmed that processes of CP and 
associated representations of the DOH’s category structure influence the perception 
of human likeness. Given the inconsistent findings in “uncanny” research to date, 
careful definition of the category boundary especially in studies using morph continua 
is therefore important. It is likely that mechanisms associated with category 
processing and the representation of human likeness also influence affective 
experience. For example, increased uncertainty in forced-choice category decisions 
might be associated with discomfort (assuming that Mori´s hypothesis is correct), 
though any discomfort need not be limited to the nonhuman side of the category 
boundary along the DOH. The present behavioural findings suggest that the general 
conception of the DOH should be revised. As Mori did not embed his ideas in any 
psychological framework, we suggest that his hypothesis should be considered in 
terms of the well-established psychological empirical-theoretical framework of 
category perception and learning. This could prove useful in examining where along 
the DOH negative or uncanny experience is most likely to occur for a given set of 
stimuli and in throwing light on the potential role of categorisation ambiguity in 
evoking negative affect. It is of course possible that any association between 
category ambiguity and negative affect is not specific to humanlike stimuli along the 
DOH but is a more general feature of category ambiguity itself.  
 
The framework set out in this study could also be applied to other fields of related 
research to understand how variously realistic humanlike characters in association 
with category ambiguity influence for example the experience of presence (i.e., 
immersive experience) in virtual reality (e.g., Brenton et al., 2008), audience 
persuasion and identification with fictive characters in narrative (e.g., Cohen, 2001), 
communication in educational virtual environments (e.g., Fabri et al., 2004), or 
consumer trust in electronic commerce (e.g., Bauer et al., 2005). For example, 
greater category ambiguity might enhance attentional processing of the human or 
non-human specifying perceptual features of digital human representations, and this 
might render it less likely that a person responds to the character as if it were in some 
way real, experiences identification, processes the media content as the designers 
intend, or develops a sense of trust. Using this framework, the fMRI study showed 
that different brain regions are responsive to the direction along the DOH in which 
there is a change in the category of observed objects (i.e. avatar-to-human or 
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human-to-avatar). This appears to reflect the impact of differences in category 
knowledge for avatar and human faces. Re-examination of this effect in the context of 
category training and experience with avatars might throw more light on this. 
Replicating the behavioural findings of this study with a larger number of participants 
and with stimuli presenting biological motion (see, Saygin et al., 2011; Chaminade et 
al., 2007) would reinforce our findings. Whether there are gender differences remains 
to be investigated. 
 
Conflict of Interest Statement 
 
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any 
commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of 
interest. 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This work was supported by the European Union FET Integrated Project 
PRESENCCIA (Contract number 27731).  
 
3.9. References  
 
 
Angeli, A., Davidoff, J., & Valentine, T. (2008). Face familiarity, distinctiveness, and 
categorical perception. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. (Hove) 61, 690–707. 
Annett, M. (1970). A classification of hand preference by association analysis. Br. J. 
Psychol. 61, 303–321. 
Ashby, F. G., & Maddox, W. T. (2005). Human category learning. Annu. Rev. 
Psychol. 56, 149–178. 
Aylett, R. S. (2004). Agents and affect: why embodied agents need affective systems. 
Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 3025, 496–504. 
Balas, B., & Nelson, C. A. (2010). The role of face shape and pigmentation in other-
race face perception: an electrophysiological study. Neuropsychologia 48, 498–
506. 
Barense, M., Bussey, T., Lee, A., Rogers, T. T., Hodges, J. R., Saksida, L., Murray, 
E., & Graham, K. (2005). Feature ambiguity influences performance on novel 
object discriminations in patients with damage to perirhinal cortex. Cognitive 
Neuroscience Society Annual Meeting Program 2005, New York, NY, 125–116. 
Bauer, H. H., & Neumann, M. (2005). “Investigating the Effects of Avatars as Virtual 
Representatives in Electronic Commerce,” in Proceedings of the Australian-
New Zealand Marketing Academy Conference (ANZMAC), Perth, 18. 
54 
 
Biederman, I., & Ju, G. (1998). Surface vs. edge-based determinants of visual 
recognition. Cogn. Psychol. 20, 38–64. 
Bray, S., & O’Doherty, J. (2007). Neural coding of reward-prediction error signals 
during classical conditioning with attractive faces. J. Neurophysiol. 97, 3036–
3045. 
Brenton, H., Gillies, M., Ballin, D., & Chatting, D. (2008). The uncanny valley: does it 
exist? Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Human-Animated Characters 
Interaction, HCI 2005:The Bigger Picture, Edinburgh. 
Bussey, T. J., Saksida, L. M., & Murray, E. A. (2003). Impairments in visual 
discrimination after perirhinal cortex lesions: testing “declarative” versus 
“perceptual-mnemonic” views of perirhinal cortex function. Eur. J. Neurosci. 17, 
649–660. 
Campbell, R., Pascalis, O., Coleman, M., Wallace, S. B., & Benson, P. J. (1987). Are 
faces of different species perceived categorically by human observers? Proc. R. 
Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 264, 1429–1434. 
Chaminade, T., Hodgins, J., & Kawato, M. (2007). Anthropomorphism influences 
perception of computer-animated characters’ actions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. 
Neurosci. 2, 206–216. 
Cincotta, C. M., & Seger, C. A. (2007). Dissociation between striatal regions while 
learning to categorize via feedback and via observation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 
249–265. 
Cohen, J. (2001). Defining identification: a theoretical look at the identification of 
audiences with media characters. Mass Commun. Soc. 4, 245–264. 
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2002). Fear conditioning in humans: 
the influence of awareness and autonomic arousal on functional neuroanatomy. 
Neuron 33, 653–663. 
den Ouden, H. E., Daunizeau, J., Roiser, J., Friston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2010). 
Striatal prediction error modulates cortical coupling. J. Neurosci. 30, 3210–
3219. 
Etkin, A., Egner, T., Peraza, D. M., Kandel, E. R., and Hirsch, J. (2006). Resolving 
emotional conflict: a role for the rostral anterior cingulate cortex in modulating 
activity in the amygdala. Neuron 51, 871–882. 
Fabri, M., Moor, D., & Hobbs, D. (2004). Mediating the expression of emotion in 
educational collaborative virtual environments: an experimental study. Int. J. 
Virtual Reality 7, 66–81. 
Filoteo, J. V., Maddox, W. T., Salmon, D. P., & Song, D. D. (2005). Information-
integration category learning in patients with striatal dysfunction. 
Neuropsychology 19, 212–222. 
Fleming, S. M., Whiteley, L., Hulme, O. J., Sahani, M., and Dolan, R. J. (2010). 
Effects of category-specific costs on neural systems for perceptual decision-
making. J. Neurophysiol. 103, 3238–3247. 
Friston, K. J., Holmes, A. P., Worsley, K. J., Poline, J. P., Frith, C. D., & Frackowiak, 
R. S. J. (1995). Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: a general 
linear approach. Hum. Brain Mapp. 2, 189–210. 
Graham, K. S., Scahill, V. L., Hornberger, M., Barense, M. D., Lee, A. C., Bussey, T. 
J., & Saksida, L. M. (2006). Abnormal categorization and perceptual learning in 
patients with hippocampal damage. J. Neurosci. 26, 7547–7554. 
Gray, M. A., & Critchley, H. D. (2007). Interoceptive basis to craving. Neuron 54, 
183–186. 
55 
 
Green, R. D., MacDorman, K. F., Ho, C.-C., & Vasudevan, S. K. (2008). Sensitivity to 
the proportions of faces that vary in human likeness. Comput. Hum. Behav. 24, 
2456–2474. 
Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., & Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain: neural 
models of stimulus-specific effects. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 10, 14–23. 
Grill-Spector, K., & Malach, R. (2001). fMR-adaptation: a tool for studying the 
functional properties of human cortical neurons. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 107, 
293–321. 
Grinband, J., Hirsch, J., & Ferrera, V. P. (2006). A neural representation of 
categorization uncertainty in the human brain. Neuron 49, 757–763. 
Gupta, R., Koscik, T. R., Bechara, A., & Tranel, D. (2011). The amygdala and 
decision-making. Neuropsychologia 49, 760–766. 
Hanson, D. (2006). Exploring the aesthetic range for humanoid robots. Paper 
Presented at the Proceedings of the ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: 
Toward Social Mechanisms of Android Science, Vancouver. 
Harnad, S. R. (1987). “Introduction: psychological and cognitive aspects of 
categorical perception: a critical overview,” in Categorical Perception: The 
Groundwork of Cognition, ed. S. Harnad (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), 1–25. 
Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2008). The neural systems that 
mediate human perceptual decision making. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 467–479. 
Henson, R. N. (2003). Neuroimaging studies of priming. Prog. Neurobiol. 70, 53–81. 
Herwig, U., Kaffenberger, T., Baumgartner, T., and Jancke, L. (2007). Neural 
correlates of a “pessimistic” attitude when anticipating events of unknown 
emotional valence. Neuroimage 34, 848–858. 
Ho, C.-C., & MacDorman, K. (2010). Revisiting the uncanny valley theory: developing 
and validating an alternative to the Godspeed indices. Comput. Hum. Behav. 
26, 1508–1518. 
Hsu, M., Bhatt, M., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Camerer, C. F. (2005). Neural systems 
responding to degrees of uncertainty in human decision-making. Science 310, 
1680–1683. 
Jensen, J., Smith, A. J., Willeit, M., Crawley, A. P., Mikulis, D. J., Vitcu, I., & Kapur, S. 
(2007). Separate brain regions code for salience vs. valence during reward 
prediction in humans. Hum. Brain Mapp. 28, 294–302. 
Jiang, F., Dricot, L., Blanz, V., Goebel, R., & Rossion, B. (2009). Neural correlates of 
shape and surface reflectance information in individual faces. Neuroscience 
163, 1078–1091. 
Jiang, X., Bradley, E., Rini, R. A., Zeffiro, T., Vanmeter, J., & Riesenhuber, M. (2007). 
Categorization training results in shape- and category-selective human neural 
plasticity. Neuron 53, 891–903. 
Jiang, X., Rosen, E., Zeffiro, T., Vanmeter, J., Blanz, V., & Riesenhuber, M. (2006). 
Evaluation of a shape-based model of human face discrimination using fMRI 
and behavioral techniques. Neuron 50, 159–172. 
King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Camerer, C. F., Quartz, S. R., & Montague, P. 
R. (2005). Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person economic 
exchange. Science 308, 78–83. 
Kleinhans, N. M., Johnson, L. C., Mahurin, R., Richards, T., Stegbauer, K. C., 
Greenson, J., Dawson, G., & Aylward, E. (2007). Increased amygdala activation 
to neutral faces is associated with better face memory performance. 
Neuroreport 18, 987–991. 
56 
 
Kumaran, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2006). An unexpected sequence of events: mismatch 
detection in the human hippocampus. PLoS Biol. 4, e424. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pbio.0040424 
Levy, I., Snell, J., Nelson, A. J., Rustichini, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010). Neural 
representation of subjective value under risk and ambiguity. J. Neurophysiol. 
103, 1036–1047. 
Li, S., Mayhew, S. D., & Kourtzi, Z. (2009). Learning shapes the representation of 
behavioral choice in the human brain. Neuron 62, 441–452. 
Lutz, A., Greischar, L. L., Perlman, D. M., & Davidson, R. J. (2009). BOLD signal in 
insula is differentially related to cardiac function during compassion meditation 
in experts vs. novices. Neuroimage 47, 1038–1046. 
MacDorman, K. (2005a). “Mortality salience and the uncanny valley,” in IEEE-RAS 
International Conference on Humanoid Robots (Tsukuba: IEEE), 339–405. 
MacDorman, K. (2005b). “Androids as an Experimental Apparatus: Why is There an 
Uncanny Valley and Can We Exploit it?” in Toward Social Mechanisms of 
Android Science: A CogSci 2005 Workshop, Stresa, 106–118. 
MacDorman, K. (2006). Subjective ratings of robot video clips for human likeness, 
familiarity, and eeriness: an exploration of the uncanny valley. Paper presented 
at the ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: Toward Social Mechanisms of 
Android Science, Vancouver. 
MacDorman, K., Green, R., Ho, C.-C., & Koch, C. (2009). Too real for comfort? 
Uncanny responses to computer generated faces. Comput. Hum. Behav. 25, 
695–710. 
MacDorman, K., & Ishiguro, H. (2006). The uncanny advantage of using androids in 
cognitive science research. Interact. Stud. 7, 297–337. 
Maddox, W. T., & Ashby, F. G. (2004). Dissociating explicit and procedural-learning 
based systems of perceptual category learning. Behav. Processes 66, 309–332. 
Meeter, M., Radics, G., Myers, C. E., Gluck, M. A., & Hopkins, R. O. (2008). 
Probabilistic categorization: how do normal participants and amnesic patients 
do it? Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 32, 237–248. 
Minato, T., Shimada, M., Itakura, S., Lee, K., & Ishiguro, H. (2006). Evaluating the 
human likeness of an android by comparing gaze behaviors elicited by the 
android and a person. Adv. Robot. 20, 1147–1163. 
Mori, M. (1970). Bukimi no tani [the uncanny valley]. Energy 7, 33–35. 
Murray, S. O., & Wojciulik, E. (2004). Attention increases neural selectivity in the 
human lateral occipital complex. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 70–74. 
Neta, M., & Whalen, P. J. (2010). The primacy of negative interpretations when 
resolving the valence of ambiguous facial expressions. Psychol. Sci. 21, 901–
907. 
O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Friston, K., Critchley, H., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Temporal 
difference models and reward-related learning in the human brain. Neuron 38, 
329–337. 
O’Toole, A. J., Vetter, T., & Blanz, V. (1999). Three-dimensional shape and two-
dimensional surface reflectance contributions to face recognition: an application 
of three-dimensional morphing. Vision Res. 39, 3145–3155. 
Pastore, R. E. (1987). “Categorical perception: some psychophysical models,” in 
Categorical perception: The groundwork of Cognition, ed. S. Harnad (New York: 
Cambridge University Press), 29–52. 
Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2006). An insular view of anxiety. Biol. Psychiatry 60, 
383–387. 
57 
 
Petrovic, P., Petersson, K. M., Ghatan, P. H., Stone-Elander, S., & Ingvar, M. (2000). 
Pain-related cerebral activation is altered by a distracting cognitive task. Pain 
85, 19–30. 
Phelps, E. A. (2004). Human emotion and memory: Interactions of the amygdala and 
hippocampal complex. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 14, 198–202. 
Phelps, E. A., & LeDoux, J. E. (2005). Contributions of the amygdala to emotion 
processing: from animal models to human behavior. Neuron 48, 175–187. 
Phelps, E. A., O’Connor, K. J., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., Grillon, C., & Davis, M. 
(2008). Activation of the left amygdala to a cognitive representation of fear. 
Neurosciences 4, 37–41. 
Poldrack, R. A., Clark, J., Pare-Blagoev, E. J., Shohamy, D., Creso Moyano, J., 
Myers, C., & Gluck, M. A. (2001). Interactive memory systems in the human 
brain. Nature 414, 546–550. 
Poldrack, R. A., & Foerde, K. (2008). Category learning and the memory systems 
debate. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 32, 197–205. 
Poldrack, R. A., Prabhakaran, V., Seger, C. A., & Gabrieli, J. D. (1999). Striatal 
activation during acquisition of a cognitive skill. Neuropsychology 13, 564–574. 
Poldrack, R. A., & Rodriguez, P. (2004). How do memory systems interact? Evidence 
from human classification learning. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 82, 324–332. 
Pollick, F. (2009). “In search of the Uncanny Valley,” in Lecture notes of the Institute 
for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications 
Engineering, UC Media 2009, eds P. Daras, and O. M. Ibarra (Venice: 
Springer), 69–78. 
Price, D. D. (2000). Psychological and neural mechanisms of the affective dimension 
of pain. Science 288, 1769–1772. 
Price, C. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1989). The effects of surface detail on object 
categorization and naming. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A. 41, 797–827. 
Pruessmann, K. P., Weiger, M., Scheidegger, M. B., & Boesinger, P. (1999). SENSE: 
Sensitivity encoding for fast MRI. Magn. Reson. Med. 42, 952–962. 
Ramey, C. H. (2005). The uncanny valley of similarities concerning abortion, 
baldness, heaps of sand, and humanlike robots. Paper Presented at the 
Proceedings of Views of the Uncanny Valley Workshop: IEEE-RAS International 
Conference on Humanoid Robots, Tsukuba. 
Roesch, M. R., Calu, D. J., Esber, G. R., & Schoenbaum, G. (2010). All that glitters. 
Dissociating attention and outcome expectancy from prediction errors signals. J. 
Neurophysiol. 104, 587–595. 
Rotshtein, P., Henson, R. N., Treves, A., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2005). Morphing 
Marilyn into Maggie dissociates physical and identity face representations in the 
brain. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 107–113. 
Rotshtein, P., Malach, R., Hadar, U., Graif, M., & Hendler, T. (2001). Feeling or 
features: different sensitivity to emotion in high-order visual cortex and 
amygdala. Neuron 32, 747–757. 
Russell, R., Biederman, I., Nederhouser, M., & Sinha, P. (2007). The utility of surface 
reflectance for the recognition of upright and inverted faces. Vision Res. 47, 
157–165. 
Russell, R., and Sinha, P. (2007). Real-world face recognition: the importance of 
surface reflectance properties. Perception 36, 1368–1374. 
Rutishauser, U., Mamelak, A. N., & Schuman, E. M. (2006). Single-trial learning of 
novel stimuli by individual neurons of the human hippocampus-amygdala 
complex. Neuron 49, 805–813. 
58 
 
Saygin, A. P., Chaminade, T., Ishiguro, H., Driver, J., & Frith, C. (2011). The thing 
that should not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving 
human and humanoid robot actions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. doi: 
10.1093/scan/nsr025 
Schultz, J., & Pilz, K. S. (2009). Natural facial motion enhances the cortical 
responses to faces. Exp. Brain Res. 194, 465–475. 
Seger, C. A., & Cincotta, C. M. (2005). The roles of the caudate nucleus in human 
classification learning. J. Neurosci. 25, 2941–2951. 
Seger, C. A., & Cincotta, C. M. (2006). Dynamics of frontal, striatal, and hippocampal 
systems during rule learning. Cereb. Cortex 16, 1546–1555. 
Seger, C. A., & Miller, E. K. (2010). Category learning in the brain. Annu. Rev. 
Neurosci. 33, 203–219. 
Seger, C. A., Peterson, E. J., Cincotta, C. M., Lopez-Paniagua, D., & Anderson, C. 
W. (2010). Dissociating the contributions of independent corticostriatal systems 
to visual categorization learning through the use of reinforcement learning 
modeling and Granger causality modeling. Neuroimage 50, 644–656. 
Seyama, J., a& Nagayama, R. S. (2007). The uncanny valley: effect of realism on the 
impression of artificial human faces. Presence (Camb.) 16, 337–351. 
Seyama, J., & Nagayama, R. S. (2009). Probing the uncanny valley with the eye size 
aftereffect. Presence-Teleop. Virt. 18, 321–339. 
Simmons, A., Matthews, S. C., Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2008). Intolerance of 
uncertainty correlates with insula activation during affective ambiguity. Neurosci. 
Lett. 430, 92–97. 
Stark, C. E., & Squire, L. R. (2000). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
activity in the hippocampal region during recognition memory. J. Neurosci. 20, 
7776–7781. 
Stern, C. E., Corkin, S., Gonzalez, R. G., Guimaraes, A. R., Baker, J. R., Jennings, 
P. J., Carr, C. A., Sugiura, R. M., Vedantham, V., & Rosen, B. R. (1996). The 
hippocampal formation participates in novel picture encoding: evidence from 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 93, 8660–
8665. 
Studdert-Kennedy, M., Lineman, A. M., Hassis, K. S., &Cooper, F. R. (1970). Motor 
theory of speech perception: a reply to Lane’s critical review. Psychol. Rev. 77, 
234–249. 
Tinwell, A., & Grimshaw, M. (2009). “Bridging the uncanny: an impossible traverse?” 
in Proceedings of the 13th International MindTrek Conference: Everyday Life in 
the Ubiquitous Era, eds. O. Sotamaa, A. Lugmayr, H. Franssila, P. Näränen, 
and J. Vanhala (Tampere: ACM), 66–73. 
Tinwell, A., Grimshaw, M., & Williams, A. (2010). Uncanny behaviour in survival 
horror games. J. Gaming Virtual Worlds 2, 3–25. 
Todorov, A., & Engell, A. (2008). The role of the amygdala in implicit evaluation of 
emotionally neutral faces. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 3, 303–312. 
Vanni-Mercier, G., Mauguiere, F., Isnard, J., & Dreher, J. C. (2009). The 
hippocampus codes the uncertainty of cue-outcome associations: an 
intracranial electrophysiological study in humans. J. Neurosci. 29, 5287–5294. 
Volz, K. G., Schubotz, R. I., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Predicting events of varying 
probability: uncertainty investigated by fMRI. Neuroimage 19(Pt 1), 271–280. 
Vuilleumier, P. (2005). How brains beware: neural mechanisms of emotional 
attention. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 9, 585–594. 
59 
 
Vuong, Q. C., Peissig, J. J., Harrison, M. C., & Tarr, M. J. (2005). The role of surface 
pigmentation for recognition revealed by contrast reversal in faces and 
Greebles. Vision Res. 45, 1213–1223. 
Wager, T. D., & Feldman Barrett, L. (2004). From affect to control: functional 
specialization of the insula in motivation and regulation. Available at: 
http://www.affective-science.org/pubs/2004/Wager_Edfest_submitted_copy.pdf 
[Published online at PsycExtra]. 
Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., & Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and 
lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of findings 
from neuroimaging. Neuroimage 19, 513–531. 
Wages, R., Grünvogel, S. M., & Grützmacher, B. (2004). How realistic is realism? 
Considerations on the aesthetics of computer games. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 
3166, 216–225. 
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S., Dautenhaun, K., te Boekhorst, R., & Koay, K. L. (2008). 
Avoiding the uncanny valley: robot appearance, personality and consistency of 
behavior in a an attention-seeking home scenario for a robot companion. Auton. 
Robots 24, 159–178. 
Weiskopf, N., Hutton, C., Joseph, O., Turner, R., & Deichmann, R. (2007). Optimized 
EPI for fMRI studies of the orbitofrontal cortex: compensation of susceptibility-
induced gradients in the readout direction. MAGMA 20, 39–49. 
Williams, Z. M., & Eskandar, E. N. (2006). Selective enhancement of associative 
learning by microstimulation of the anterior caudate. Nat. Neurosci. 9, 562–568. 
Xu, X., Yue, X., Lescroart, M. D., Biederman, I., & Kim, J. G. (2009). Adaptation in 
the fusiform face area (FFA): image or person? Vision Res. 49, 2800–2807. 
Yamamoto, K., Tanaka, S., Kobayashi, H., Kozima, H., & Hashiya, K. (2009). A non-
humanoid robot in the “uncanny valley”: experimental analysis of the reaction to 
behavioral contingency in 2-3 year old children. PLoS ONE 4, e6974. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0006974 
 
 
  
60 
 
4. Study B. Category processing and the human likeness dimension 
of the uncanny valley hypothesis: eye-tracking data 
 
4.1. Abstract 
 
The Uncanny Valley Hypothesis (Mori, 1970) predicts that perceptual difficulty 
distinguishing between a humanlike object (e.g., lifelike prosthetic hand, mannequin) 
and its human counterpart evokes negative affect. Research has focused on affect, 
with inconsistent results, but little is known about how objects along the hypothesis’ 
dimension of human likeness (DHL) are actually perceived. This study used morph 
continua based on human and highly realistic computer-generated (avatar) faces to 
represent the DHL. Total number and dwell time of fixations to facial features were 
recorded while participants (N = 60) judged avatar versus human category 
membership of the faces in a forced choice categorization task. Fixation and dwell 
data confirmed the face feature hierarchy (eyes, nose, and mouth in this order of 
importance) across the DHL. There were no further findings for fixation. A change in 
the relative importance of these features was found for dwell time, with greater 
preferential processing of eyes and mouth of categorically ambiguous faces 
compared with unambiguous avatar faces. There were no significant differences 
between ambiguous and human faces. These findings applied for men and women, 
though women generally dwelled more on the eyes to the disadvantage of the nose. 
The mouth was unaffected by gender. In summary, the relative importance of facial 
features changed on the DHL’s non-human side as a function of categorization 
ambiguity. This change was indicated by dwell time only, suggesting greater depth of 
perceptual processing of the eyes and mouth of ambiguous faces compared with 
these features in unambiguous avatar faces. 
 
4.2. Introduction 
 
The Uncanny Valley Hypothesis (Mori, 1970) predicts that difficulty distinguishing 
between a humanlike object (e.g., robot, lifelike prosthetic hand, mannequin) and its 
natural human counterpart will evoke negatively valenced feelings and cognitions (for 
recent overviews, see, MacDorman et al., 2009a; Pollick, 2010). Mori described this 
negative state as characterized by feelings of unease and the uncanny (Figure 1). 
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This prediction has been of concern to animators, video game designers and 
roboticists in their effort to ensure that the appearance of highly realistic humanlike 
characters influences subjective experience and behaviour in the way that its design 
intended (e.g., Fabri et al., 2004; Minato et al., 2006; Walters et al., 2008; 
MacDorman et al., 2009a; Ho and MacDorman, 2010). Uncanny experience and the 
hypothesis’ valence dimension have therefore received much research attention. But 
this research has produced inconsistent results (e.g., Hanson, 2006; MacDorman, 
2006; Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009; Tinwell et al., 2010). One likely reason for this 
inconsistency is the uncertainty surrounding the vague terminology used to describe 
the hypothesis’ valence dimension (e.g., Bartneck et al., 2007; Seyama and 
Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009a; Dill et al., 2012). Another reason might 
be related to the fact that the hypothesis’ dimension of human likeness (DHL), 
defined in terms of a linear change in the degree of physical humanlike similarity, is 
not subjectively perceived as a simple linear change in humanlike similarity 
(Cheetham et al., 2011; Cheetham and Jancke, 2013). Given the aim of uncanny 
research to understand subjective experience of nonhuman characters in terms of 
human likeness, this recent evidence suggests that a better understanding of how 
human likeness is really perceived is needed. 
 
One approach to investigating perception along the DHL is to record eye movement 
(Just and Carpenter, 1980; Goldberg and Wichansky, 2003). Eye movements orient 
foveal vision to perceptual details that are critical for encoding and perceiving objects 
(Yarbus, 1967; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Egeth 
and Yantis, 1997 (for reviews, see Rayner, 1998; Henderson, 2003, 2007). 
Investigation of eye movement has contributed to our understanding of face 
perception (e.g., Walker-Smith et al., 1977; Cook, 1978; Schyns et al., 2002; Pearson 
et al., 2003; Stacey et al., 2005). These studies show that measures of eye 
movement such as the number of fixations and dwell time (i.e., the cumulative 
duration of fixations) over a particular area of interest are sensitive to bottom-up 
effects of stimulus information and to top-down task requirements (e.g., Robinson, 
1964; Yarbus, 1967; Posner, 1980). 
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Figure 1. Uncanny valley hypothesis. The illustration shows the hypothesis’ proposed non-
linear relationship between physical humanlike realism and affective experience. This 
relationship is generally positively valenced except at the degree of humanlike realism at 
which an object’s appearance and behavior is difficult to distinguish from that of the real 
human counterpart (i.e., at the first positive peak). This difficulty results in a sharp negative 
peak in the valence of affective experience that Mori describes as including feelings of 
eeriness and the uncanny (i.e., uncanny valley). This uncanny effect is thought to be stronger 
for objects in motion (illustration adapted from MacDorman, 2005). 
 
The Uncanny Valley Hypothesis essentially describes a situation in which individuals 
engage in the task of implicitly or explicitly assigning perceptually similar humanlike 
objects to a non-human or human category. An implicit assumption of the hypothesis 
is that this task can vary in difficulty along the DHL. This was confirmed by Cheetham 
et al. (2011). They used human and highly realistic avatar faces to generate morph 
continua to represent the DHL and presented the morphs of these continua in a two-
alternative forced choice categorization task. This task required participants to assign 
membership of each morphed face to either the human or avatar category. Their 
measures of response accuracy and response time confirmed that task difficulty 
increases sharply at the category boundary, that is, at the point of greatest 
categorization ambiguity. Similar findings have been reported for continua based on 
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other stimuli (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997). Consistent with Mori’s informal description 
of the hypothesis, this boundary should therefore mark the point along the DHL at 
which perceptual difficulty in extracting the visual evidence required to inform the 
category decision is most likely to evoke uncanny experience. The relationship 
between perceptual difficulty and uncanny experience has yet to be tested. 
 
Greater task difficulty can also be indicated by a longer duration of fixations, that is, 
dwell time (Buswell, 1935). Dwell time is thought to reflect the demands of actively 
processing a fixated region of visual interest (for process monitoring models see, 
Rayner, 1987; Rayner and Fischer, 1987) and of the degree of in-depth processing of 
task-relevant information (Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Remington and Folk, 2001; 
Becker, 2011). For example, longer dwell time can reflect greater processing 
demands when discriminating between similar stimuli (Shen et al., 2003; Becker, 
2011) and when matching observed visual stimulus information to internal 
representations (Goldberg and Kotval, 1999). Uncertainty in perceptual decision 
making entails enhanced recruitment of attentional resources for the accumulation of 
sensory evidence (Heekeren et al., 2008). Longer dwell time might therefore be 
expected when an individual encounters difficulty extracting perceptual information 
from a categorically ambiguous stimulus and matching this information to 
representations of the non-human or human category (Fitts et al., 1950; Barton et al., 
2006). Assuming that Mori’s hypothesis is correct, the cognitive demands placed on 
processing perceptual information should be greater at the category boundary of the 
DHL compared with the other regions of the DHL where there is little or no 
categorization ambiguity. Based on the preceding considerations, it would be 
consistent with Mori’s hypothesis that differences in perceptual processing demands 
along the DHL are indicated by differences in dwell time. 
 
The relative importance of particular visual features such as the eyes, nose, and 
mouth is not addressed in the Uncanny Valley Hypothesis, although these features 
have received attention in uncanny-related research (e.g., Seyama and Nagayama, 
2007; MacDorman et al., 2009a; Looser and Wheatley, 2010). Certain facial features 
and particularly the eyes do generally draw more overt attention in various tasks 
(Yarbus, 1967; Fisher and Cox, 1975; Haith et al., 1977; Walker-Smith et al., 1977; 
Janik et al., 1978; Langdell, 1978; Althoff and Cohen, 1999; Minut et al., 2000; 
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Henderson et al., 2005; Schwarzer et al., 2005). Evidence of a facial feature 
hierarchy pertaining to the relative importance of the eyes, nose, and mouth (and of 
other features) is long established (Ellis et al., 1979; Fraser and Parker, 1986). But a 
central question affecting both design considerations and the cognitive processing of 
such realistic humanlike characters is whether the relative importance of these facial 
features is modulated by categorization ambiguity. In other words, does the relative 
importance of these facial features change as a function of the difficulty of perceptual 
decision making at different points along the DHL? Uncanny-related research shows 
that the relative realism of the eyes can influence the experience of negative affect 
(Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009a), and a recent study 
suggests that the eyes and mouth contain more diagnostic information for 
determining whether human and humanlike faces are animate (Looser and Wheatley, 
2010). These findings mean that certain facial features might be preferentially fixated 
in order to determine category membership when sensory evidence is unclear. This 
would be indicated by a change between categorically unambiguous and ambiguous 
faces in the relative proportion of fixations to the eyes, nose, and mouth. 
 
An important consideration is that women show a general processing advantage for 
perceptual details in face detection and facial identity discrimination tasks, especially 
under more demanding processing conditions (McBain et al., 2009; see also Lewin 
and Herlitz, 2002; Rehnman and Herlitz, 2007). This advantage is well investigated 
for face recognition (for a review, see Herlitz and Rehnman, 2008) and facial 
expression recognition (Kirouac and Doré, 1985; Nowicki and Hartigan, 1988; Thayer 
and Johnsen, 2000; Hall and Matsumoto, 2004; Montagne et al., 2005; Scholten et 
al., 2005; Biele and Grabowska, 2006). These studies show that women process 
faces faster and more accurately than do men. The female advantage in expression 
recognition is associated with greater female attention to the eyes, indicated by 
longer eye-related dwell time and larger fixation number (Hall et al., 2010). Similar 
findings have been found in other tasks and with other stimuli (Miyahira et al., 
2000a,b). 
 
The aim of this investigation was to examine whether there are differences in the way 
visual attention is overtly oriented to the eyes, nose, and mouth of categorically 
unambiguous and ambiguous faces along the DHL. The DHL was represented using 
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morph continua (e.g., Hanson, 2006; Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; Ho et al., 2008), 
the advantage of which is that they allow careful experimental control of differences 
in humanlike appearance and the exclusion of confounding perceptual dimensions 
(for a critical overview of the use of morph continua in uncanny research, see 
Cheetham and Jancke, 2013). The morph continua were generated from avatar and 
human parent faces and the morphs presented in a forced choice categorization 
task. Eye measures of fixation number and dwell time were collected to determine, 
firstly, the presence of a general face feature hierarchy for the eyes, nose, and 
mouth. Second, we examined whether the relative importance of these features 
changes between categorically unambiguous avatar and human faces compared with 
categorically ambiguous faces at the category boundary of the DHL. The 
categorically unambiguous faces and the peak in categorization ambiguity were 
determined on the basis of the categorization responses and response times (RT) in 
the categorization task. Based on the preceding considerations, we predicted that 
greater categorization ambiguity would be reflected in a shift in the relative 
importance of facial features in terms of dwell time but not necessarily in terms of the 
actual location of fixations. Third, we examined whether there are differences 
between men and women in categorization responses and response latencies and in 
our measures of eye movement. Based on the available literature, we anticipated that 
women would generally show shorter response latencies than men and explored the 
possibility that the eyes are generally more important for women than for men when 
processing faces along the DHL. 
 
4.3. Experiment 4. Category processing and eye-movement 
 
4.4. Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
 
All volunteers were healthy students (N = 60, 31 females, 29 males; aged 18–32, 
mean 23 years) of the University of Zurich, with no record of neurological or 
psychiatric illness and no current medication. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, were native or fluent speakers of Swiss or 
Standard German, and consistently right-handed (Annett, 1970). All participants 
66 
 
reported having no active design or gaming experience with computer-generated 
characters in video games, virtual role-playing games, second life and other virtual 
reality environments. One female participant was omitted from analyses because she 
did not show a logistic component in the response function of her data (see section 
Logistic Function of Categorization Responses). Heavy track loss, that is, failure by 
the eye-tracking system to detect the pupil (mostly in this study because of excessive 
blinking) resulted in there being no fixation data in over 20% of trails in another 
female and in five male participants. The data of these participants was excluded 
from further analysis. Written informed consent was obtained before participation 
according to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. Each volunteer received 15 
Swiss Francs for participation. The study and all procedures and consent forms were 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Zurich. 
 
Stimuli 
 
Ten morph continua were generated using Morpher 3.3 software (Zealsoft, Inc., Eden 
Prairie, MN, USA) to represent the DHL. The parent images of the continua were 
natural human and avatar faces. Each face was male, indistinctive, presented with 
full frontal view, direct gaze, neutral expression and no other salient features (e.g., 
facial hair, jewelry). The avatars were generated using the avatar modeling software 
Poser 7 (Smith Micro Software, http://www.smithmicro.com). The avatars’ facial 
geometry and texture (configural cues, skin tone) were modeled to closely match the 
human counterpart. The parent images were then edited using Adobe Photoshop 
CS3. The external features of each parent image were masked with a generic elliptic 
form and black background, and contrast levels, overall brightness of the parent 
images of each continuum were adjusted to match. Each morph continuum 
comprised 15 different morphed images, each morph separated by an increment of 
6.66% in physical difference. A pilot study of N = 20 participants who were not 
recruited for the present study was conducted using the morph images of each 
morph continua in a forced choice categorization task. These images were numbered 
1 (avatar end) to 15 (human end). The purpose of the pilot study was to verify that 
the morph position along the continua of the category boundary and the shape of the 
response function of each continuum was consistent across all continua before 
performing the present eye-tracking study. This was confirmed. The task and 
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analyses for the pilot study were the same as described in the following sections for 
the present study. Based on the pilot study, the morph images 3–15 (i.e., the 13 most 
human-like morphs) of each morph continuum were used in the present study and re-
labeled 1 (avatar end) to 13 (human end; Figure 3). This was done to achieve a 
better balance in the number of morph images either side the category boundary. At 
a viewing distance of 62 cm, the stimuli (400 × 500 pixels) subtended a visual angle 
of 11° × 14°. This is approximately equivalent to viewing a real face from a normal 
distance during conversation of 90–100 cm (Hall, 1966; Henderson et al., 2005). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The participants were examined individually, each examination lasting approximately 
20 min in total. The participant received general instructions before beginning each 
experimental phase (i.e., calibration of eye-tracker, practice pre-test, and main test). 
The participant was seated in a chair with a chin rest and head band to restrain head 
movement. An I-View SMI dark pupil remote eye-tracker system (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Gmbh) with sampling frequency at 50 Hz and up to 0.5° accuracy was 
used to record horizontal and vertical eye positions. A 13-point calibration procedure 
was applied at the beginning of the experiment and drift correction was performed 
automatically. After the calibration procedure, the participant read written instructions 
on the monitor before commencement of the forced choice categorization task. This 
began with a practice pre-test of five trials using stimuli drawn from an unused 
continuum. Comprehension of the task and correct use of the response buttons was 
ensured. The participant then pressed the response box to initiate trial presentation 
for the main test. 
 
Each trial started with a blank screen for 2200 ms to allow rest and blinks followed by 
a fixation point for 800 ms (prepare signal) and then a stimulus. Participants were 
instructed to fixate on the point until the stimulus appeared, to view the stimulus 
freely and to identify the stimulus quickly and accurately as either an avatar or human 
by pressing one of two response keys. The stimulus disappeared from view following 
button press or after the maximum viewing duration of 3000 ms. Participants 
performed 130 trials, with each morph of each continuum being presented once, 
individually, in the centre of the monitor and in random order. 
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The task was conducted in a sound attenuated and light-dimmed room, and stimuli 
were presented on a LCD monitor (1280 × 1024 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate, at 
eye-to-monitor viewing distance of 62 cm), using Presentation® software (Version 
14.1, www.neurobs.com).  
 
Analyses 
 
Eye movement data from stimulus onset until participant response was analyzed. Be-
Gaze software Version 2.5 (SensoMotoric Instruments, Gmbh) was used to pre-
process the data. A fixation was defined as consecutive eye gaze positions within an 
area of 1° for a period of 100 ms or more. Blinks and any fixations that fell outside the 
masked face region were discarded from data analysis. Four areas of interest (AOI) 
were assigned: the internal face area as a whole and the individually defined areas of 
the eyes (including the eyebrows), nose, and mouth, as shown in Figure 2. Total 
fixation number and cumulative total fixation duration for each AOI was computed. 
The same AOI were applied to all stimuli to ensure consistency in the definition of 
boundaries between facial features and size of AOI. Given the different response 
latencies, values were normalized to represent the “proportion of the total number of 
fixations” (referred to in the following as “fixations”) and the “proportion of the total 
fixation duration” (referred to in the following as “dwell time”) within each AOI and 
entered into statistical analyses as dependent variables. For all analyses, only data 
was included for trials in which responses were made and before stimulus duration 
elapsed. All data analyses were performed using SPSS version 17.0 (SPSS, Inc., 
Chicago, IL, USA). 
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Figure 2. Areas of interest. Illustration of internal region of the face comprising the areas of 
interest for the facial features eyes, nose, mouth. 
 
4.5. Results 
 
Forced Choice Categorization 
 
Forced choice – categorization responses 
 
The slope of the categorization response function was used to summarize the avatar-
human categorization response data. The function was determined by fitting logistic 
function models to the data of each participant across continua. Informal inspection of 
each participant’s fitted regression curve indicated for each participant a response 
function with a sigmoid shape indicative of a category boundary, with the exception of 
one participant who following the analysis of logistic function (see section Logistic 
Function of Categorization Responses) was excluded from subsequent analyses. 
Parameter estimates were derived from the model and entered in the analyses of the 
logistic function of categorization responses and of the category boundary. 
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Figure 3 shows the mean aggregated response data for the 10 continua across male 
and female participants and, for purposes of illustration, the fitted response function 
computed on the basis of the grand mean of these continua. The sigmoid-shaped 
curve of the fitted response function shows a lower and upper asymptote of avatar 
and human categorization responses that nears 100% for avatars and 95% for 
humans, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean responses in the categorization task. The mean aggregated response 
(dotted line), shown in terms of the percentage of “human” responses, and the mean logistic 
curve (continuous line) across all continua and participants are displayed. The mean 
category boundary (dashed line) indicates the morph position along the continua at which 
there is maximum uncertainty of 50% in categorization judgments. The bottom panel of the 
figure shows an example of a morph continuum. 
 
Logistic function of categorization responses 
 
The derived parameter estimates for the logistic function of data averaged across the 
10 continua for each participant were tested against zero in a one-sample t-test. The 
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result showed a highly significant logistic component, t58 = 20.19, p > 0.001, that 
captures a sigmoid-shaped function consistent with a category boundary (Harnad, 
1987; Figure 3). 
 
Category boundary 
 
The estimates for the β0 and β1 parameters of each participant across continua were 
used to compute the category boundary value [i.e., y = 0.5: −ln(β0)/ln(β1)]. This value 
indicates the morph position along the continua that corresponds with the ordinate 
midpoint between the lower and upper asymptotes, that is, the point of maximum 
uncertainty of 50% in categorization judgments. Across continua, the mean category 
boundary value (M = 7.81, SD = 0.83) corresponds with face morph position 8 
(Figure 3). An independent t-test showed that the mean category boundary value for 
male participants (M = 8.23, SD = 0.93) was not significantly different from that for 
female participants (M = 7.49, SD = 0.68). 
 
Categorization response as a function of morph position 
 
We tested for expected differences in the categorization responses as a function of 
morph position (i.e., 1–13) and examined potential differences in categorization 
responses between the continua and male and female participants. A repeated 
measures of analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA) was performed on the dependent 
variable “response” (for avatar-human categorizations) of each participant with the 
“morph position” (13 levels) across the 10 continua. “Sex” was entered in analysis as 
between subject variable. Greenhouse–Geisser adjustment was applied to correct 
the degrees of freedom for violation of the sphericity assumption (and applied as 
appropriate in subsequent analyses). The analysis showed a highly significant effect 
for morph position [F(4.39, 259.23) = 765.48, p < 0.001]. 
 
Forced choice – categorization response times 
 
Differences in category decision difficulty, as indicated by the slope of the 
categorization response function, are likely to be reflected in different response 
latencies for the morphs of the continua. To gain an overall picture of the RT at 
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different morph positions, a one-way RM-ANOVA with morph position (13 levels) and 
RT as the dependent variable was conducted. “Sex” was entered in analysis as 
between subject variable. The analysis showed a highly significant effect for morph 
position [F(4.28, 252.3) = 168.2, p < 0.001], and for sex, F(4.28, 252.3) = 4.54, p = 
0.001 (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean RT in the categorization task. The mean aggregated response time for men 
(blue line) and women (black line) at the different morph positions 1–13, with error bars as 
standard errors (N = 59). Note that the longest response latencies for men and women at 
morph 8 correspond with the category boundary shown in Figure 2. 
 
The longest response latency should correspond with the position of the category 
boundary. For the whole sample, the category boundary is morph 8. To characterize 
the effect more clearly, the mean RT values at morph 8 were compared with the 
mean RT values at all other morph positions. A one-way RM-ANOVA analysis with 
morph position morph 8 versus all other morphs and RT as dependent variable and 
sex as between subject variable showed that RT at morph 8 (M = 1.73, SD = 0.33) 
differed highly significantly from RT for the other morph positions (M = 1.25, SD = 
0.16), F(1, 58) = 158.93, p < 0.001. There was no effect for sex. 
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Given the interest in asymmetry in performance for within-category avatar and human 
faces, we compared mean RT for morph positions 1–4 with mean RT for the morph 
positions 10–13. These morph positions were unambiguously assigned to one or 
other category with a decision certainty of in excess of 90%; a much less 
conservative criterion is often used in CP research (e.g., 66% as in Ectoff and 
Magee, 1992; Beale and Keil, 1995). For this, a one-way RM-ANOVA was conducted 
using the factor morph position (two levels: 1–4, 10–13) and RT as dependent 
variable. This indicated that mean RT for avatars at morph positions 1–4 (M = 1.02, 
SD = 0.12) was significantly shorter than that for the human faces at morph positions 
10–13 (M = 1.33, SD = 0.24), F(1, 58) = 135.29, p < 0.001. There was also a gender 
effect, such that males were slower to humans faces (M = 1.38, SD = 0.21) than 
females (M = 1.28, SD = 0.26), F(1, 58) = 5.14, p = 0.027 (Figure 4). There was no 
difference in RT between man and women for faces of the avatar category. 
 
Eye Movement 
 
Internal face area, and dwell time 
 
To determine the relative importance of the internal face area comprising the eyes, 
nose, and mouth as a whole, a one-way RM-ANOVA was conducted using the factor 
morph position (13 levels: 1–13) and dwell as dependent variable. Sex was entered 
in the analysis as between subject variable. No significant differences were found. 
 
Eyes, nose, mouth, and dwell time 
 
To examine the relative role of eyes, nose, and mouth for the DHL regions avatar 
category, human category and for the morph of peak uncertainty (i.e., morph position 
8) during category decision making, a two-way RM-ANOVA was conducted with the 
factors DHL region (3 levels: 1–4, 8, 10–13) and feature (three levels: eyes, nose, 
mouth) and dwell as dependent variable. “Sex” was entered in analysis as between 
subject variable. The analysis showed a general difference between men and women 
in the relative importance of the eyes, nose, and mouth, F(68.1, 1.36) = 4.47, p < 
0.027. The pre-planned contrasts show that there were generally no significant 
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differences for the mouth between men and women, while the eyes were more 
salient relative to the nose for women (Meyes = 58.55, SEeyes = 3.39; Mnose = 29.55, 
SEnose = 2.95) than for men (Meyes = 48.78, SEeyes = 4.36; Mnose = 33.38, SEnose = 
3.83), F(1, 50) = 5.26, p < 0.026 (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The proportion of total fixation duration on the eyes, nose, and mouth. The relative 
proportion of total dwell time to the eyes, nose, and mouth for the avatar and human 
categories and for the peak in uncertainty at the category boundary, with error bars as 
standard errors (N = 53). 
 
 
The analysis showed also a significant interaction effect for ENM × DHL region 
[F(2.65, 132.46) = 4.24, p = 0.009] such that the relative salience of the eyes, nose, 
and mouth varies as a function of DHL region. At the peak compared with the avatar 
category, pre-planned contrasts show a significant increase in sampling of the eyes 
(Mpeaks = 57.56, SE = 3.66; Mavatar = 50.34, SE = 3.42) compared with the nose (Mpeak 
= 29.38, SE = 2.31; Mavatar = 37.84, SE = 3.16), F(1, 51) = 7.78, p < 0.007, and a 
significant decrease in sampling of nose (Mpeak = 29.38, SE = 2.31; Mavatar = 37.84, 
SE = 3.16) compared with the mouth (Mpeak = 8.43, SE = 1.17; Mavatar = 10.62, SE = 
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1.45), F(1, 51) = 0.78, p < 0.033. At the human compared with the avatar category, 
there was a significant decrease in sampling of the nose (Mhuman = 34.65, SE = 2.74; 
Mavatar = 37.84, SE = 3.62) relative to the mouth (Mhuman = 11.62, SE = 1.43; Mavatar = 
10.07, SE = 1.45), F(1, 51) = 6.96, p < 0.011, but no significant effect for eyes. 
 
Internal face area, and fixation number 
 
A one-way RM-ANOVA was conducted using the factor morph position (13 levels: 1–
13) and dwell as dependent variable, and with sex as between subject variable. 
There were no effects. 
 
Eyes, nose, mouth, and fixation number 
 
To examine the relative role of eyes, nose, and mouth for the three DHL regions, as 
in the preceding analysis, a two-way RM-ANOVA was conducted with the factors 
DHL region (three levels: 1–4, 8, 10–13) and feature (three levels: eyes, nose, 
mouth) and fixations as dependent variable. “Sex” was entered in analysis as 
between subject variable. The analysis showed a highly similar general pattern for 
fixation as for dwell. There was a main effect for facial feature such that the eyes, 
nose, and mouth are differently important, F(1.53, 76.53) = 58.91, p < 0.001. The 
pre-planned contrasts show that the eyes were more salient relative to the nose 
(Meyes = 54.01, SEeyes = 3.23; Mnose = 31.67, SEnose = 2.71) [F(1, 51) = 116.61, p < 
0.001] and mouth (Mmouth = 11.55, SEmouth = 1.93) F(1, 51) = 21.63, p < 0.001 and the 
nose more salient than the mouth, F(1, 51) = 53.12, p < 0.001 (Figure 6). But there 
was no significant effect for DHL region, though this did approach significance, 
F(148.9, 74.44) = 3.27, p = 0.058. There were no other significant effects for 
fixations. 
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Figure 6. The proportion of total fixation number to the eyes, nose, and mouth. The relative 
proportion of total fixation number to the eyes, nose, and mouth for the avatar and human 
categories and for the peak in uncertainty at the category boundary, with error bars as 
standard errors (N = 53). 
 
4.6. Discussion 
 
The unique feature of uncanny research is the interest in understanding the impact 
on subjective experience and behaviour of uncertainty in distinguishing highly 
realistic non-human objects (or specific perceptual attributes of these) from their 
human counterpart (Ramey, 2005; MacDorman et al., 2009b). In terms of 
categorization behavior, ambiguity in assigning category membership should be 
greatest at the category boundary (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997). For our avatar-human 
continua, a category boundary was indicated by the sigmoid shape of the response 
function (Harnad, 1987). This shape reflects a monotonic increase in categorization 
accuracy (i.e., the proportion of decision responses in favour of the avatar or human 
category) and a corresponding monotonic decrease in response latency as a function 
of morph distance from the category boundary. The data thus indicate that the 
category boundary marks the point of greatest cognitive conflict between the two 
competing categorization response tendencies. 
77 
 
 
Overt orientation of visual attention to the eyes, nose, and mouth was therefore 
compared between faces at the category boundary and faces that were 
unambiguously assigned to the avatar or human category. The data for the number 
of fixations showed no significant differences in this comparison, indicating that 
category ambiguity has no specific effect on the targeting of fixations to these facial 
features. But this data did confirm that the relative importance of features in the face 
feature hierarchy (e.g., Walker-Smith et al., 1977; Althoff and Cohen, 1999) is similar 
for faces of variously humanlike appearance along the DHL, the eyes being 
especially important. The latter might be expected given the high human sensitivity to 
eye information (Itier et al., 2007; Itier and Batty, 2009) and the diagnostic value of 
the eye region for various face processing tasks (e.g., Althoff and Cohen, 1999; Hall 
et al., 2010). This eye dominance might also reflect the influence of an automatic 
gaze strategy that entails positioning fixations near a center of gravity (Bindemann et 
al., 2009). This center of gravity is biased toward a position between the eyes and 
nose (e.g., Deaner and Platt, 2003; Grosbras et al., 2005; Tyler and Chen, 2006; 
Hsiao and Cottrell, 2008; Saether et al., 2009; van Belle et al., 2010). It is possible 
that the presentation of full frontal faces in this study facilitated the targeting of the 
eyes (Saether et al., 2009). On the other hand, fixations to the eye region might have 
been advantageous in our categorization task because this point of regard might best 
serve rapid visual inspection of the faces, with the eyes being processed foveally and 
the nose and other areas parafoveally. Compared with our full frontal face stimuli, a 
change in the relative viewpoint of the observer might alter the fixation patterns 
generally. This is likely because head (and body) orientation can influence the 
direction of the viewer’s attention (Hietanen, 1999, 2002; Langton, 2000; 
Pomianowska et al., 2011). The impact of different viewpoints on eye movement 
patterns when processing categorically unambiguous and ambiguous faces along the 
DHL is not known. 
 
The data for dwell time revealed a different picture. Categorization ambiguity 
influenced the relative amount of dwell time spent extracting visual information from 
the eye, nose, and mouth before making a category decision. This effect was 
associated with the non-human side of the DHL, with a relative shift away from the 
nose region in avatars to the regions of the eyes and mouth of faces at the category 
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boundary. A similar effect almost reached significance for the comparison of the 
human versus ambiguous faces. The eye movement data thus suggest that avatars 
are processed differently than are ambiguous faces. The behavioural data support 
this by showing that category assignment of avatar faces is also much faster in 
comparison with the assignment of human faces. This replicates Cheetham et al.’s 
(2011) finding, using a much larger participant sample in the present study. Given 
that our participants’ perceptual and categorization experience with novel non-human 
but highly humanlike faces generally and especially with those presented in this study 
does not compare to their everyday expertise with human faces (Diamond and 
Carey, 1977; Tanaka and Curran, 2001; see, Ramey, 2005), one might have 
expected that the assignment of faces to the human category would have been 
easier than to the avatar category. 
 
One possible explanation for the strong difference in RT for the avatar compared with 
the human category decisions is that this decision is influenced by a strategy that 
involves the detection of perceptual information that is diagnostic of the non-human 
category, that is, of the category of which the human participant is not a member (see 
the race-feature hypothesis, Levin, 2000). This would mean that classification 
decisions are be based on establishing the presence or absence of avatar-specifying 
perceptual information, with faces being coded and categorized in terms of “avatar or 
not avatar” rather than as “avatar or human.” Assuming that detecting the presence 
rather than the absence of perceptual information is cognitively less demanding, this 
classification strategy would result in a classification advantage in RT for avatar 
faces. This avatar-feature hypothesis thus suggests that there might be preferential 
processing of avatar-specifying information during explicit categorization of 
categorically unambiguous avatars. 
 
The question is what perceptual information might be diagnostic for avatar faces 
during categorization. One possibility, given the task’s context of processing novel 
avatar faces and faces of the familiar human category, is that perceptual information 
indicating novelty could in itself serve as a readily identifiable primitive feature of 
members of the avatar category (cf. Levin, 2000). Certain properties of an avatar’s 
face such as the general shading of the smoothed skin texture might be relatively 
easy to detect and support a fast and reliable strategy for categorization (cf. 
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Cheetham et al., 2011). Alternatively, avatar-specifying information might relate to 
more detailed shape and texture information of the eyes, nose, and mouth 
(MacDorman et al., 2009a; Looser and Wheatley, 2010) independently of novelty 
processing. But it should be noted that visual discrimination performance of facial 
texture and shape properties is influenced by experience (Vuong et al., 2005; Balas 
and Nelson, 2010) and that perceptual and categorization experience can influence 
the selection of perceptual details used for analysis before categorization (e.g., 
Schyns, 1991; Schyns and Murphy, 1994). Given that novel stimuli are known to 
evoke different patterns of fixations than familiar stimuli (Althoff and Cohen, 1999), it 
is possible that repeated exposure to and greater perceptual and categorization 
experience with non-human faces might result in a change in eye movement 
patterns. Participants were therefore selected with a view to limiting the potential 
impact on eye movement behaviour of active experience with building and modifying 
avatars in video games and virtual reality environments and of active gaming 
experience, while recognizing that active and incidental exposure to humanlike 
characters in other media (e.g., comics and books, movies, and commercials) could 
influence eye movement patterns. The influence on eye movement patterns of active 
and incidental perceptual and categorization learning with humanlike characters 
along the DHL awaits investigation. 
 
Our main finding of the present study concerns the relative shift away from the nose 
region in avatars to the regions of the eyes and mouth of ambiguous faces. One 
approach to understanding which perceptual details are perceived and analyzed 
before categorization of these faces might be to consider the role of spatial frequency 
information. Eye movements are selective for spatial frequency information (e.g., 
Tavassoli et al., 2009) and the nose region is more diagnostic for processing stimulus 
information in coarser spatial frequency scales (Schyns et al., 2002). Coarser 
frequencies (i.e., low spatial frequencies) are suggested to facilitate encoding of 
shape and texture on the basis of the general luminance properties and shading of 
the face, corresponding therefore to a faster and broader but less detailed processing 
of the face (Sergent, 1986; Schyns and Oliva, 1994; Schyns and Gosselin, 2003). 
Given the relative shift in dwell time toward the nose region of avatars and the 
comparatively short RT for avatars, it is conceivable that a broad processing strategy 
80 
 
would help the quick identification of perceptual information that indicates 
membership of the avatar category. 
 
In contrast, longer response latencies and a greater proportion of dwell time to the 
eyes and mouth of ambiguous faces might be interpreted as reflecting a shift away 
from a faster but broad and less detailed processing strategy to a more time-
consuming strategy of processing finer perceptual details (Schyns and Murphy, 1994; 
Lamberts, 1998; Johansen and Palmeri, 2002). This is especially likely for highly 
similar faces (e.g., Oliva and Schyns, 1997) and, presumably, for faces that are 
difficult to discriminate in terms of avatar or human category membership. The eye 
region is more diagnostic in finer frequency scales (Schyns et al., 2002) and the 
processing of the specific shape of the mouth and eyes and of the contours of the 
nose benefits from a finer spatial resolution (i.e., high spatial frequencies; Sergent, 
1986; Schyns and Gosselin, 2003). We did not examine or manipulate spatial 
frequency, but these considerations suggest that there may have been a subtle shift 
in the relative salience of the nose of avatars to the eyes and mouth of ambiguous 
faces in a manner that resembles a course-to-fine sampling strategy along the DHL. 
This strategy would entail rapid and courser perceptual information processing that is 
sufficient for avatar categorization and more time-consuming processing of finer 
details (in addition to the coarser details) in order to disambiguate the category 
membership of faces near and at the category boundary. This course-to-fine 
hypothesis might be of further interest for uncanny-related research. 
 
Women were faster than men to make category decisions. This is generally 
consistent with the reported female advantage in other face processing 
categorization tasks (e.g., Hall et al., 2010). But this finding applied only to 
ambiguous and human faces. In fact, the greatest difference between men and 
women in RT was at the category boundary. The category boundary is associated 
with enhanced perceptual discrimination ability along the DHL (Cheetham et al., 
2011; Cheetham and Jancke, 2013), but these studies did not examine gender-
related differences. Like the present study, these studies presented male faces only. 
Whether the findings of this study similarly apply for female stimuli awaits further 
investigation. Women do show a processing advantage for discriminating perceptual 
details in faces, especially under more demanding processing conditions (McBain et 
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al., 2009; see also McGivern et al., 1998; Kimchi et al., 2008), but there were no 
gender-related differences in fixation or dwell time between avatar, human, and 
ambiguous faces, suggesting that any female advantage in RT does not translate 
into differences in eye movements along the DHL. The only gender-related difference 
in eye movements was in the general face feature hierarchy, with enhanced female 
attention to the eye region across the DHL for dwell time. A similar finding in women 
has been shown for expression recognition, and this was associated with greater 
eye-related dwell time and fixation number (Hall et al., 2010). Enhanced female 
attention to the eyes could be considered a task-independent effect associated with 
greater processing of socially relevant information in women (Saether et al., 2009). 
 
In summary, these findings show that categorization ambiguity influenced the relative 
amount of dwell time spent extracting visual information from the eyes, nose, and 
mouth, though in comparison only with the non-human side of the DHL. Together 
with the shorter decision response latencies for avatar faces, the findings thus 
suggest that categorically unambiguous avatars are processed differently than 
ambiguous or human faces. Guided in part by current uncanny research, the focus of 
this first eye movement study of category decision making along the DHL was placed 
on the eyes, nose, and mouth. These internal face features were also selected 
because the greater part of eye sampling behavior was directed toward these regions 
in previous studies (e.g., Barton et al., 2006). But the arbitrary size and shape of the 
AOI used in the present study might well have masked potential findings. For 
example, our data show a consistent 70–75% of fixations and dwell time within the 
internal facial regions of all faces along the DHL, suggesting that the external face 
area is nevertheless relevant for avatar-human category decision making. External 
facial features such as the jaw line, hair profile, and head contour, which were 
masked in this study, might be informative in further studies of the DHL and category 
processing. We focused on highly realistic non-human faces, and our findings might 
apply for similarly highly realistic androids (see Saygin et al., 2012) but not 
necessarily for less humanlike avatars, cartoon faces, and robots (see Chen et al., 
2010; Saygin et al., 2012). Our choice of stimuli did not reflect the examples of 
humanlike objects in the depiction of Mori’s hypothesis in Figure 1. This was because 
we sought to ensure careful experimental control and exclusion of visual cues of 
other perceptual dimensions that could confound with judgments of human likeness 
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along the DHL (Cheetham and Jancke, 2013). We used 2D facial stimuli, but given 
the growing impact of 3D technology in various media, a promising avenue of further 
research would be to examine the effect of stereoscopic depth cues in 3D compared 
with 2D facial stimuli on eye sampling behavior and categorization (e.g., Bülthoff and 
Newell, 2000; Liu and Ward, 2006; Chelnokova and Laeng, 2011). 
 
Conflict of Interest Statement 
 
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any 
commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of 
interest. 
Acknowledgments 
 
This work was supported by the European Union FET Integrated Project 
PRESENCCIA (Contract number 27731). 
 
4.7. References 
 
Althoff, R. R., and Cohen, N. J. (1999). Eye-movement-based memory effect: a 
reprocessing effect in face perception. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 25, 
997–1010. 
Annett, M. (1970). A classification of hand preference by association analysis. Br. J. 
Psychol. 61, 303–321. 
Balas, B., and Nelson, C. A. (2010). The role of face shape and pigmentation in 
other-race face perception: an electrophysiological study. Neuropsychologia 48, 
498–506. 
Bartneck, C., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., and Hagita, N. (2007). “Is the Uncanny Valley 
an Uncanny Cliff?,” in Proceedings of the 16th IEEE, RO-MAN, Jeju, 368–373. 
Barton, J. J. S., Radcliffe, N., Cherkasova, M. V., Edelman, J., and Intriligator, J. M. 
(2006). Information processing during face recognition: the effects of familiarity, 
inversion, and morphing on scanning fixations. Perception 35, 1089–1105. 
Beale, J. M., and Keil, F. C. (1995). Categorical effects in the perception of faces. 
Cognition 57, 217–219. 
Becker, S. I. (2011). Determinants of dwell time in visual search: similarity or 
perceptual difficulty? PLoS ONE 6:e17740. 
Biele, C., and Grabowska, A. (2006). Sex differences in perception of emotion 
intensity in dynamic and static facial expressions. Exp. Brain Res. 171, 1–6. 
Bindemann, M., Scheepers, C., and Burton, A. M. (2009). Viewpoint and center of 
gravity affect eye movements to human faces. J. Vis. 9, 1–16. 
Bülthoff, I., and Newell, F. N. (2000). Investigating categorical perception of gender 
with 3-D morphs of familiar faces. Perception 29, 57. 
83 
 
Buswell, G. T. (1935). How People Look at Pictures. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Campbell, R., Pascalis, O., Coleman, M., Wallace, S. B., and Benson, P. J. (1997). 
Are faces of different species perceived categorically by human observers? 
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 264, 1429–1434. 
Cheetham, M., Suter, P., and Jancke, L. (2011). The human likeness dimension of 
the “uncanny valley hypothesis”: behavioral and functional MRI findings. Front. 
Hum. Neurosci. 5:126. 
Cheetham, M., and Jancke, L. (2013). Perceptual and category processing of the 
Uncanny Valley Hypothesis’ dimension of human likeness: some 
methodological issues. J. Vis. Exp. e4375.. 
Chelnokova, O., and Laeng, B. (2011). Three-dimensional information in face 
recognition: an eye-tracking study. J. Vis. 11, 27. 
Chen, H., Russell, R., Nakayama, K., and Livingstone, M. (2010). Crossing the 
“uncanny valley”: adaptation to cartoon faces can influence perception of 
human faces. Perception 39, 378–386. 
Cook, M. (1978). “Eye movements during recognition of faces,” in Practical Aspects 
of Memory, eds M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, and R. N. Sykes (New York: 
Academic Press). 286–292. 
Deaner, R. O., and Platt, M. L. (2003). Reflexive social attention in monkeys and 
humans. Curr. Biol. 13, 1609–1613. 
Desimone, R., and Duncan, J. (1995). “Neural mechanisms of selective visual 
attention.” Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 18, 193–222. 
Diamond, R., and Carey, S. (1977). Development changes in the representation of 
faces. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 23, 1–22. 
Dill, V., Flach, L., Hocevar, R., Lykawka, C., Musse, S., and Pinho, M. (2012). 
“Evaluation of the uncanny valley in CG characters,” in Intelligent Virtual Agents 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, eds N. Yukiko, M. Neff, A. Paiva, and M. 
Walker (Berlin: Springer), 511–513. 
Duncan, J., and Humphreys, G. W. (1989). Visual search and stimulus similarity. 
Psychol. Rev. 96, 433–458. 
Ectoff, N. L., and Magee, J. J. (1992). Categorical perception of facial expressions. 
Cognition 44, 227–240. 
Egeth, H. E., and Yantis, S. (1997). Visual attention: control, representation, and time 
course. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 48, 269–297. 
Ellis, H. D., Shepherd, J. W., and Davis, G. M. (1979). Identification of familiar and 
unfamiliar faces from internal and external features: some implications for 
theories of face recognition. Perception 8, 431–439. 
Fabri, M., Moore, D. J., and Hobbs, D. J. (2004). “Mediating the expression of 
emotion in educational collaborative virtual environments: an experimental 
study,” in International Journal of Virtual Reality, London: Springer Verlag. 
Fisher, G. H., and Cox, R. L. (1975). Recognizing human faces. Appl. Ergon. 6, 104–
109. 
Fitts, P. M., Jones, R. E., and Milton, J. L. (1950). Eye movements of aircraft pilots 
during instrument-landing approaches. Aeronaut. Eng. Rev. 9, 24–29. 
Fraser, I. H., and Parker, D. M. (1986). “Reaction time measures of feature saliency 
in a perceptual integration task,” in Aspects of face processing, eds H. D. Ellis, 
M. A. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, and A. Young (Dordecht: Martinus Nijhoff), 45–58. 
Goldberg, J. H., and Kotval, X. P. (1999). Computer interface evaluation using eye 
movements: methods and constructs. Int. J. Ind. Ergon. 24, 631–645. 
84 
 
Goldberg, J. H., and Wichansky, A. M. (2003). “Eye tracking in usability evaluation: a 
practitioner’s guide,” in The Mind’s Eye: Cognitive and Applied Aspects of Eye 
Movement Research, eds J. Hyönä, R. Radach, and H. Deubel (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier), 493–516. 
Grosbras, M.-H., Laird, A., and Paus, T. (2005). Human cortical regions involved in 
gaze production, attention shifts and gaze perception: a brain imaging meta-
analysis. Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 140–154. 
Haith, M. M., Bergman, T., and Moore, M. J. (1977). Eye contact and face scanning 
in early infancy. Science 198, 853–855. 
Hall, E. T. (1966). The Hidden Dimension. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Hall, J. A., and Matsumoto, D. (2004). Gender differences in judgments of multiple 
emotions from facial expressions. Emotion 4, 201–206. 
Hall, J. K., Hutton, S. B., and Morgan, M. J. (2010). Sex differences in scanning 
faces: does attention to the eyes explain female superiority in facial expression 
recognition? Cogn. Emot. 24, 629–637. 
Hanson, D. (2006). “Exploring the aesthetic range for humanoid robots”, in 
Proceedings of the ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: Toward Social 
Mechanisms of Android Science, Vancouver, 39–42. 
Harnad, S. R. (1987). “Introduction: psychological and cognitive aspects of 
categorical perception: a critical overview,” in Categorical Perception: The 
Groundwork of Cognition, ed. S. R. Harnad (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), 1–25. 
Heekeren, H. R., Marrett, S., and Ungerleider, L. G. (2008). The neural systems that 
mediate human perceptual decision making. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 467–479. 
Henderson, J. M. (2003). Human gaze control during real-world scene perception. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 7, 498–504. 
Henderson, J. M. (2007). Regarding scenes. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 219–222. 
Henderson, J. M., Williams, C. C., and Falk, R. J. (2005). Eye movements are 
functional during face learning. Mem. Cognit. 33, 98–106. 
Herlitz, A., and Rehnman, J. (2008). Sex differences in episodic memory. Curr. Dir. 
Psychol. Sci. 17, 52–56. 
Hietanen, J. K. (1999). Does your gaze direction and head orientation shift my visual 
attention? Neuroreport 10, 3443–3447. 
Hietanen, J. K. (2002). Social attention orienting integrates visual information from 
head and body orientation. Psychol. Res. 66, 174–179. 
Ho, C.-C., and MacDorman, K. F. (2010). Revisiting the uncanny valley theory: 
developing and validating an alternative to the Godspeed indices. Comput. 
Hum. Behav. 26, 1508–1151. 
Ho, C.-C., MacDorman, K. F., and Pramono, Z. A. D. (2008). “Human emotion and 
the uncanny valley: a GLM, MDS, and isomap analysis of robot video ratings,” 
in ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human–Robot Interaction, 
Amsterdam, 169–176. 
Hsiao, J. H., and Cottrell, G. (2008). Two fixations suffice in face recognition. 
Psychol. Sci. 19, 998–1006. 
Itier, R. J., and Batty, M. (2009). Neural bases of eye and gaze processing: the core 
of social cognition. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33, 843–863. 
Itier, R. J., Villate, C., and Ryan, J. D. (2007). Eyes always attract attention but gaze 
orienting is task-dependent: evidence from eye movement monitoring. 
Neuropsychologia 45, 1019–1028. 
85 
 
Janik, S. W., Wellens, A. R., Goldberg, M. L., and Dell’Osso, L. F. (1978). Eyes as 
the center of focus in the visual examination of human faces. Percept. Mot. 
Skills 47, 857–858. 
Johansen, M. K., and Palmeri, T. J. (2002). Are there representational shifts during 
category learning? Cogn. Psychol. 45, 482–553. 
Just, M. A., and Carpenter, P. A. (1980). A theory of reading: from eye fixations to 
comprehension. Psychol. Rev. 87, 329–354. 
Kimchi, R., Amishav, R., and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, A. (2008). Gender differences in 
global-local perception? Evidence from orientation and shape judgments. Acta 
Psychol. (Amst.) 130, 64–71. 
Kirouac, G., and Doré, F. Y. (1985). Accuracy of the judgement of facial expression 
of emotions as a function of sex and level of education. J. Nonverbal Behav. 91, 
3–7. 
Lamberts, K. (1998). The time course of categorization. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. 
Cogn. 24, 695–711. 
Langdell, T. (1978). Recognition of faces: an approach to the study of autism. J. Child 
Psychol. Psyc. 19, 255–268. 
Langton, S. R. H. (2000). The mutual influence of gaze and head orientation in the 
analysis of social attention direction. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 53A, 825–845. 
Levin, D. T. (2000). Race as a visual feature: using visual search and perceptual 
discrimination tasks to understand face categories and the cross race 
recognition deficit. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 129, 559–574. 
Lewin, C., and Herlitz, A. (2002). Sex differences in face recognition-women’s faces 
make the difference. Brain Cogn. 50, 121–128. 
Liu, C. H., and Ward, J. (2006). The use of 3D information in face recognition. Vision 
Res. 46, 768–773. 
Loftus, G. R., and Mackworth, N. H. (1978). Cognitive determinants of fixation 
location during picture viewing. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 4, 
565–572. 
Looser, C. E., and Wheatley, T. (2010). The tipping point of animacy: how, when, and 
where we perceive life in a face. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1854–1862. 
MacDorman, K. (2005). “Androids as an experimental apparatus: why is there an 
uncanny valley and can we exploit it?,” in Toward Social Mechanisms of 
Android Science: A CogSci 2005 Workshop, Stresa, 106–118. 
MacDorman, K. F. (2006). “Subjective ratings of robot video clips for human likeness, 
familiarity, and eeriness: an exploration of the uncanny valley [electronic 
resource],” in ICCS/CogSci-2006 Long Symposium: Toward Social Mechanisms 
of Android Science. Vancouver. 
MacDorman, K., Green, R., Ho, C.-C., and Koch, C. (2009a). Too real for comfort? 
Uncanny responses to computer generated faces. Comput. Hum. Behav. 25, 
695–710. 
MacDorman, K. F., Vasudevan, S. K., and Ho, C.-C. (2009b). Does Japan really have 
robot mania? Comparing attitudes by implicit and explicit measures. AI Soc. 23, 
485–510. 
McBain, R., Norton, D., and Chen, Y. (2009). Females excel at basic face perception. 
Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 130, 168–173. 
McGivern, R. F., Mutter, K. L., Anderson, J., Wideman, G., Bodnar, M., and Huston, 
P. J. (1998). Gender differences in incidental learning and visual recognition 
memory: support for a sex difference in unconscious environmental awareness. 
Pers. Individ. Dif. 25, 223–232. 
86 
 
Minato, T., Shimada, M., Itakura, S., Lee, K., and Ishiguro, H. (2006). Evaluating 
human likeness of an android by comparing gaze behaviors elicited. Adv. 
Robot. 20, 1147–1163. 
Minut, S., Mahadevan, S., Henderson, J. M., and Dyer, F. C. (2000). “Face 
recognition using foveal vision,” in Biologically Motivated Computer Vision 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, eds S.-W. Lee, H. H. Bülthoff, and T. 
Poggio (Berlin: Springer), 424–433. 
Miyahira, A., Morita, K., Yamaguchi, H., Morita, Y., and Maeda, H. (2000a). Gender 
differences and reproducibility in exploratory eye movements of normal 
subjects. Psychiatry Clin. Neurosci. 54, 31–36. 
Miyahira, A., Morita, K., Yamaguchi, H., Nonaka, K., and Maeda, H. (2000b). Gender 
differences of exploratory eye movements: a life span study. Life Sci. 68, 569–
577. 
Montagne, B., Kessels, R. P., Frigerio, E., de Haan, E. H., and Perrett, D. I. (2005). 
Sex differences in the perception of affective facial expressions: do men really 
lack sensitivity? Cogn. Process. 6, 136–141. 
Mori, M. (1970). “Bukimi no tani: the uncanny valley. Energy 7(4):33–35 (in 
Japanese),” in English translation provided at CogSci ’05 workshop: toward 
social mechanisms of android science, views of the Uncanny Valley. Available 
at: http://www.androidscience.com/ 
theuncannyvalley/proceedings2005/uncannyvalley.html. 
Nowicki, S. Jr., and Hartigan, M. (1988). Accuracy of facial affect recognition as a 
function of locus of control orientation and anticipated interpersonal interaction. 
J. Soc. Psychol. 128, 363–372. 
Oliva, A., and Schyns, P. G. (1997). Coarse blobs or fine edges? Evidence that 
information diagnosticity changes the perception of complex visual stimuli. 
Cogn. Psychol. 34, 72–107. 
Pearson, A., Henderson, J., Schyns, P. G., and Gosselin, F. (2003). Task dependent 
eye movements during face recognition. Abstr. Psychon. Soc. 8, 84. 
Pollick, F. E. (2010). “In search of the uncanny valley,” in User Centric Media, eds P. 
Daras, and O. M. Ibarra (Berlin: Springer), 69–78. 
Pomianowska, I., Germeys, F., Verfaillie, K., and Newell, F. N. (2011). The role of 
social cues in the deployment of spatial attention: head-body relationships 
automatically activate directional spatial codes in a Simon task. Front. Integr. 
Neurosci. 6:4. 
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 32, 3–25. 
Ramey, C. H. (2005). The uncanny valley of similarities concerning abortion, 
baldness, heaps of sand, and humanlike robots. Paper Presented at the 
Proceedings of Views of the Uncanny Valley Workshop: IEEE-RAS International 
Conference on Humanoid Robots, Tsukuba. 
Rayner, K. (1987). Eye movements in reading and information processing. Psychol. 
Bull. 85, 618–660. 
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years 
of research. Psychol. Bull. 124, 372–422. 
Rayner, K., and Fischer, D. L. (1987). Letter processing during eye fixations in visual 
search. Percept. Psychophys. 42, 87–100. 
Rehnman, J., and Herlitz, A. (2007). Women remember more faces than men do. 
Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 124, 344–355. 
Remington, R. W., and Folk, C. L. (2001). A dissociation between attention and 
selection. Psychol. Sci. 12, 511–515. 
87 
 
Robinson, D. A. (1964). The mechanics of human saccadic eye movement. J. 
Physiol. 174, 245–264. 
Saether, L., Belle, W. V., Laeng, B., Brennen, T., and Overvoll, M. (2009). Anchoring 
gaze when categorizing faces’ sex: evidence from eye-tracking data. Vision 
Res. 49, 2870–2880. 
Saygin, A. P., Chaminade, T., Ishiguro, H., Driver, J., and Frith, C. (2012). The thing 
that should not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving 
human and humanoid robot actions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7, 413–422. 
Scholten, M. R., Aleman, A., Montagne, B., and Kahn, R. S. (2005). Schizophrenia 
and processing of facial emotions: sex matters. Schizophr. Res. 78, 61–67. 
Schwarzer, G., Huber, S., and Dümmler, T. (2005). Gaze behavior in analytical and 
holistic face processing. Mem. Cognit. 33, 344–354. 
Schyns, P. G. (1991). A modular neural network of concept acquisition. Cogn. Sci. 
15, 461–508. 
Schyns, P. G., Bonnar, L., and Gosselin, F. (2002). Show me the features! 
Understanding recognition from the use of visual information. Psychol. Sci. 13, 
402–409. 
Schyns, P. G., and Gosselin, F. (2003). “Diagnostic use of scale information for 
componential and holistic recognition,” in Perception of Faces, Objects, and 
Scenes. Analytic and Holistic Processes, eds M. A. Peterson, and G. Rhodes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 120–145. 
Schyns, P. G., and Murphy, G. L. (1994). “The ontogeny of part representation in 
object concepts,” in The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, ed. D. L. Medin 
(New York: Academic Press), 305–349. 
Schyns, P. G., and Oliva, A. (1994). From blobs to boundary edges: evidence for 
time and spatial scale dependent scene recognition. Psychol. Sci. 5, 195–200. 
Sergent, J. (1986). “Microgenesis of face perception,” in Aspects of Face Processing, 
eds H. D. Ellis, M. A. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, and A. M. Young (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff), 17–33. 
Seyama, J., and Nagayama, R. S. (2007). The uncanny valley: the effect of realism 
on the impression of artificial human faces. Presence (Camb.) 16, 337–351. 
Shen, J., Reingold, E. M., Pomplun, M., and Williams, D. E. (2003). “Saccadic 
selectivity during visual search: the influence of central processing difficulty,” in 
The Mind’s Eyes: Cognitive and Applied Aspects of Eye Movement Research, 
eds J. Hyona, R. Radach, and H. Deubel (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers), 65–88. 
Stacey, P. C., Walker, S., and Underwood, J. D. (2005). Face processing and 
familiarity: evidence from eye-movement data. Br. J. Psychol. 96(Pt 4), 407–
422. 
Tanaka, J. W., and Curran, T. (2001). A neural basis for expert object recognition. 
Psychol. Sci. 12, 43–47. 
Tavassoli, A., Linde, I., Bovik, A. C., and Cormack, L. K. (2009). Eye movements 
selective for spatial frequency and orientation during active visual search. Vision 
Res. 49, 173–181. 
Thayer, J. F., and Johnsen, B. H. (2000). Sex differences in judgement of facial 
affect: a multivariate analysis of recognition errors. Scand. J. Psychol. 41, 243–
246. 
Tinwell, A., and Grimshaw, M. (2009). “Bridging the uncanny: an impossible 
traverse?,” in Proceedings of the 13th International MindTrek Conference: 
Everyday Life in the Ubiquitous Era, eds O. Sotamaa, A. Lugmayr, H. Franssila, 
P. Näränen, and J. Vanhala (Tampere: ACM), 66–73. 
88 
 
Tinwell, A., Grimshaw, M., and Williams, A. (2010). Uncanny behaviour in survival 
horror games. J. Gaming Virtual World. 2, 3–25. 
Tyler, C. W., and Chen, C. C. (2006). Spatial summation of face information. J. Vis. 
6, 1117–1125. 
van Belle, G., Ramon, M., Lefèvre, P., and Rossion, B. (2010). Fixation patterns 
during recognition of personally familiar and unfamiliar faces. Front. Psychol. 
1:20. 
Vuong, Q. C., Peissig, J. J., Harrison, M. C., and Tarr, M. J. (2005). The role of 
surface pigmentation for recognition revealed by contrast reversal in faces and 
Greebles. Vision Res. 45, 1213–1223. 
Walker-Smith, G. J., Gale, A. G., and Findlay, J. M. (1977). Eye-movement strategies 
involved in face perception. Perception 6, 313–326. 
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S., Dautenhaun, K., Boekhorst, R., and Koay, K. L. (2008). 
Avoiding the uncanny valley: robot appearance, personality and consistency of 
behavior in an attention-seeking home scenario for a robot companion. Auton. 
Robots 24, 159–178. 
Yarbus, A. L. (1967). Eye movements and Vision. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
5. Study C. Perceptual discrimination difficulty and familiarity in the 
Uncanny Valley  
 
5.1. Abstract    
 
The Uncanny Valley Hypothesis predicts that enhanced difficulty perceptually 
discriminating between categorically ambiguous human and humanlike characters 
(e.g., highly realistic robot) will evoke negatively valenced (i.e., uncanny) experience. 
An ABX perceptual discrimination task and signal detection analyses were used to 
delineate the profile of perceptual discrimination (PD) difficulty along the UVH' 
dimension of human likeness (DHL). The DHL was represented using avatar-to-
human morph continua. Rejecting the implicit assumption underlying the UVH' 
prediction, Experiment 1 (N=49) confirmed reduced PD difficulty for categorically 
ambiguous (and for unambiguous avatar) faces and, notably, enhanced PD difficulty 
for unambiguous human faces. In contrast to the predicted direction of the 
relationship between PD difficulty and affective experience (i.e. the UVH' familiarity 
dimension), Experiment 2 (N=49) demonstrated that greater PD difficulty is 
associated with more positively rather than negatively valenced affective experience. 
Critically, this effect was strongest for ambiguous faces, this suggesting a relationship 
between PD and familiarity that is more consistent with the metaphor happy valley. 
Using inverted faces, Experiment 3 (N=25) found no evidence to suggest that the 
asymmetry in PD along the DHL is attributable to a differential processing strategy 
(i.e., processing avatars at a category and human faces at an individual level).  In 
conclusion, these findings for static faces show clearly that the UVH' assumed 
distribution of PD difficulty along the DHL and the predicted relationship between this 
and familiarity is incorrect.  
 
5.2. Introduction  
 
Progress in robotics and computer graphics in simulating human appearance and 
behaviour to high degrees of realism has fuelled research interest in the Uncanny 
Valley Hypothesis (UVH) (Mori, 1970). The UVH predicts that perceptual difficulty 
discriminating between highly realistic humanlike objects and characters (e.g., robot, 
prosthetic hand) and their human equivalent will evoke an unpleasant affective state. 
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The degree of high realism at which this state occurs is conjectured to be at the point 
along the UVH' dimension of human likeness (DHL) at which attribution of objects 
and characters to the human or nonhuman category is subject to greatest ambiguity 
(i.e., the 'valley' in Fig.1). This unpleasant state is described as marked by a sense of 
personal disquiet, strangeness and the uncanny. While the data have not yet 
provided a consistent picture in favor of this uncanny effect, this field of research is 
still in its infancy (e.g., Hanson, 2006; MacDorman, 2006). Possibly for this reason, 
almost no attention has been given to where along the DHL there is greater difficulty 
in perceptual discrimination (PD) and whether PD difficulty does relate to affective 
experience as described in the UVH (for exceptions, see Cheetham et al., 2011; 
Looser and Wheatley, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the Uncanny Valley Hypothesis. The uncanny valley hypothesis 
proposes a non-linear relationship between affective experience and physical humanlike 
realism in appearance and motion (the non-linearity is more pronounced for motion). The key 
prediction of the hypothesis is that a high degree of human likeness will evoke a sharp 
negative peak (valley) in affective experience (i.e., along the familiarity dimension). This 
valley is characterized by feelings of strangeness (and the uncanny). The valley occurs at the 
point along the dimension of human likeness at which objects are categorically most 
ambiguous (illustration from MacDorman, 2005). 
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The UVH' prediction is based on the implicit assumption that PD difficulty is 
enhanced at or near the point of greatest category ambiguity (i.e., the category 
boundary) along the DHL. This assumption conflicts with the general consensus that 
lesser rather than greater difficulty in PD is normally associated with a category 
boundary (e.g., Cheetham et al., 2011). Besides this problem, a further potential 
problem that was not addressed in recent theoretical work on the uncanny effect 
(Moore, 2012) is that there might be asymmetry in PD difficulty along the DHL such 
that PD difficulty is actually greatest for categorically unambiguous human stimuli. If 
this is the case, and assuming that the conjectured direction of the relationship 
between greater PD difficulty and more negative affective experience is correct, it 
would follow from the UVH' prediction that greater negative affect should actually be 
experienced for objects and characters at the human end of the DHL. This potential 
outcome of the UVH’ prediction would be difficult to reconcile with the available 
evidence. This indicates more positive affective experience for the human compared 
with nonhuman stimuli along the DHL (e.g. XXXX), unless of course the direction of 
the conjectured relationship between PD difficulty and affect is also incorrect.  
 
These two problems can be considered in terms of the literature on categorical 
perception (CP). CP refers to the phenomenon that the cognitive representation of 
psychological similarity space (such as along a perceptual dimension like the DHL) 
can be selectively deformed (Livingstone et al., 1998). Deformation (or warping) of 
psychological similarity space is evident when, relative to a baseline of comparison, 
physical differences between stimuli within a category are subjectively perceived to 
be more similar (i.e., less discriminable) than equally spaced physical differences 
between stimuli from two different categories that are subjectively perceived to be 
less similar (i.e., more discriminable). Many studies of CP such as for famous faces 
(Beale and Keil, 1995), unfamiliar faces (Levin and Beale 2000), facial expressions 
(Ectoff and Magee 1992) and faces of different gender (Bülthoff and Newell, 2000) 
show a relatively symmetrical pattern of perceptual discrimination performance along 
the continua, with enhanced PD performance at the category boundary (rather than 
poor PD performance as assumed in the UVH) and attenuated PD performance 
within each category. 
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Studies of CP (including those in the preceding) typically assume comparable (or 
symmetrical) category knowledge, categorization experience and processing of 
continua endpoints from which morph continua are generated. In contrast, the UVH 
was originally formulated on the basis of (informal) observation of individuals with 
little perceptual and categorization experience of humanlike robotic characters. The 
implicit assumption in the UVH that categorization experience is asymmetrical is also 
implicit in most uncanny-related studies (e.g., Yamada et al., 2013; Burleigh et al., 
2013). These typically examine participants who have everyday expertise in facial 
processing of human category exemplars (see Tanaka, 2001; Diamond & Carey, 
1977) but, by virtue of the innovative nature of avatar and robot research and design, 
comparatively little if any such experience with the subtle perceptual manipulations of 
and differences in human likeness in the nonhuman objects and characters under 
investigation. It is conceivable that these differences in categorization experience 
might influence perceptual information processing, discriminative performance 
(Goldstone, 1994; Sigala et al., 2010; Harnad, 1987; Gibson, 1991; Hall, 1991) and 
category processing along the DHL (see the neuroimaging experiment in Cheetham 
et al., 2011). Compared with discrimination performance before categorization 
training, categorization experience with novel continua based on line drawings of 
fictitious animals (Livingston et al., 1998), natural unfamiliar faces (Kikutani et al., 
2008; 2010) and faces of identical twins (Stevenage, 1998) is reflected in a reduction 
in the discriminability of within-category stimuli and an improvement in the 
discriminability of between category stimuli.  It would be consistent with such findings 
that asymmetry in perceptual and categorization experience with human compared 
with novel nonhuman objects and characters might be reflected in a corresponding 
asymmetry in PD performance along the DHL. This would mean poorer PD 
performance for within-category human stimuli (for which healthy participants have 
everyday expertise due to a history of normal social interaction) compared with better 
PD performance for within-category nonhuman stimuli (for which participants have 
comparatively little or no such everyday expertise).  
 
In the first of three experiments, we tested whether the distribution of PD difficulty 
along the DHL implicitly assumed in the UVH is correct. Considering the influence of 
categorization experience on CP and psychological similarity space reported in the 
preceding studies, we anticipated, firstly, that faces within the human category would 
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generally be more difficult to discriminate compared with those closest to or at the 
category boundary. Second, we anticipated that faces within the human category 
would generally be more difficult to discriminate compared with those within the 
nonhuman category. To examine this, we delineated the profile of PD performance 
for morphed faces drawn from morph continua representing the DHL. The continua 
were generated from avatar (i.e., computer-generated characters) and human parent 
faces. The morphed faces were presented in an ABX perceptual discrimination task 
(Liberman et al, 1957; this task is described in detail in Section 2.1.3). Campbell et al. 
(1997) used the ABX task to investigate CP along other dimensions of human 
likeness and show that this task is sensitive to perceptual processing differences 
between human and nonhuman faces. Signal detection analysis was used to assess 
discrimination sensitivity. A two-alternative forced choice categorization task 
(described in detail in Section 2.1.3) was conducted after the ABX task in order to 
define the profile of categorisation ambiguity and the location of the category 
boundary along the continua. The second experiment replicated the findings of the 
first experiment. In the second experiment, we tested the UVH' predicted relationship 
between PD difficulty and negative affective experience. In the third experiment, we 
explored the possibility that the asymmetry in PD difficulty reported in Experiments 1 
and 2 might be attributable to a differential processing bias such that different 
category and exemplar-related information is extracted from avatar and human faces, 
respectively. 
 
5.3. Experiment 5: Perceptual discrimination and forced choice 
categorization. 
 
5.3.1 Materials and Methods  
 
Participants 
 
Healthy adult volunteers (N = 49, 29 female, mean age 21.8 years; range 19 - 25 
years) with no record of neurological or psychiatric illness and no current medication 
use were recruited for the study. All study participants were students of the University 
of Zurich, native or fluent speakers of Swiss or Standard German, and consistently 
right-handed, as assessed with self-rating scales (Annett, 1970). Each participant 
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confirmed after completion of the experiment having had no previous experience 
designing or modifying computer-generated characters for example in virtual reality 
(VR) role-playing games, second life, or VR environments or using such 
environments (e.g. for psychotherapy, rehabilitation, training, e-commerce or virtual 
reality-based research) and explicitly no previous experience (e.g., in video games, 
cinema) with the kind of highly humanlike characters presented in the current study, 
with similarly humanlike characters or with manipulations of human likeness as in 
such a study. At debriefing, one participant reported uncertainty about the correct use 
of the response buttons and 3 others about the meaning of the label "avatar" in the 
forced choice categorization task. Analyses with and without the data of these four 
participants had no impact on the pattern of findings. The findings are reported on the 
basis of the complete data set.  Written informed consent was obtained before 
participation according to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. Each volunteer 
received 20 Swiss Francs for participation. The study and all procedures and consent 
forms were approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Zurich. 
 
Stimuli 
 
Morph continua were generated to represent the DHL, using the software 
Fantamorph® (Abrosoft, http://www.abrosoft.com). Eight colour photographic images 
of natural faces and 8 colour images of avatar faces were used as parent faces to 
produce 8 morph continua. The selection of continua was based on previous pilot 
testing to ensure like performance across continua (i.e. same morph position of the 
category boundary and shape of the response function). Each continuum comprised 
11 different morphed images from the avatar endpoint (number 1) to the human 
endpoint (number 11), each morph being separated by an increment of 10% in 
physical difference (see Fig, 2.B). All parent faces were male, indistinctive, presented 
with full face, frontal view, direct gaze, neutral expression and no other salient 
features such as facial hair and jewellery. Avatars were generated with the modeling 
suite Poser 7® (Smith Micro Software, http://www.smithmicro.com) for detailed 
adjustment of facial geometry and texture (e.g. age and configural cues) to closely 
match the corresponding human face. Matching aimed to minimize perception of 
biological motion due to quick successive presentation of morphs (Schultz and Pilz, 
2009) and to ensure perception of faces in the two-step procedure of the ABX as 
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having the same identity. Adobe Photoshop 7.0® (http://www.adobe.com) was used 
for image editing. Before morphing, the external features of each parent face were 
masked with an elliptic form and black background (96 dpi and 560 x 650 pixels), and 
contrast levels, overall brightness and skin tone of the parent faces of each 
continuum were adjusted to match.  
 
Design and procedure 
 
All participants were tested individually by a research assistant blind to the purpose 
and hypotheses of the study. The perceptual discrimination ABX task was conducted 
first followed by the two-alternative forced-choice categorization task. The experiment 
lasted approximately 40 min, with a short break between the discrimination and 
categorization tasks. 
 
Perceptual discrimination ABX task 
 
The UVH does not suggest how DP difficulty should be operationalised and tested. 
For this, was used the ABX discrimination task (Liberman et al., 1957; Harnad, 1987). 
This entails presentation of trials in which pairs of different face stimuli (A and B) are 
followed by a second presentation of either A or B as the target stimulus X. 
Participants are required to view all three images and respond by button press to 
indicate whether A or B is identical to (i.e., the same as) X.  A 2-step discrimination 
procedure was applied so that stimulus B differed in physical distance along the 
continuum from stimulus A by two steps (i.e., 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, etc.). To counterbalance 
the sequence of face pairs, each pair was presented four times, once in each of the 
possible combinations (i.e., AB-A, BA-B, AB-B, BA-A). Both faces of each presented 
pair were always drawn from the same continuum in which they were originally 
morphed. The presentation of face pairs was pseudo-randomized so that no trails 
using face pairs from corresponding morph positions of other continua were 
presented in sequence.  
 
Written instructions were presented on the screen before commencement of the 
experiment. Participants performed a pre-test of 5 trials (using stimuli drawn at 
random from continua that were not included in the main test) to ensure 
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comprehension of the instructions and correct use of the response buttons. The 
background on the monitor was always black. Stimuli A and B were presented for 
750ms immediately followed by stimulus X, which remained on screen until the 
response was made or till time-out at 4 s. The inter-trail interval was 1500ms. 
Response accuracy and response time (RT) were measured for each trial, including 
the practice trials. 
 
The ABX (and forced-choice classification task described in the next section) were 
conducted in a sound attenuated and light-dimmed room, and morph stimuli were 
presented on a LCD monitor (1280 x 1024 resolution, 60 Hz refresh rate), using 
Presentation® software (Version 14.1, www.neurobs.com). The stimuli (400 × 500 
pixels) were presented at a viewing distance of 62 cm. 
 
Two-alternative forced-choice categorization task 
 
The same stimuli presented in the ABX task were presented in a two-alternative 
forced-choice categorization task. This task commenced with the presentation of 
written instructions. Subsequently, participants performed a practice pre-test of 5 
trials, using the same stimuli used in the pre-trials of the ABX task. Having ensured 
task comprehension and correct use of the response buttons, the participant initiated 
testing by pressing a button. The forced-choice categorization task normally follows 
the perceptual discrimination task in order to minimize the potential influence of 
labeling on discrimination performance (Newell & Bulthoff, 2002). To minimize this 
further, the labels "avatar" and "human" were first used during task instruction for the 
forced choice task. The background on the monitor was always black. All morph 
stimuli were presented twice, individually, centrally, and in random order with the 
constraint that stimuli from corresponding morph positions of other continua were not 
presented in sequence. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation point for 
500ms (participants were required to maintain fixation), followed by a morph image 
for 750ms. The participant was asked to identify the stimulus quickly and accurately 
as either an avatar or human by pressing one of two response keys. A black screen 
with fixation point remained after presentation of the morph image until the participant 
pressed the response key, after which a blank black screen without fixation cross 
remained for 1500 ms until the next trial began.  
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All data analyses were performed using SPSS version 21.0 (http://www.ibm.com). 
MATLAB 2006b (http://www.mathworks.ch) was used to implement the Palamedes 
routines (Prins and Kingdom, 2009) for signal detection analysis of data from the 
ABX task. 
 
5.3.2. Results  
 
The response data for avatar-versus-human category judgments in the forced choice 
categorization task were analysed (Section 2.2.1) to determine the choice of 
categorically ambiguous and unambiguous morphs for use in the analyses of 
perceptual discrimination performance (Section 2.2.2). 
 
 Forced choice categorization task: Responses, logistic function, and category 
boundary  
 
The slope of the categorization response function was used to summarize the 
category judgments by fitting logistic function models to the data of each participant 
across continua. The parameter estimates derived from each model were entered in 
analyses of logistic function of categorization responses and of the category 
boundary.  
 
For the logistic function of categorization responses, the parameter estimates were 
tested against zero in a one-sample t-test. The result showed a highly significant 
logistic component (t48= 44.31, p > 0.001) consistent with the presence of a category 
boundary (Harnad, 1987) (see Fig. 2).  
 
To compute the value of the category boundary (i.e., y=.5: -ln[β0]/ln[β1]), the 
parameter estimates β0 and β1 of each participant's logistic function model were 
used. The mean category boundary value was M = 6.95. This value indicates the 
actual morph position along the continua that corresponds with the ordinate midpoint 
between the lower and upper asymptotes, that is, the point of maximum uncertainty 
of 50% in categorization judgments. Across continua, morph M7 is closest to this 
boundary (Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2.  Results of the forced choice classification task. Mean responses are depicted in 
terms of % of ‘human’ responses (A). The mean grand average (continuous blue line) across 
all continua (error bars showing standard deviation), fitted logistic curve based on the grand 
mean (black line), and the category boundary (dashed gray line) are shown. The category 
boundary indicates the point of maximum uncertainty of 50% in categorisation judgements 
along the continua. The logistic-shaped curve shows a lower and upper asymptote of avatar 
and human categorisation responses and a step-like response function consistent with the 
presence of a category boundary. Morph M7 shows the greatest categorisation ambiguity.  
 
To show this profile of high and low ambiguity in categorization judgments more 
clearly, we tested for differences in category decisions between the unambiguous 
avatar (i.e., M3, M4, M5) and human faces (i.e., M9, M10, M11) and the most 
ambiguous faces (i.e., M7). This choice of morphs permitted control for physical 
morph distance along continua between the ambiguous M7 and the unambiguous 
avatar and human faces. A one-way repeated measures of analysis of variance (RM-
ANOVA) was performed on the dependent variable mean 'categorization' response of 
each participant across continua, using the factor 'morph' position (3 levels: "M3, M4, 
M5", "M7", "M9, M10, M11"). Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to correct 
the degrees of freedom for violation of the sphericity assumption (and applied as 
appropriate in all subsequent analyses). This analysis showed a highly significant 
effect for morph position, F(1.27, 58.93) = 455.26, p < 0.001. Mean categorization 
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difficulty for M7 was M = 0.58 (SE = 0.04), while that for the human faces was M = 
94.52 (SE = 0.01) and for avatar faces M = 4.02 (SE = 0.01) (see, Fig. 3). 
 
Forced choice categorization task: Response times  
 
Differences in category ambiguity, as indicated by the logistic-shaped response 
function, are likely to be reflected in different response times (RT) for category 
judgments. Before data analysis, short RT latencies of less than 100 ms were 
excluded. RT data for long latency outliers were screened by z-standardizing and 
filtering out data points using z=3 as a cut-off score (Van Selst and Jolicoeur, 1994). 
Analyses were conducted with and without outliers. These analyses produced the 
same pattern of results. The findings are therefore reported for the complete data set. 
Confirming RT differences in category decision difficulty, a one-way RM-ANOVA with 
morph position (11 levels: M1- M11) and RT as the dependent variable showed a 
main effect for morph position, F(4.58, 215.09) = 41.23, p < 0.001.  
 
The longest response latencies would be expected to correspond with the morph 
position closest to the category boundary, that is, at M7. But inspection of the Figure 
X indicates that RT for M6 and M7 are similarly long. The tests of planned within-
subject contrasts in the preceding analysis showed no significant difference between 
M6 and M7 in RT. Given that M7 and the category boundary are so closely aligned, 
the following analysis compared ambiguity at M7 with the unambiguous avatar (i.e., 
M3, M4, M5) and human faces (i.e., M9, M10, M11), but a re-run of the same 
analysis using the aggregate mean of M6 and M7 instead of just M7 produced the 
same pattern of results. A one-way RM-ANOVA analysis with 'morph' positions (3 
levels: "M3, M4, M5", "M7", "M9, M10, M11") and RT in ms as dependent variable 
was conducted. The analysis showed a highly significant effect for morph position 
[F(2.96, 58.93) = 45.22, p < 0.001] (see Fig XX). Pre-planned contrasts showed that 
RT was longer significantly longer for human (M = 1073, SE = 44) than for avatar 
faces (M = 898, SE = 33), F(1,48) = 15.72, p > 0.001, and that RT for M7 (M = 1348, 
SD = 60) differed highly significantly from RT for the other avatar and human morph 
positions (M = 928, SD = 0.19), F(1,48) = 67.49, p < 0.001. 
 
ABX Perceptual discrimination task  
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Differences in the ability to perceptually discriminate between pairs of morphs (M6-
M8) straddling the ambiguous M7 and between pairs of unambiguous morphs within 
the avatar (M3-M5, M4-M6) and human (M8-M10, M9-M11) face categories were 
tested. This choice of avatar and human morph pairs ensured control for the physical 
morph distance along the continua between the ambiguous and unambiguous faces. 
The mean value of PD was compared in a one-way RM-ANOVA with factor morph 
position (3 levels: "M3-M5, M4-M6", “M6-M8”, "M8-M10, M9-M11") using d' as 
dependent variable (Best et al., 1981). d' is used a measure of discrimination 
performance derived from Signal Detection Theory (e.g., Macmillan and Creelman, 
2005) that takes effects of response bias (c) into account. This measure is used 
instead of the percentage of correct different responses to different pairs (Francis and 
Ciocca, 2003). A differencing model was applied to compute d' because this is 
considered to best reflect the decision strategy used in the ABX task (Hautus and 
Meng, 2001; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005; Pierce and Gilbert, 1958).  
 
This analysis showed a significant effect for morph pair position, F(2, 96) = 14.68, p < 
0.001. Tests of planned within-subject contrasts showed that PD of faces within the 
avatar category (M = 1.74, SE = 0.1) was significantly greater than that of ambiguous 
faces at the category boundary (M = 1.47, SE = 0.12) (F[1, 48] = 5.59, p = 0.022) and 
of faces within the human category (M = 1.15, SE = 0.05), F(1, 48) = 38.54, p < 
0.001. PD of ambiguous faces was significantly greater than that of faces within the 
human category, F(1, 48) = 7.5, p = 0.009. 
 
 A one-way RM-ANOVA with "morph position" (11 levels) and c as the dependent 
variable for response bias showed no significant differences for c.  
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Figure 3. Results of the ABX perceptual discrimination task. The figure depicts mean 
discrimination sensitivity d’ in the ABX perceptual discrimination task for unambiguous avatar 
and human and highly ambiguous faces. The profile of d’ shows a marked asymmetry along 
the continua, meaning that unambiguous avatar (and the ambiguous faces) are perceived as 
more dissimilar than equally spaced human faces. Contrary to the implicit assumption in the 
UVH, perceptual discrimination difficulty is thus greatest for human faces. The error bars 
indicate 1 SE (N = 49). 
 
5.3.3. Discussion 
 
The data confirm that there are differences in PD difficulty as a function of human 
likeness along the DHL. But the pattern of PD is entirely different than that implicitly 
assumed in the UVH. Firstly, and as expected on the basis of previous studies of CP, 
PD of faces at the category boundary is enhanced compared with PD of within-
category human faces. Second, PD of within-category avatars is also enhanced 
compared with PD of within-category human faces, thus supporting the suggestion 
that there might be asymmetrical PD along the DHL.  
 
Given that the UVH predicts enhanced negative affective experience as a function of 
enhanced PD difficulty, these findings would mean - assuming that the UVH is 
otherwise correct - that human faces should evoke more negative affect compared 
with ambiguous faces and unambiguous avatar faces. This is clearly inconsistent with 
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the idea that Mori sought to convey in his graphical representation of his hypothesis, 
and the available evidence from uncanny-related research suggests that enhanced 
feelings of strangeness for human category exemplars is highly unlikely. Self-ratings 
of comparably well-controlled morph continua show that positive ratings (e.g., liking, 
pleasantness) increase with greater human likeness (e.g., Looser and Wheatley, 
2011). More recently, well-validated psychophysiological and self-assessment 
measures of valence and arousal (i.e., the underlying orthogonal dimensions of 
affective experience) that are unaffected by the conceptual ambiguities surrounding 
the affective dimension of the UVH also demonstrate that positive affective 
experience increases with increasing human likeness (Cheetham et al., submitted in 
Frontiers).  
 
In a second experiment, we tested whether there is nevertheless evidence in favor of 
the UVH' prediction that enhanced PD difficulty is associated with greater negative 
affective experience.  The UVH conceptualizes affective experience as shinwakan, 
an ambiguous Japanese neologism that Mori used to describe the positive and 
negative character of affective experience of humanlike objects. There have been 
various renderings of shinwakan's meaning in uncanny-related research, including 
comfort level, familiarity, eeriness, pleasantness, likability, empathy and affinity (e.g. 
Burleigh et al., 2013; MacDorman et al., 2013; Dill et al., 2012; Mori, 2012; Tinwell et 
al., 2011; Seyama and Nagayama, 2009; Green et al., 2008; 2007; Bartneck et al., 
2007; MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006). To examine affective experience, we used an 
ad hoc self-rating scale based on the UVH' bi-polar dimension of familiarity (i.e., 
familiar vs. strange). Familiarity was selected because this rendering of shinwakan 
has been used frequently in research, it is most often used to denote the affective 
dimension of the UVH in its illustration (see Fig.1), and because it arguably best 
captures the intended meaning of shinwakan that Mori sought to convey in the UVH's 
description. Clearly, there are alternative approaches to examining affective 
experience of human like objects and characters based on well-validated dimensions 
of affective experience and measures of these (see Cheetham et al., in Frontiers). 
The aim of this experiment was to test affective experience as conceptualized in the 
UVH in relation to PD difficulty. 
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5.4. Experiment 6. Perceptual discrimination and familiarity. 
 
5.4.1. Materials and Methods  
 
The materials, methods and analyses in Experiment 2 were identical to those in 
Experiment 1, with two exceptions. Firstly, the presented morphs were drawn from 
continua that were generated anew by switching the source image (i.e., avatar) and 
destination image (i.e., human) for morphing in Experiment 1 so that the human was 
the source and the avatar the destination image. The continua were then re-
morphed, and the morphs were labeled M1 (avatar) to M11 (human) as in 
Experiment 1. The aim of re-morphing was to exclude the possibility that the strong 
asymmetry in perceptual discrimination performance in Experiment 1 was simply a 
systematic artefact of any nonlinearity in the morphing algorithm. If it was a 
systematic artefact, the PD data in Experiment 2 would show a similar pattern of PD 
along the DHL skewed however toward enhanced PD for human instead of avatar 
faces. Second, participants performed the ABX task followed this time by a self-rating 
task, in which to report feelings of familiarity, and only then by the two-alternative 
forced choice categorization task. The latter task was performed last to ensure that 
any effects in ratings were not biased by explicit processing of faces for forced 
categorization.  
 
The UVH does not suggest how DP difficulty and feelings of familiarity should be 
operationalised and tested. We used our measure of discrimination sensitivity d' to 
indicate DP performance, as applied in Experiment 1, and, in keeping with the 
favored approach to date in uncanny research, subjective ratings indicating feelings 
of familiarity in the self-rating task. The task requirements, instructions and stimulus 
presentation conditions for the self-rating task were identical to those described for 
the two-alternative forced choice categorization task in Experiment 1, with the 
exception that participants viewed and rated the subjective feeling of familiarity 
evoked by each morphed stimulus on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale ranged from 
very strange (1) to very familiar (5). To test the relationship between DP difficulty and 
feelings of familiarity, we took an inter-individual differences approach. We tested 
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whether individual variability in the ability to discriminate between a pair of morphed 
faces (e.g., M2-M4) predicts individual variability in self-rated feelings of familiarity for 
the face (e.g., M3) that the given face pair straddles. This approach assumes that 
there are stable individual differences in the relationship between familiarity ratings 
and discrimination performance.  If Mori's prediction is correct, greater PD difficulty 
should be associated with increased feelings of strangeness (i.e., with less 
familiarity). This was tested. 
 
Participants 
 
A new sample of N = 49 volunteers (34 female, mean age 21.9 years; range 19 - 31 
years) not involved in Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2.   
 
5.4.2. Results 
 
Forced choice categorization task: Responses, logistic function, and category 
boundary  
 
The parameter estimates derived from each logistic function model of each 
participant across continua were tested against zero in a one-sample t-test and 
showed, as in Experiment 1, a highly significant logistic component (t48= 27.83, p > 
0.001 (see Fig. 4). Based on the parameter estimates β0 and β1, the mean category 
boundary value was M = 6.6. Across continua, the most ambiguous face morph M6 is 
closest to this boundary. 
 
To show the effects of this profile of high and low ambiguity in categorization 
judgments more clearly, we tested for differences in category decisions between the 
unambiguous avatar (i.e., M2, M3, M4) and human faces (i.e., M8, M9, M10) and the 
most ambiguous faces (i.e., M6). Consistent with the approach in Experiment 1, the 
choice of morphs permitted control for physical morph distance along continua 
between M6 at the category boundary and the avatar and human faces. A one-way 
RM-ANOVA was performed on the dependent variable mean 'categorization' 
response of each participant across continua, using the factor 'morph' position (3 
levels: "M2, M3, M4", "M6", "M8, M9, M10"). This analysis showed a highly significant 
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effect for morph position [F(1.22, 58.52) = 483.72, p < 0.001]. Categorization difficulty 
for M6 was closest to chance level of 50% (M = 40.31; SE= 3.73), while that for the 
human faces was M = 93.58 (SE = 1.13) and for avatar faces M = 2.63 (SE =.44) 
(see, Fig. 4).  
 
 
Figure 4.  Results of the forced choice classification task. Mean responses are depicted in 
terms of % of “human” responses, with the grand average (continuous blue line) across all 
continua (with error bars showing standard deviation), the fitted logistic curve based on the 
grand mean (black line), and the category boundary (dashed gray line) to indicate the point 
of maximum uncertainty of 50% in categorisation judgements along the continua. Results 
indicate a step-like response function consistent with the presence of a category boundary. 
Morph M6 shows the greatest categorisation ambiguity. 
 
 
Forced choice categorization task: Response times  
 
We verified whether differences in category ambiguity are reflected in the RT for 
category judgments. Data were screened for outliers as in Experiment 1 and 
analyses conducted with and without these. These analyses produced the same 
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pattern of results for which reason the findings for the complete data set are reported. 
Confirming RT differences in category decision difficulty, a one-way RM-ANOVA with 
morph position (11 levels: M1-M11) and RT as the dependent variable showed a 
main effect for morph position, F(4.58, 220.22) = 39.03, p < 0.001.  
 
Inspection of the RT data indicates that the longest response latencies correspond 
with the most ambiguous morph M6. A one-way RM-ANOVA analysis with 'morph' 
positions (3 levels: 'M2, M3, M4', 'M6', 'M8, M9, M10') and RT in ms as dependent 
variable was conducted. The analysis showed a highly significant effect for morph 
position, [F(2, 96) = 54.99, p < 0.001]. Pre-planned contrasts showed that RT was 
longer significantly longer for human (M = 957, SE = 34) than for avatar faces (M 
=751, SE = 23), F(1,48) = 15.72, p > 0.001, and that RT for M6 (M = 1191, SD = 53) 
differed highly significantly from RT for the other morph positions (M = 851, SD = 
0.37), F(1,48) = 65.91, p < 0.001.  
 
ABX perceptual discrimination task  
 
An independent samples t-test (Experiment 1 versus Experiment 2) using d' for each 
morph pair position in the ABX task (i.e., pairs M1-3 through to M9-11) of each 
participant across continua as dependent variable showed that discrimination 
performance for each morph pair was not significantly different between Experiments 
1 and 2. The following results indicate also that the PD effects in Experiment 1 are 
comparable to those in Experiment 2. 
 
Given that face morph position M6 was closest to the category boundary in 
Experiment 2,  differences in the ability to perceptually discriminate between pairs of 
morphs (M5-M7) straddling the ambiguous M6 was compared with the ability to 
perceptually discriminate between unambiguous morphs within the avatar (M1-M3, 
M2-M4, M3-M5) and human (M7-M9, M8-M10, M9-M11) face categories. These 
morph pairs were selected because they straddle the morph positions M2, M3, M4, 
M6, M8, M9, M10 that were analysed in the forced choice task of Experiment 2 and 
because this choice of pairs ensures control for physical morph distance between the 
ambiguous and the unambiguous human and avatar faces. The mean value of 
discrimination sensitivity was compared in a one-way RM-ANOVA with factor morph 
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position (3 levels: "M1-M3, M2-M4, M3-M5", "M5-M7", " M7-M9, M8-M10, M9-M11") 
using d' as dependent variable.  
 
This analysis showed a significant effect for morph pair position, F(2, 96) = 16.52, p < 
0.001 (see, Fig. 5). Tests of planned within-subject contrasts showed that 
discrimination of avatar faces (M = 1.41, SE = 0.08) was significantly greater than 
that of faces within the human category (M = 0.99, SE = 0.07), F(1, 48) = 27.59, p > 
0.001. Discrimination of ambiguous faces at the category boundary (M = 1.53, SE = 
0.11) was not significantly greater than that of faces within the avatar category (M = 
1.41, SE = 0.08) (F[1, 48] = 1.11, p = 0.299), but it was significantly greater than that 
of faces within the human category (M = .99, SE = 0.07), F(1, 48) = 25.76, p < 0.001.  
 
 
Figure 5. Results of the ABX perceptual discrimination task. The figure depicts mean 
discrimination sensitivity d’ in the ABX perceptual discrimination task for unambiguous avatar 
and human and highly ambiguously faces. The profile of discrimination sensitivity replicates 
that found in the first experiment. Perceptual discrimination difficulty is greatest for human 
faces. The error bars indicate 1 SE (N = 49). 
 
It should be noted that the most ambiguous morph was M7 in Experiment 1 and M6 
in Experiment 2. This means that the choice of morph pairs for inclusion in the 
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analyses of d' in Experiment 1 is partially different than the choice in Experiment 2. 
To compare Experiments 1 and 2, the one-way RM-ANOVA in Experiment 2 was re-
run, using this time the same morph positions selected in Experiment 1, that is, M3-
M5 and M4-M6 for avatar faces, M6-M8 for the ambiguous M7, and M8-M10 and M9-
M11 for human faces. This analysis showed the same pattern of significant effects for 
morph pair position [F(2, 96) = 21.42, p < 0.001] and for the tests of planned within-
subject contrasts. The contrasts showed that PD of faces within the avatar category 
(M = 1.67, SE = 0.11) was significantly greater than that of ambiguous faces at the 
category boundary (M = 1.34, SE = 0.11) (F[1, 48] = 12.87, p = 0.001) and of faces 
within the human category (M = 0.98, SE = 0.07), F(1, 48) = 35.48, p < 0.001. PD of 
ambiguous faces was significantly greater than for faces within the human category, 
F(1, 48) = 11.26, p = 0.002.  Taken together, these analyses are consistent in 
indicating asymmetry in discrimination performance along the continua. 
 
A one-way RM ANOVA with "morph position" (11 levels) and c as the dependent 
variable for response bias showed no significant differences for c.  
 
Familiarity ratings 
 
Differences in mean familiarity ratings between the unambiguous avatar (i.e., M2, 
M3, M4) and human faces (i.e., M8, M9, M10) and the most ambiguous faces (i.e., 
M6) were tested using the same morph positions as in the analysis of the forced 
choice categorization task in Experiment 2 (Section 3.2.1). A one-way RM-ANOVA 
with the factor morph position (3 levels: 'M2, M3, M4', 'M6', 'M8, M9, M10') and the 
dependent variable familiarity rating of each participant across continua revealed a 
highly significant effect of morph position, F(1.48,70.93) = 180.61, p = < 0.001 (see 
Fig.5). Pre-planned contrasts showed a significant difference between the avatar 
morphs (M = 1.93; SE = 0.1) and M6 (M = 3; SE = 0.08) [F(1,48) = 278.67, p = < 
0.001] and between M6 and the human morphs (M = 3.68; SE = 0.07), F(1,48) = 
53.02, p = < 0.001, and between the avatar and human morphs, F(1,48) = 27.59, p = 
< 0.001. Taken together, the data indicate that familiarity ratings increase negatively 
(i.e., greater strangeness) across the three stimulus conditions with increasing 
distance from the human end of the continua. This lends no support to the UVH' 
predicted increase in negative evaluations for the most ambiguous faces. 
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Figure 6. Results of self-rating task for familiarity.  Overall, the figure illustrates a general 
increase in self-rated feelings of strangeness with decreasing human likeness from the 
human end of the continua. There is no indication of the uncanny effect predicted in the 
UVH. The error bars indicate standard errors (N = 49). 
 
Relationship between perceptual discrimination and familiarity ratings 
 
The UVH predicts a positive relationship between greater PD difficulty and greater 
subjective experience of strangeness. To test this we examined whether individual 
variability in PD for face pairs predicts individual variability in ratings of subjective 
experience for the faces that the face pairs straddle. Pearson product-moment 
correlations were conducted using the mean data of each participant across continua 
of each morph in the familiarity rating task (i.e. 'M2, M3, M4’ for avatar, M6 for 
ambiguous, and ‘M8, M9, M10' for human faces) and the morph pairs that straddled 
these faces in the ABX task (i.e. 'M1-M3, M2-M4, M3-M5' for avatar,  M5-M7 for 
ambiguous, M7-M9, M8-M10, M9-M11 for human faces). Outlier detection was 
performed before analysis by means of boxplots. This indicated 1 outlier. After 
removal, the analyses showed a highly significant (two-sided) negative correlation 
between PD performance and familiarity ratings for avatar faces (r48= -.314, p = 0.03) 
and for ambiguous faces (r48= -.494, p > 0.001). There was no significant relationship 
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between PD performance and familiarity ratings for human faces (r49= .088, p = 
0.533).   
 
5.4.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 by showing the same pattern of PD 
asymmetry, that is, enhanced perceptual discrimination for highly ambiguous faces 
and highly unambiguous nonhuman faces but attenuated discrimination for highly 
unambiguous human faces. Based on a new sample of participants and re-morphed 
continua, this pattern re-affirms that the implicit assumption in the UVH, that is, 
greater PD difficulty in the categorically most ambiguous region of the DHL, is 
incorrect. It is in this region that the UVH suggests stronger feelings of strangeness 
compared with those evoked by neighboring less ambiguous human or humanlike 
stimuli. But the data show that greater feelings of strangeness are actually reported 
for the least human faces, and that feelings of strangeness diminish with increasing 
human likeness of the facial morphs.  
 
While there is no indication of an uncanny effect, these data are based on group 
averaging. It is however possible that there are inter-individual differences in the 
relationship between familiarity and PD difficulty and that these differences reveal an 
effect consistent with Mori’s suggestion. In fact, the correlative data show a 
significant relationship between PD difficulty and feelings of familiarity, but the 
direction of this relationship is the opposite of that predicted in the UVH. Increasing 
PD difficulty is associated with more positive feelings of familiarity. Interestingly, this 
effect only applies for nonhuman and ambiguous faces. There was no significant 
relationship between PD difficulty and familiarity for human faces. Critically, this 
correlative effect was greatest for ambiguous faces. Taken together, the correlative 
data suggest, irrespective of the question of the causal direction, that the UVH' 
prediction is most likely wrong.  
 
The reason for asymmetry in perceptual discrimination performance along the 
continua is not clear. One potential explanation draws on the suggestion that human 
observers preferentially code other members of the human in-group (e.g., our human 
exemplars) differently than members of a nonhuman out-group (e.g., our highly 
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humanlike avatars) (Cheetham et al., 2013; see the other-race hypothesis, Levin, 
2000; differential processing hypothesis, Ostrom et al., 1993; other-race effect, 
Rhodes et al., 2007). This bias in coding means that individuals are tuned by 
categorization experience to detect subtle differences between other human 
individuals, thus facilitating face recognition among in-group members at the 
(individuating) exemplar level (see the feature-selection hypothesis, Lewin, 2000). In 
contrast, individuals code information in the out-group that is more relevant for 
detection of out-group members, that is, information at the category level. At the 
category level, the best cognitive processing strategy for discriminating faces would 
be to code information indicating differences in human likeness along the DHL, thus 
enhancing discrimination of out-group members (i.e., our avatars). In contrast, a 
processing strategy that is more suited to face recognition of the individual human 
category exemplars than processing differences in human likeness along the DHL is 
more likely to result in poorer discrimination performance for human faces.  
 
Face recognition among in-group members at the individuating level is more likely to 
rely on the use of configural information (Maurer et al., 2002), whereas there is 
evidence of less configural coding of out-group members (e.g., Rhodes et al., 1989; 
Fallshore & Schooler, 1995). Configural information relates to the individual 
arrangement of first- and second-order (e.g. nose-mouth distance) spatial relations 
among facial features (Rhodes, 1988). Configural processing is disrupted when faces 
are inverted instead of being presented upright (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al, 1993; Rossion, 2009). If the asymmetry in PD between 
the avatar and human faces is attributable to a greater tendency to individuate 
human category exemplars than avatar category exemplars and a bias therefore 
toward greater configural processing of human exemplars, then face inversion should 
reduce or eliminate the asymmetry. If on the other hand the asymmetry is not 
attributable to differences in configural processing, face inversion will have no impact 
on it.  Experiment 3 was performed in order to test this.  
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5.5. Experiment 7. Perceptual discrimination and differential processing 
bias 
 
5.5.1. Materials and Methods  
 
The ABX and forced choice categorization tasks were performed. The task 
requirements, instructions and stimulus presentation conditions for these tasks were 
identical to those described for the two preceding experiments, with one exception. 
The re-morphed stimuli that were presented in Experiment 2 were inverted by 
rotating them 180°. 
 
Participants 
 
A new sample of N = 25 volunteers (21 female, mean age 21 years; range 18 - 26 
years) not involved in Experiments 1 or 2 participated in Experiment 3.  
 
5.5.2. Results 
 
Forced choice categorization task: Logistic function, and category boundary 
 
The parameter estimates derived from each logistic function model of each 
participant across continua were tested against zero in a one-sample t-test and 
showed, as in Experiments 1 and 2, a highly significant logistic component (t24= 
22.29, p > 0.001) (see Fig. 7). Based on the parameter estimates β0 and β1, the 
mean category boundary value was M = 6.7. Across continua, the data show that the 
most ambiguous face morph M6 is closest to this boundary (Fig. 7).  
 
For completeness, the other analyses for the forced choice categorization task 
conducted in Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., categorization responses and RT) were 
repeated for Experiment 3. These produced the same pattern of results as 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Figure 7.  Results of the forced choice classification task for inverted faces. Mean responses 
are depicted in terms of % of “human” responses (A), with the grand average (continuous 
blue line) across all continua (with error bars showing standard deviation), the fitted logistic 
curve based on the grand mean (black line), and the category boundary (dashed gray line) to 
indicate the point of maximum uncertainty of 50% in categorisation judgements along the 
continua. Results indicate a step-like response function consistent with the presence of a 
category boundary. 
 
ABX perceptual discrimination task 
 
An independent two-sample t-test (Experiment 3 versus Experiment 2) using mean d' 
of each participant across continua as dependent variable was conducted to 
compare perceptual discrimination performance in Experiments 2 and 3; these were 
compared because these experiments used the same re-morphed continua. This 
analysis showed that discrimination performance for each of the 9 morph pairs (i.e., 
M1-3 to M9-11) was not significantly different between Experiments 2 and 3. 
Levene's test of equality of variances indicated that the group variances for each of 
the 9 morph pairs can be treated as equal. For completeness, the same analysis was 
repeated to test for differences between Experiment 3 versus Experiment 1. This 
showed a significant difference in discrimination between morph pairs M6-M8 [(t72= 
2.12, p > 0.038] (note that M7 in Experiment 1 and M6 in Experiment 3 were the most 
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ambiguous) and between the most human morph pairs M9-M11, t72= 3.5, p > 0.001. 
There were no other differences. 
 
PD performance in Experiment 3 was then tested. Given that face morph position M6 
was closest to the category boundar, differences in the ability to perceptually 
discriminate between pairs of morphs (M5-M7) straddling the ambiguous M6 was 
compared with the ability to perceptually discriminate between unambiguous morphs 
within the avatar (M1-M3, M2-M4, M3-M5) and human (M7-M9, M8-M10, M9-M11) 
face categories were tested. This choice of morph pairs was based on the preceding 
data of the forced choice task, and ensured control for the physical morph distance 
between the ambiguous and unambiguous faces. The mean value of discrimination 
sensitivity was compared in a one-way RM-ANOVA with factor morph position (3 
levels: avatar, ambiguous, human) using d' as dependent variable. This analysis 
showed a significant effect for morph pair position, F(2, 48) = 11.18, p < 0.001.  
 
Tests of planned within-subject contrasts showed the same pattern of significant 
differences in PD as in Experiment 2. PD of avatar faces (M = 1.44, SE = 0.13) was 
significantly greater than that of faces within the human category (M = 0.87, SE = 
0.11), F(1, 48) = 27.31, p > 0.001.  As in Experiment 2, discrimination sensitivity for 
ambiguous faces at the category boundary (M = 1.32, SE = 0.15) was not 
significantly greater than for faces within the avatar category, F(1, 24) =1.03, p = 
0.319, but it was significantly greater than for faces within the human category, F(1, 
24) = 9.5, p = 0.005.  
 
The data thus indicate that face inversion had no differential impact on the ability to 
discriminate between faces along the continua. 
 
A one-way RM ANOVA with "morph position" (11 levels) and c as the dependent 
variable for response bias showed no significant differences for c. 
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Figure 8. Results of the ABX perceptual discrimination task for inverted faces. This figure 
depicts that mean discrimination sensitivity d’ in the ABX perceptual discrimination task for 
inverted unambiguous avatar and human and highly ambiguously faces. The data replicate 
those of experiments 1 and 2, showing the same asymmetry in perceptual discrimination 
performance along the dimension of human likeness. Face inversion had no impact on this, 
indicating that this asymmetry is not attributable to a differential processing strategy in which 
avatars are coded at a category and human faces at an individual level. The error bars 
indicate 1 SE (N = 25). 
 
5.5.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 3 explored the possibility that the asymmetry in PD reported in 
Experiments 1 and 2 might be attributable to a differential processing bias. This bias 
suggests that participants preferentially code human-category exemplars at the 
individual level and avatar-category exemplars at the category level. The data show 
that the inversion of faces did not impact the asymmetry in PD, indicating that the 
asymmetry is not likely to be attributable to differences in configural coding and to a 
tendency to process human compared with avatar faces at an individual level.  
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5.6. General discussion 
 
The UVH conceptualizes the DHL as a linear dimension of physical similarity space. 
This space is considered to span between points representing similar objects or 
characters of various degrees of human likeness within the nonhuman category and 
a single point representing the human category (Fig.1). The problem with this 
conceptualization and, more importantly, its faithful application in uncanny studies 
and theoretical considerations (e.g., Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009; Ramey, 2005) is 
that it implicitly assumes that this space does not vary within the human category. 
The assignment of physically different morphs to the human category in the forced 
choice categorization task clearly shows that this assumption is wrong (see also e.g., 
Yamada et al., 2012, Cheetham et al., 2011; Looser and Wheatley, 2011).  
 
The advantage of considering the human end of the DHL is that this provides a basis 
of comparison for understanding how other objects and characters along the DHL are 
perceived and experienced. This approach is important for the present study. The 
UVH predicts enhanced negative affective experience as a function of enhanced PD 
difficulty and suggests that this effect occurs at the point along the DHL at which 
categorization ambiguity is greatest. The data of the first and second experiments 
confirmed that there are differences in PD performance as a function of human 
likeness. But the pattern of differences in PD is very different than that implicitly 
assumed in the UVH. Firstly, and as expected on the basis of previous studies of CP, 
PD of faces at the category boundary is enhanced compared with PD of within-
category human faces. Second, PD of within-category avatars is also enhanced 
compared with PD of within-category human faces. Together, these findings support 
the suggested asymmetry in PD along the DHL. Importantly, they show, contrary to 
the UVH, that PD difficulty is actually greatest for human faces.  
 
On the human side of the DHL’s category boundary, this finding is reflected in the 
warped profile of psychological similarity space that is typically described for CP. This 
profile is characterized by attenuated perceptual discrimination of faces within the 
human category compared with enhanced discrimination of faces close to and at the 
category boundary (e.g., Livingstone et al., 1998). In the present study, warping likely 
reflects the impact of perceptual and category learning processes over a person’s 
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history of everyday social interactive behaviour with other members of the human 
category: All participants expressly reported no previous experience with our specific 
avatar parent faces, no previous experience with similarly humanlike faces (and 
robots), and no knowledge of previous experience with human likeness-related 
manipulations of perceptual features such as those applied along our morph 
continua. In contrast, they considered the human parent faces to be of the kind that 
they might typically encounter in normal everyday situations. The impact of 
perceptual and category learning processes is that these likely lead to perceptual 
desensitization to within-category human features that are therefore perceived as 
more alike or equivalent, and to enhanced perceptual sensitivity close to and at the 
category boundary to those stimulus features that facilitate assignment of category 
membership in everyday tasks (e.g., human versus nonhuman). These features are 
therefore perceived as more distinctive (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997; Goldstone, 1994; 
Lawrence, 1949; Gibson, 1998; for an overview of acquired distinctiveness and 
acquired equivalence, see, e.g., Goldstone, 2009). In contrast to the warped profile 
on the human side of the DHL’s category boundary, there was no such difference in 
PD for unambiguous within-category avatar faces compared with the ambiguous 
faces at or closest to the category boundary. Considered in terms of the CP literature, 
participants thus appear to be perceptually desensitized to information that would 
facilitate visual discrimination of within-category human faces, while a corresponding 
desensitization is not apparent within the nonhuman category.  
 
The present study did not aim to show that PD within the nonhuman category can 
change with experience, but stimulus exposure and explicit categorization training is 
known to evoke changes in discrimination sensitivity to a range of stimuli, from simple 
line drawings of unnatural entities to perceptually complex facial stimuli (e.g., 
Livingston et al., 1997; Kikutani et al., 2008, 2010; Stevenage, 1998; Goldstone, 
Steyvers, & Rogosky, 2003; Goldstone, 1996; Levin, 1996, 2000; Schyns and 
Murphy, 1994; Gibson, 1991; Hall, 1991). If categorization training can modulate PD 
along the DHL, this might induce effects of acquired equivalence (i.e., decreased 
perceptual sensitivity for within-category faces), acquired equivalence (i.e., increased 
perceptual sensitivity for faces either side of the category boundary) or both, resulting 
therefore in a different profile of warping along the DHL than shown in the present 
study. Presumably, categorization training would primarily influence the cognitive 
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representation of the avatar side of the DHL. Training could be based, for example, 
on familiarization with avatar faces so that individuals learn to discriminate between 
these in terms of their unique features (McGugin et al., 2011; Bruyer et al., 2004). 
Alternatively, the impact of experience might be examined in designers. Animators, 
video game designers and roboticists concerned about the uncanny effect and the 
impact of their designs on subjective affect (e.g., Minato et al., 2006; Walters et al., 
2008; MacDorman et al., 2009) regularly expose themselves to a range of humanlike 
faces and actively engage in carefully crafting perceptual features related to human 
likeness. Differences between novices and experts in processing perceptual 
information has been reported for other domains of expertise, ranging from the 
diagnosis of aberrant structures in x-rays to identification of gender in chickens (e.g., 
Norman et al., 1992; Peron and Allen, 1988; Myles-Worsley et al., 1988; Biederman 
and Shiffrar, 1987; Burns and Ward, 1978). This has yet to be examined in the 
present context.  
 
In view of this asymmetry in PD, the third experiment examined whether avatars are 
preferentially coded at the category level and human faces at the exemplar level. 
This idea draws on findings relating to the other-race affect that show greater 
accuracy recognizing individual own- compared with other-race faces and show less 
configural coding of out-group members (e.g., Rhodes et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 
1989). The third experiment used inverted faces because inversion strongly 
influences efficient configural coding of spatial relations (e.g. nose-mouth distance) 
among facial features (Leder and Bruce, 2000), while its impact on processing the 
individual features is generally much weaker (e.g., Murray et al., 2000). The lack of 
an inversion effect in the present experiment suggests that PD along the DHL 
generally relies more on coding human likeness-specifying information of facial 
features such as the eyes, nose, and mouth and other features such as skin tone 
rather than on coding the spatial relationship among these features, even though 
coding configural information might enhance the accuracy of coding facial features 
(Tanaka and Farah, 1993).  
 
The potential role of these features in the reported asymmetry in PD is therefore 
worth considering in terms of the avatar-feature hypothesis (Cheetham et al., 2013). 
This hypothesis initially related to categorization performance along the DHL. It 
119 
 
suggests that participants preferentially detect perceptual information in nonhuman 
faces that is diagnostic of the nonhuman category. Assuming that it is cognitively less 
demanding to detect the presence of this diagnostic information in avatars rather 
than its absence in human faces, a categorization decision strategy based on “avatar 
versus not avatar” instead of “avatar versus human” would result in faster 
categorization decisions for avatars (see also feature asymmetry,  Triesmman and 
Gorman, 1988).  Consistent with this, the forced choice categorization data of all 
three experiments show shorter categorization response latencies for avatar 
compared with human faces, replicating the data of previous studies (Cheetham et 
al., 2013, 2011; see also Levin, 1996). It is similarly possible that participants 
preferentially detected or found it easier to detect perceptual information in 
nonhuman faces that is diagnostic of human likeness along the DHL, thus facilitating 
the asymmetric effect in PD for these faces. The absence of an inversion effect in the 
ABX task indicates that this information is not relational (i.e. based on configural 
coding). Given that inversion effects are weaker for facial features like the eyes, nose 
and mouth and absent for facial properties like facial color (Leder and Carbon, 2006), 
it is conceivable that the participants coded and processed perceptual differences 
along the DHL on the basis of facial properties such as smoothed skin texture, color 
and shading. This does not exclude a role for feature-based processing, especially 
as processing for example the general luminance properties of faces can enhance 
processing of facial features (Sergent, 1986; Schyns and Oliva, 1994; Schyns and 
Gosselin, 2003). The question is why these properties should be easier to detect in 
the avatar faces. In view of the task context of processing novel avatars and 
everyday human faces, it is possible that perceptual information indicating the novelty 
of these facial properties renders these more salient in the nonhuman regions of the 
DHL and that novelty therefore serves as a primitive perceptual feature that can 
facilitate PD within the avatar category (Levin, 2000).  
 
An alternative explanation is that visual discrimination performance might be 
facilitated by the progressive reduction in perceptual complexity of the morphs with 
increasing distance from the human end of the continua independently of experience 
and perceptual strategy. The avatar parent faces have less structural and textural 
detail than the human parent faces and it is possible that certain perceptual 
properties of the avatar morphs such as the reduced variance in shading of the 
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smoothed skin texture is in itself a readily detectable feature of these morphs that 
eases discrimination. On the other hand, if enhanced perceptual simplicity toward the 
avatar end of the continua does drive discrimination one might expect a more linear 
increase in discrimination performance as a function of morph distance from the 
human end of the continua and no indication of warping between the category 
boundary and the human side of the DHL.  
 
The UVH predicts that greater PD will evoke greater feelings of strangeness (i.e., 
feelings of less familiarity) at the point along the DHL at or near which ambiguity is 
greatest. The data of the second experiment suggest that this is wrong on two 
counts. Firstly, the analysis of familiarity ratings indicates that greater feelings of 
strangeness (i.e., feelings of less familiarity) are not reported for ambiguous faces. 
Instead, feelings of strangeness increased with increasing morph distance from the 
human end of the continua. This is consistent with the pattern reported in other 
studies in which comparably well-controlled morph continua and ad hoc measures of 
shinwakan such as measures of pleasantness have been used (e.g., Looser and 
Wheately, 2011). This is also consistent with a recent study in which well-validated 
psychophysiological and self-report measures were used to investigate the impact of 
category ambiguity on valence and arousal (Cheetham et al., submitted to Frontiers). 
Valence and arousal were used as these form the primary orthogonal dimensions of 
affective experience (Schlossberg, 1954; Russell, 1980; Russell, 2003; Yik et al., 
1999; Posner et al., 2005). Based on these dimensions, Cheetham et al.’s study 
shows no evidence to suggest any uncanny-like effect along the DHL. That study 
also applied the same familiarity scale as used in the present study, showing the 
identical profile in familiarity ratings. This finding is already discussed in detail in that 
study. But the overall implication of the present familiarity data is that more humanlike 
stimuli simply evoke more positive affective experience and are preferred over less 
humanlike stimuli. The most straightforward explanation for this relates to the mere-
exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968). This means that repeated exposure to human faces 
over a person’s history of social interaction and the often more positive affective tone 
of interaction with particular in-groups results in more positive evaluations of other in-
group members (e.g., Reis and Gable, 2003). 
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Second, the inter-individual differences approach adopted in the second experiment 
shows that there is indeed a significant relationship between familiarity and PD 
difficulty, but that the direction of this relationship is the opposite of that predicted in 
the UVH. Increasing PD difficulty is associated with more positive feelings of 
familiarity. The effect was evident for nonhuman and ambiguous faces, whereas 
there was no significant relationship between PD and feelings of familiarity for human 
faces. This correlative effect was greatest for ambiguous faces, indicating that, 
irrespective of the causal relationship between PD and feelings of familiarity, the 
UVH' prediction is most likely to be incorrect. It should be noted that the UVH does 
not suggest how DP difficulty and its affective dimension, shinwakan, should be 
operationalised. This issues has hampered uncanny-related research from the 
outset. But the approach taken in the present study to testing the relationship 
between DP and affective experience (as described in the UVH) was straightforward 
and produces strong effects, indicating that further examination of this relationship 
might be fruitful.  
 
Why greater PD difficulty should correlate with more positive self assessment of 
affect is not clear. A popular account of the uncanny effect is based on the Hedonic 
Fluency Model (Winkielman et al., 2003; see Yamada et al., 2012). This suggests 
that negative evaluations of novel or unfamiliar stimuli relate to cognitive difficulty 
extracting information needed for rapid and efficient processing. This makes sense if 
the UVH’ prediction for PD is assumed to be correct. But the present data suggest 
that this prediction is incorrect. The present PD data do however fit better with an 
alternative model of processing fluency, the Fluency Amplification Model (Albrecht 
and Carbon, 2014). This model states that processing fluency enhances the affective 
reaction that the stimulus already evokes. Assuming that the valence of a given 
stimulus is initially experienced as comparatively negative (in our case, the more 
negatively rated unambiguous avatar and ambiguous faces), individuals who 
experience greater fluency (in our case, lesser difficulty in PD) will experience the 
negative stimulus as even more negative. By the same token, greater PD difficulty 
would correlate with less negative ratings. This is consistent with the effect reported 
in the present study. This might be an interesting avenue of further investigation, 
especially as the Fluency Amplification Model is also consistent with the data 
reported in Cheetham et al. (submitted to Frontiers). 
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The ABX perceptual discrimination task is useful for testing naive participants 
because it requires no description of the specific physical dimensions along which the 
stimuli vary and participants do not need to know the category labels. One 
explanation for CP effects suggests a role for the presence of category labels (Pilling, 
Wiggett, Özgen, & Davies, 2003; Roberson & Davidoff, 2000; Kikutani et al, 2008). 
This is because within-category stimuli differ only at the exemplar level, while cross-
category stimuli differ both at the exemplar and category levels. If exemplar-level 
information and category-level information are processed in parallel so that the 
category boundary can be represented in naive participants after initial learning 
(Marsolek, 2004), category-level processing might encourage the use of labeling and 
the emergence of CP effects. This effect might be even stronger in a task with a 
strong memory component such as the ABX task (i.e., the test stimulus must be 
compared with the stored representation of the target stimuli). Considering the 
asymmetry in discrimination performance around the category boundary, a labeling 
effect is unlikely, unless labeling affected the human side of the category boundary 
only. It has however been argued that any impact of category labeling would be 
reflected in specific within-category discrimination asymmetries (Hanley and 
Roberson, 2011). There are no such asymmetries within the human or nonhuman 
categories. 
 
In summary, the data of the three experiments reject the implicit assumption 
underlying the UVH' key prediction.  The data show lesser PD difficulty for 
categorically ambiguous faces and for unambiguous avatar faces and, notably, 
greater PD difficulty for unambiguous human faces. The data indicate that this 
asymmetry in PD difficulty cannot be attributed to differences between human and 
nonhuman faces in configural coding. It is likely that perceptual differences along the 
DHL are generally processed on the basis of human likeness-related manipulations 
of facial properties such as skin texture, color and shading. Ratings of familiarity 
show that faces associated with greatest category ambiguity do not show an 
uncanny-like effect. Negatively valenced ratings increased across the tested stimulus 
conditions with increasing distance from the human end of the continua. An 
interindividual differences approach revealed that greater PD difficulty is associated 
with more positively rather than negatively valenced experience. This challenges the 
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key idea behind the UVH. This effect is strongest for ambiguous faces, suggesting 
that this effect is more consistent with the metaphor “happy valley”. These findings for 
our static faces thus indicate that both the assumed distribution of PD difficulty along 
the DHL and the predicted relationship between PD difficulty and affective 
experience (as ‘conceptualized’ in the UVH) are wrong.  
 
Clearly, it is not possible to refute the vaguely formulated non-scientific UVH in its 
current form. Our approach has been to augment the notions underlying the UVH 
with the necessary assumptions needed to render the essential features of the 
hypothesis testable. While we find no evidence in favor of these notions, our findings 
do not exclude the possibility that other well-controlled experimental paradigms and 
other methods show effects consistent with the prediction of the UVH. It should be 
noted that only male face stimuli were presented. The choice of stimuli for this study 
was not guided by the well-known depiction of Mori’s hypothesis in Figure 1, because 
we sought to ensure that perceptual discriminative, categorization and familiarity 
judgments would not be confounding by factors other than degrees of human 
likeness in the depiction (for a discussion of confounds, see Cheetham and Jancke, 
2013).  This study presented stimuli similar to those used in preceding studies 
(Cheetham et al., 2011, 2013). Given the absence of comparable investigations of 
the DHL, this approach has provided an effective means to developing a basis for 
further uncanny-related investigation. But an important element of further such study 
would be to examine whether these findings generalize to other stimuli. 
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6. General discussion 
 
On the basis of informal observation of individuals who showed signs of personal 
disquiet when presented with humanlike robots, Mori (1970) speculated about a 
phenomenon that might pose a general problem for designers of very realistic 
anthropomorphic characters and objects (e.g. robots, mannequins, or prostheses).  
This problem is expressed in the non-scientific statement referred to as the UVH 
(Popper, 1963; for bold conjecture, see Popper, 1992, 2004). Formulated as a 
question, the UVH asks what impact highly realistic non-human objects designed to 
closely simulate human appearance and behaviour have on the affective experience 
and behaviour of the human observer. The UVH presents this question in the form of 
a (visual) hyperbole (McQuarrie and Mick, 1996). This uses the exaggerated valley in 
the shape of the curve and the illustrative description of this to convey a general 
sense of the problem. While the seeming parsimony of the UVH might contribute to 
129 
 
its persuasiveness on thinking guided by the UVH (for parsimony in well-developed 
theories, see e.g. Patterson, 1986). But the UCH does not specify any details, embed 
the proposed problem in contemporary theories and knowledge, or consider the 
potential complexity of the psychological processes underlying experience of the 
proposed uncanny effect. As such the UVH represents an early stage of scientific 
enquiry (Hempel, 1945; Northrop, 1966; Poundstone, 1988). It is in this context that 
the studies of the present dissertation sought to gain insight into the meaning and 
relevance of the UVH.  
 
The main prediction of the UVH is that positive or negative affect will be evoked by 
nonhuman entities as a function of their perceived human likeness. The way in which 
human likeness is perceived along the DHL is thus critical to understanding and 
examining the UVH.  A valuable approach to examination is to use morph continua to 
represent the DHL (e.g. MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Hanson et al., 2005; 
MacDorman et al, 2008; Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; Hanson, 2006). These allow 
the relationship between fine-grained differences in humanlike appearance and 
behavioural measures of subjective perception and experience (e.g. category 
decisions, uncanny feelings) and with underlying neural processes to be examined 
(Cheetham et al., 2011). 
 
The use of morph continua to represent the DHL in a forced choice categorisation 
task enabled experiment 1 to demonstrate that physical similarity space along the 
DHL includes variation in human-like appearance within the human category. The 
UVH and its depiction focuses on physical human-like variation of nonhuman objects 
and treats human image as a general point of reference (see also Minato et al., 2006; 
Ramey (2005); Walters et al., 2008). The relevance of this finding is that it affirms the 
importance of considering differences in human likeness within the human category 
and its cognitive representation. For the present study, this is important because the 
UVH prediction deals with the ambiguities in perceptual discrimination (PD) or 
categorisation between the nonhuman and human categories that need therefore to 
be defined. Experiment 1 defined the point of greatest ambiguity as the category 
boundary. One approach to investigating the UVH is to augment the vaguely 
formulated UVH by proposing that any personal discomfort associated with 
processing human likeness is most likely to occur in response to stimuli at or near the 
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category boundary at which category decision ambiguity is greatest. Yamada et al., 
(2012) tested this proposal, flinging evidence in support of it.  
 
An alternative reading of the vaguely formulated UVH is that enhanced difficulty 
perceptually discriminating between human and humanlike characters will evoke 
negatively valenced experience. Experiment 2 was used in conjunction with the data 
of experiment 1 to test for effects of categorical perception (CP; see Harnad, 1987). 
Using a variant of the same-different discrimination task (e.g., Angelini et al., 2008), 
experiment 2 showed enhanced discriminative sensitivity for stimuli that straddle the 
category boundary. This finding is relevant for the UVH in two ways. Firstly, it shows 
that the definition of the DHL in terms of physical similarity space diverges from its 
cognitive representation in psychological similarity space. This divergence means 
that after controlling for physical differences, stimuli within certain regions of the DHL 
(i.e., the human and nonhuman categories) are perceived as more similar and stimuli 
straddling the category boundary as less similar. This is consistent with the idea that 
the cognitive representation of psychological similarity space (such as along a 
perceptual dimension like the DHL) can be selectively deformed (Livingstone et al., 
1998) and suggests that this effect applies also to the DHL. This is not unique for the 
DHL.  
 
Second, the UVH proposes that difficulty perceptually discriminating between such 
stimuli evokes negative affect. The present finding shows however that perceptually 
discrimination difficulty is in fact greatest for within category stimuli that, according to 
the UVH, should actually evoke positive affect. This suggests that the UVH might be 
incorrect. Many studies of CP such as for famous faces (Beale and Keil, 1995), 
unfamiliar faces (Levin and Beale 2000), facial expressions (Ectoff and Magee 1992) 
and faces of different gender (Bülthoff and Newell, 2000) show such effects. Interms 
of the criteria for CP (see Studdert-Kennedy et al., 1970), Experiment 1 confirms that 
the first criterion for the presence of CP is fulfilled, namely that there is a category 
boundary. Experiment 2 confirms better discrimination accuracy for pairs that cross 
the category boundary than for equidistant pairs drawn from within a category, thus 
indicating a discrimination boundary, that is, the second criterion for CP. It might be 
assumed that the third criterion is fulfilled, namely that the discrimination boundary is 
aligned with the category boundary. Critically, the perceptual discrimination task was 
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based on the use of a four-step procedure. This means that the task required 
percetual discrimination between morphs that were four steps apart along the 
continuum (i.e. the morphs 0, 4, 8, and 12 of the 13-morph contiuna). This in turn 
means that the precise profile of perceptual discrimination performance is not 
delineated. This limitation applies also to the examination of the DHL in Looser and 
Wheatly (2011) and for studies of CP effect in other dimensions of human likeness 
(based on human, cow and monkey faces) (Campbell, et al, 1997). The fourth 
criterion is that discrimination is at chance within the categories (note that this is not 
always applied, Harnad, 1987; Repp, 1984). Discrimination in this experiment was 
slightly above chance within the categories (a finer-grained delineation of perceptual 
discrimination along the DHL was conducted in Experiments 5 to 7). 
 
The use of the four-step procedure in Experiment 2 served a particular purpose. Mori 
described perceptual uncertainty (and associated uncanny experience) as occurring 
at levels of realism that correspond to the region along the DHL between the two 
positive peaks in the slope of the familiarity-human likeness relationship (see Fig. 1). 
At these peaks, objects are regarded as either nonhuman or human. In reframing 
Mori's considerations in terms of category processing, these peaks may be seen as 
reflecting degrees of human likeness at which correctly classified category instances 
(i.e. nonhuman and human) straddle the category boundary. The UVH does not 
specify how efficient classification at these peaks must be, though the identification of 
objects at each peak is clearly considered to be relatively efficient and effortless. 
Morphs 4 and 8 were tested in Experiment 1 and verified as clearly identifiable as 
nonhuman and human, respectively (for less conservative criterion indicating each 
category see e.g. Beale and Keil, 1995; Ectoff and Magee, 1992). Morph M4 was 
identified on average as an avatar in more than 85% of trials and morph M8 as a 
human in more than 85% of trials. Please note that this criterion had to apply to both 
morphs of any one continuum. Using this approach, this choice of morphs sought to 
capture a sense of category change along the DHL between nonhuman and human 
objects in accordance with Mori’s description.  
 
Experiment 3 used fMRI methodology and the same stimuli and stimulus 
presentation paradigm (pair-repetition paradigm) as used in Experiment 2 to examine 
effects of category processing on neural activity, while simultaneously controlling for 
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effects of physical change along the DHL. The aim was to recreate the stimulus 
conditions described by Mori in the UVH. Mori suggests that viewing a nonhuman 
stimulus that is initially perceived to be human evokes negative affect. To this end 
The fMRI study utilized a phenomenon called repetition suppression (RS) (e.g., Grill-
Spector et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2006, see also Saygin et al, 2011, who used the 
same procedure to examine perception of robots). Pairs of morphs were presented in 
rapid succession. The repetition in the second morph of stimulus attributes already 
presented in the first morph of a given pair leads to attenuation in activation (i.e., RS) 
in those brain region's that are sensitive to that particular attribute. This attenuation 
can be used to identify the sensitive brain regions. By experimentally manipulating 
the category of each morph of a morph pair, the effect on neural processing of 
viewing two faces drawn from within a category can be compared with the effect for 
faces of a pair that change category. The data showed that a change in category 
between morph in the avatar-to-human direction along the DHL evoked a different 
pattern of neural activity (i.e. hippocampus, amygdala, and insula) than a change in 
category in the human-to-avatar direction (i.e., putamen, head of caudate, thalamus, 
and red nucleus). At a broad level, this pattern of differences indicates that 
processing category change along the DHL is differentially impacted by the category 
of the priming (i.e., first morph of a pair). This suggests that novel avatar and 
everyday human faces represent different categorization problems for which the 
process of categorisation relies on the coding of different perceptual features. 
 
Experiment 4 considered this notion and showed that categorically unambiguous 
avatars are processed differently than ambiguous or human faces as indicated by the 
relative amount of dwell time spent extracting visual information from the eyes, nose, 
and mouth. The behavioural data support this by showing that category assignment 
of avatar faces is also much faster in comparison with the assignment of human 
faces.  Experiment 5 followed the conclusions of experiments 1-4, assuming greater 
differences perceptual discrimination performance between the nonhuman and 
human categories than Experiment 2 suggested. Experiment 5 (and 6 and 7) used a 
perceptual discrimination task (i.e. the ABX task) in which the morph distance 
between pairs of morphs was reduced to create a two-step procedure (Liberman et 
al, 1957). The aim of this was to establish clearly whether and where along the DHL 
differences in PD difficulty as a function of human likeness occur. The reason for this 
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was a further reading of the vague UVH. This reading predicts that that perceptual 
difficulty discriminating between highly realistic humanlike objects and characters and 
their human equivalent will evoke an unpleasant affective state. Critically, the degree 
of high realism at which this state should occur is conjectured to be at the point along 
the DHL at which attribution of objects and characters to the human or nonhuman 
category is subject to greatest ambiguity (i.e. at or near the category boundary). 
 
Experiments 4 and 5 confirmed that there are differences in PD difficulty as a function 
of human likeness along the DHL, but that the pattern of PD is different than 
indicated in the UVH. PD difficulty was lowest for characters at or near the category 
boundary and greatest for human faces. Experiment 5 showed that overall, negative 
affect increases with increasing distance from the human end of the DHL. Using an 
an inter-individual differences approach to examine the relationship between 
familiarity and PD difficulty, experiment 5 showed also that greater PD difficulty is 
associated with enhanced positive affect (as measured in terms of the UVH' 
dimension of familiarity). This effect was more consistent with the Fluency 
Amplification Model (Albrecht and Carbon, 2014) rather than the Hedonic Fluency 
Model of perceptual fluency that has been used to account for uncanny-like effects 
(Yamada et al., 2012). Interestingly, this effect only applies for nonhuman and 
ambiguous faces. There was no significant relationship between PD difficulty and 
familiarity for human faces. Critically, this correlative effect was greatest for 
ambiguous faces.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the experiments using well-controlled morph continua and different 
methodological approaches show that many aspects of the UVH are in need of 
revision: 1) The UVH's conceptualization of linear physical similarity space along the 
DHL diverges strongly from the nonlinear cognitive representation of the DHL, 2) 
human category exemplars vary in human-like appearance along the DHL, 3) the 
perceived direction of category change along the DHL evokes different processes or 
processing strategies during categorization of faces, 4) the underpinning pattern of 
brain regions suggest that these different processes relate to differences in  
perceptual and categorization expertise, 5) the potential impact of this is indicated in  
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differences in PD difficulty as a function of human likeness, 6) critically, this pattern is 
different than that implicitly assumed in the UVH, with greatest PD difficulty for 
human faces and least PD difficulty for ambiguous faces, 7) there is no general 
increase in negative affect (as assessed in terms of the UVH' dimension of familiarity) 
for categorically ambiguous stimuli along the DHL, 8) negative affect increases with 
increasing distance from the human end of the DHL, 9) greater PD difficulty is 
associated with enhanced positive affect (i.e., greater feelings of familiarity) instead 
of less positive affect (i.e., greater feelings of strangeness) as the UVH suggests, 
and, 10) presenting a major challenge to the UVH' prediction, the last effect was 
greatest for stimuli located at the point along the DHL at which the uncanny effect is 
predicted to occur. Taken together, the current data suggest that the UVH is most 
likely wrong in a number of pints and essentially in its main prediction. 
 
Implications and directions for future studies 
 
The UVH can be understood in its present form as representing the initial stage of 
scientific enquiry (Northrop, 1966). In part because of this, empirical support for the 
uncanny effect has been inconsistent (e.g., Hanson, 2006; MacDorman, 2006; 
Tinwell and Grimshaw, 2009; Yamada et al., 2013; MacDorman et al., 2013). This 
has lead some researchers to question how uncanny-related research should now 
best proceed (e.g., Zlotowski et al., 2013). One approach is to understand Mori’s 
visual hyperbole as serving as a useful heuristic device, rather than the object of 
research itself (as has been the case in most studies to date). As a hyperbole, this 
device makes a seemingly simply idea more easily accessible to exploratory thought 
in the face of incomplete and uncertain information about the potential problem that 
the UVH addresses. Exploratory thought requires the use of background knowledge 
from psychology and other domains of science in order to introduce to the UV 
problem known and communicable terminology, concepts, and methods, and for 
hypothesis testing a means to formulating clear definition of constructs, prediction of 
interrelationships, selection of experimental operations needed for testing, and 
provision of a framework for understanding data and a theoretical context for 
interpreting the findings (Fleck, 1979; Hempel, 1945; Northrop, 1966; Poundstone, 
1988).. For example, theory and knowledge on perceptual and category processing, 
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perceptual decision making and CP can be used, as in the studies of this thesis, to 
develop, specify and generate testable ideas, for example, in relation to perceptual 
discrimination (Cheetham et al., 2011), or, for example, in relation to effects of high 
and low visual spatial frequency (Cheetham et al., 2013), effects of exposure duration 
and asymmetry in perceptual and category knowledge and experience, personality 
traits, priming (Cheetham et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2011), or the true relevance of 
the Hedonic Fluency Model (Winkielman et al., 2003) for understanding uncanny-
related effects.  
 
The use of our ad hoc developed familiarity scale for assessing the UVH dimension 
of familiarity in Study C served the purpose of examining the conjectures of the UVH 
in terms that approximate most closely to the essence of the UVH itself. But, clearly, 
the UVH' ambiguous definition of the concept shinwakan and researchers' efforts to 
explicate what shinwakan might mean need to be superseded by the application of 
psychologically well-validated components of affective experience. In relation to the 
UVH, this application might entail considering affective experience along the DHL in 
terms of the constructs valence and arousal (e.g., Lang, et al., 1997). These 
constructs are intrinsic to all of Mori's illustrative examples of the uncanny effect (see 
Davitz, 1969), to the affective dimensions (e.g. likeability, pleasantness, familiarity) so 
often used to examine the uncanny effect (e.g., Green et al., 2008; Seyama and 
Nagayama, 2009, 2007; Dill et al., 2012; MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Tinwell and 
Grimshaw 2009; Bartneck et al., 2007; Tinwell et al., 2011; Burleigh et al., 2013; 
MacDorman et al., 2013), and to all of the early theoretical accounts of uncanny 
experience (e.g. MacDorman, 2005).   
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